Thinking the End in Itself: a Critical Study of First Principles in Plato, Aristotle, the Bible, and Kant by Khimji, Mohamed
 
THINKING THE END IN ITSELF: A CRITICAL STUDY OF FIRST PRINCIPLES IN 
PLATO, ARISTOTLE, THE BIBLE, AND KANT 
 
 
 
MOHAMED KHIMJI 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 
YORK UNIVERSITY 
TORONTO, ONTARIO 
 
 
 
APRIL 2014 
 
 
 
© Mohamed Khimji, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
Dissertation Abstract 
 
 
 
What is truth?  What is untruth?  Or is there no truth or untruth?  Is the mind 
trapped, as Hume concludes, between false reason and no reason?  In my 
dissertation I show that Hume’s conclusion is inevitable only when we reduce 
moral reason, founded on the biblical ideal of love, to the law of contradiction and 
sense perception, the twin engines of ancient Greek teleology.  
To defend the above, I argue that there is no consciousness of either truth 
or untruth in ancient Greek thought.  That is why its two greatest expositors, Plato 
and Aristotle, teach that human beings are ignorant of the end in itself, the highest 
good (or telos) that all men seek.  For the end is, in itself, not relative (related) to 
consciousness which is not (the) good but to appearance only.  The ancient 
Greeks, I show, have no alternative but to employ deductive logic and inductive 
logic as the indemonstrable bases of demonstration.  This leads them into 
inescapable contradictions.  
Kant demonstrates that sense perception and logic are each worthless 
unless they serve moral ends.  This insight, he shows, is biblical.  “Christianity” 
reveals that the truth cannot be thought except as existing and cannot exist except 
in thought.  For the “categorical imperative” to love your neighbor (the stranger, 
your friend, your enemy …) as yourself by treating her as you would want her to 
treat you, i.e., always as an end and never as a means, is a priori.  This means, 
Kant sees, that there is no possibility even of thinking of anything that is absolutely 
good, in the world or out of it, except a good will.  
 iii 
In the dissertation that follows I distinguish between two incommensurable 
ontologies: the ancient Greek, in which human beings are ignorant of the end in 
itself, and the biblical, in which the moral will is the end in itself.  I show that to 
conflate these standpoints is to conflate reason with logic and sense, bad will (evil) 
with ignorance, and, in so doing, to create the contradictions that necessarily follow 
whenever we seek the truth in things that we cannot will.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
  In this dissertation I shall examine the first principles of Plato and Aristotle 
(Chapter 2), the Bible (Chapter 3), and Kant (Chapter 4) in order to defend the 
general thesis that modern ideas and values rest on the moral and ontological 
foundation of the Bible, i.e., the golden rule that human beings are, and must be 
respected as, ends and beginnings in themselves.  Modern thought is not 
grounded in ancient pagan teleology, where, I shall argue, human beings are not 
ends or beginnings in themselves and, therefore, do not regard themselves as 
such.  To fulfill this project, I shall examine the fundamental structure of ancient 
pagan teleology through the lenses of its two leading expositors, Plato and 
Aristotle.1  I shall show that Aristotle, notwithstanding his critique of Plato, 
undertakes to demonstrate, like Plato, on the bases of the principle of contradiction 
and sense perception, both of which, I maintain, are the pillars of ancient teleology, 
that human beings are not ends in themselves but are, rather, for the sake of an 
end.  In the metaphysics of both Plato and Aristotle, it is impossible for human 
beings either to think their existence or to exist in their thought because thought is 
an appearance that is relative to the individual and is not in itself, whereas 
existence is understood to be in itself and is not an appearance that is relative to 
thought.  At the same time, for Plato and Aristotle, thought and existence (human 
beings and the end in itself) are dependent on each other despite their necessary 
                                            
1 Providing a sustained defense of the connection between Plato and Aristotle and other ancient 
teleological thinkers, e.g., in the ancient Mesopotamian, Indian, Chinese, Greek, and Roman 
traditions, would take me far beyond my present purposes in the present study.  Thus, I have 
chosen to limit my comments to noting the essential features of this connection, as required. 
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opposition.  Plato holds that the principle of contradiction necessitates that 
appearances have an essence in order to appear, i.e., that the essence is of 
appearances, while he also insists that this essence is separate from appearances 
because it is not itself an appearance.  Similarly, Aristotle argues that all actions, 
choices, and movements must aim at a final and complete end that is itself 
unmoved.  Otherwise, actions, choices, and movements have no end (purpose, 
reason, or fulfillment).  The end in itself is central to the definitions of actions, 
choices, and movements but is defined in opposition to actions, choices, and 
movements.  For both Plato and Aristotle, then, the essence of appearances, i.e., 
the end in itself, is opposed to its appearances while, at the same time, it is not 
knowable except through them.  Thus, I shall argue that Plato and Aristotle depict 
human beings as dependent on appearances, which, qua appearances, cannot 
exist, in order to think existence that, qua existence, cannot appear.  This means 
that human beings are dependent on reproducing contradictions in their thought 
when they try to escape from the contradictions of their thought by way of the 
principle of contradiction.  
In light of the above, I shall show that biblical thought is fundamentally to be 
distinguished from the teleology of the ancient Greeks, i.e., that it is not 
teleological, because human beings are regarded as free ends (beginnings) in 
themselves.  In the “Old” and “New” Testaments,2 the biblical peoples, by whom I 
                                            
2 Throughout this dissertation I use the common expressions “Old Testament” and “New 
Testament” to refer to the Hebrew Bible and the second part of the Christian Bible, respectively.  By 
these terms I do not mean, or want to imply that, the Old Testament has either greater or lesser 
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mean the ancient Israelites3 and early Christians, are conscious of their freedom 
and so of their fundamental moral obligation to treat all persons as ends in 
themselves and not as means to a higher end.  For they comprehend that their 
most important duty is to love God above all others, the God whose highest 
commandment is to love your neighbor as yourself and so to treat her4 as you 
would want her to treat you, simply because she is human and has dignity.  This 
moral law does not exist in ancient teleology, where the notion of right is an 
appearance that is determined on the basis of nature, i.e., personal preference, 
self-interest, power, rank, or birth.  I shall argue that what the golden rule of biblical 
morality expresses is the ontologically and morally necessary relationship between 
thought and existence.  To think the moral law is to exist as an end and not as a 
contradictory appearance of nature, and to exist as an end entails the obligation to 
think the moral law.  To think and to exist as a beginning and as an end, and not as 
a means to an end, is to be responsible for treating oneself and, equally, others, as 
such, because the dignity of all persons is justified on the same ground.  I shall 
argue, then, that what the Bible demonstrates is that a higher end than a moral life, 
i.e., an end that is outside of or apart from the necessary relationship between 
thought and existence, is inconceivable.  Or again: the Bible teaches that the 
                                                                                                                                     
significance than the New Testament but only that it precedes the New Testament in time.  When I 
speak of “the Bible” in general, I mean the Old and New Testaments taken together.     
3 I include the Jews in the designation “ancient Israelites.”  For the technical differences between 
these two terms, see Harold Bloom’s The Book of J (translated by David Rosenberg.  New York: 
Random House, Inc., 1990), pp. 3-5.  
4 I have used masculine and feminine pronouns interchangeably throughout this dissertation when 
referring to the individual human being in general, i.e., irrespective of his or her gender, in order to 
facilitate ease of expression. 
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fulfillment of the necessary relationship between thought and existence, i.e., the 
end in itself, is and must be the moral life. 
It is on the basis of this biblical insight that Kant explores in his 
transcendental (or “critical”) philosophy the issue of how necessary existence, as 
found in the synthetic a priori propositions of scientific and moral reason, is 
possible.  He demonstrates that scientific knowledge (of causally determined 
objects in nature) and morality (in human relationships) presuppose 
“transcendental conditions” that lie outside the limits of formal (Aristotelian) logic 
and sense perception and, therefore, I shall argue, outside of pagan teleology.  He 
shows that there can be no science or morality without the idea of freedom, which 
expresses the necessary relationship between thought and existence to be the end 
in itself.  For, Kant argues, both logic and sense perception are empty and blind, 
i.e., contradictory, when taken as the principal instruments of, or sufficient 
conditions for, truth.  The person who employs the law of contradiction as a first 
principle for demonstration cannot demonstrate that her premises are true – for the 
needle in the compass of logic points in the direction of natural preference which, 
because relative to the individual, points in all directions; and the person who relies 
on outer sense cannot demonstrate that what appears must be as it appears and 
not otherwise.  It is for this reason that Kant makes central to his project the 
critique of the nature and limits of logic and sense experience from the standpoint 
of “pure reason,” i.e., the consciousness of being an end.  For, he shows, it is only 
insofar as human reason distinguishes between formal logic and sense 
experience, and then between itself and these modes of cognition, that we can 
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establish that when we trespass beyond the fixed boundaries of logic, experience, 
and/or reason, we confuse means and ends and contradict both ourselves and one 
another to our individual and collective detriment.  The insight that we can express 
ourselves as ends and live up to what it means to be human only insofar as we 
ground our judgments in the necessary relationship between thought and 
existence, i.e., in the idea of freedom, and, therefore, in the moral law, is, I argue, 
equivalent to the recognition that Kant’s critical revolution, which shows necessary 
existence in modernity to be inconceivable on the basis of logic and sense, rests 
on a biblical foundation. 
The structure of this dissertation is as follows.  In Chapter 2, “Ancient Greek 
Metaphysics: the End in Itself in Plato and Aristotle,” I shall show that, in the 
writings of both Plato and Aristotle, thought contradicts existence.  Human beings 
cannot think their divine, immortal, undifferentiated, and unchanging end (form or 
telos) because it exists in itself.  Yet, this end in itself constitutes their essence, 
definition, or soul; it is their goal, reason, and principle, what Aristotle calls the 
“unmoved mover” of all action, choice, and movement.  According to both 
philosophers the essence or end of changing things cannot itself change or else 
changing things would have no essence or end and nothing could exist or appear, 
be or become, which is absurd.  I thus characterize the “relationship” between 
thought and existence as found in Plato and Aristotle to be between “inseparable 
contradictories” or “dependent opposites.”  Since existence is opposed to 
appearance while, at the same time, it is what appearances are in themselves, it is, 
in principle, impossible for human beings to attain the end for which they strive.  
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For existence cannot be thought and thought cannot exist.  There can be no 
relationship between thought and existence because human beings are not viewed 
as ends, or beginnings, in themselves.  
Since the end in itself as depicted in Plato and Aristotle – and, I argue, in 
ancient Greek teleology in general – is simultaneously opposed to and identical 
with its appearances, the notion that the human being “is” identical with the end in 
itself bears no relationship to the biblical and critical conception of human beings 
as ends in themselves, in which the necessary relationship between thought and 
existence is constituted by the power of human beings to will their existence on 
moral grounds.  In ancient Greek epic poetry, tragedy, philosophy, and history, 
human beings are ignorant of what things are in themselves and have no power 
over fate, the gods, nature, and so over the ultimate beginning and end of their 
own lives.  For this reason, the formal identity of the human being with his soul 
restates the inexorable opposition between them, i.e., that human beings are 
means and not ends.  What follows from the ontological opposition between, and 
identity of, thought and existence is, first, that the content of thought is limited to 
contradictory appearances, i.e., to inner and outer perceptions, and, second, that 
one cannot judge these appearances from a position of being independent of them 
except through the purely formal operation of the mind, i.e., the principle of 
contradiction.  Aristotle indicates that human beings must begin and end with what 
is familiar, i.e., with the “facts of perception.”  He observes, however, that these 
facts are the opposite of the end in itself, an end that, more than anything else, is 
man.  Because the human being is ignorant of that at which he aims, his judgments 
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about it are merely logical (formal) and lead to contradiction.  For what is (to him) is 
not (to those who oppose him).  Kant shows that the highest success of logical 
judgment is freedom from contradiction with itself; logic cannot avoid falling into 
contradiction with the judgments of others.     
It is because Aristotle sees that perception cannot supply necessity that he 
upholds the law of contradiction, together with its variant formulations, the laws of 
identity and the excluded middle, to be the most certain and indisputable principle 
for demonstration.  He notes, however, that the law of contradiction is itself 
indemonstrable.  His position is not that there is no demonstration of this principle 
outside of this principle because it is a necessary presupposition for demonstration.  
Rather, his position is that it is not possible to explain why the principle of 
contradiction is the first principle for demonstration without being carried away in 
an infinite regress in which there can be no demonstration at all.  In the former 
case, the principle of contradiction is a necessary condition for demonstration.  In 
the latter case, it is the basis, i.e., the sufficient condition or instrument, for 
demonstration.  On the one hand, it must be the sufficient condition for 
demonstration because the facts of perception cannot demonstrate anything.  On 
the other hand, human beings must begin with the familiar facts to establish the 
premises of their thought.  Otherwise, the law of contradiction leads to 
contradiction with the available facts.  
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In the Apology, Plato’s Socrates5 proclaims on the divine authority of Apollo 
that the one thing that he knows is that he knows nothing at all.  It is for this 
reason, he argues, that Apollo has declared that he (Socrates) is the wisest of all 
men.  When Socrates positions himself as a good example for others because he – 
unlike even the greatest politicians, poets, and craftsmen – recognizes that all 
examples of the good in itself are worthless; when he teaches that no human 
being, including himself, can have anything worthwhile to teach because human 
wisdom is opinion, not knowledge, and has no valid currency; and when he 
demonstrates that the highest task of a living man is to train for death, but that 
death is a mere episode in the unending metamorphoses of appearances, an 
episode that leads back to life; in these cases, his speech is at once consistent and 
contradictory.  That is, he is consistent with the ontological contradiction between 
thought and existence, a contradiction that expresses the limit of human wisdom to 
be “knowledge” that one is ignorant, but not what one is ignorant of.  This 
consciousness is shared among the Homeric heroes and is celebrated in Greek 
tragedy.    
For Plato, the highest object of love is the end in itself that alone is the 
source of all value.  It is loved because it is in itself, i.e., because human beings 
cannot comprehend what they love.  Socrates demonstrates on this basis that one 
cannot possess what one loves or love what one possesses.  For one to love, to 
desire, to search for the end entails that one cannot find it; if one could find it, it 
                                            
5 In this dissertation I make no distinction between the position of Socrates and the position of Plato 
or between Socrates and Plato. 
 9 
would be an appearance and not the unchanging and immortal object that one 
desires.  Thus, the end in itself is loved because it does not relate to anything 
(there is nothing that can relate to it) and because it cannot be thought (thought 
does not exist).  Hence, we see that the reason that Socrates seeks knowledge 
(“of” form) is that it is impossible for him to attain it; his search is motivated by his 
consciousness that he is in contradiction with what he searches for.  It is because 
the end in itself transcends the contradictory appearances of consciousness that, 
on the one hand, it is sought but that, on the other hand, it cannot be found.  
I shall argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Aristotle’s teleology 
is fundamentally indistinguishable from Plato’s teleology.  For Aristotle, like Plato, 
argues on the basis of three axiomatic principles: (1) the ontological opposition 
between, and identity of, thought and existence; (2) the formal logic of 
contradiction; and (3) sense perception.  These three engines, I hold, are what 
drive the train of ancient teleological thought in general along a closed circular 
track.  Since thought and existence are dependent contradictories, to speak about 
one is to be contradicted by the other.  Aristotle points out the contradictions of 
Plato in much the same way as Plato points out the contradictions of Socrates and 
his opponents.  He sees, for example, that, if form cannot relate to particular 
things, then it cannot be the essence of particular things and that, if it is the 
essence of particular things, then it must be subject to the same reversals as the 
particulars.  He sees, as Plato sees, that the opposition between thought and 
existence leads to contradiction; but he, like Plato, is not able to overcome the 
contradictions that he sees because in his own teleological system the 
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consciousness of contradiction is itself contradictory.  His “seeing” thus expresses 
his blindness and ignorance.  
Aristotle defines the unmoved mover that is the final, complete, self-
sufficient end of, and reason for, all action, choice, and movement as thought 
thinking itself – thinking thinking thinking – a notion that does not admit of any 
relationship among the subject, the subject’s thought, and the object of thought, all 
of which are indistinguishable.  The end in itself cannot be an object of thought.  
Further, since the reason that things are done is the same as that for the sake of 
which they are to be done, it is not possible for one to choose one’s final end or to 
deliberate correctly about how to attain it.  Rather, it is an object of wish, loved for 
its own sake, i.e., “without qualification” and not for how it appears.  In Aristotle, as 
in Plato, human beings aim at an end that they can neither conceive nor conceive 
being without.  Thus, thought is dependent on being contradicted by the end that 
cannot appear in order to avoid being contradicted by appearances that have no 
end.  The ontological contradiction between thought and existence in both Plato 
and Aristotle leads to a total dependence on the law of contradiction that shows 
that all things both are and are not at one and the same time.  Hence, teleological 
thought is trapped in the excluded middle and discloses logic itself to be a 
contradictory appearance.    
In Chapter 3, “Why Biblical Metaphysics is Not Teleological: an Examination 
of Core Biblical Ideas,” I shall argue that the Bible is a polemic directed against 
pagan teleology from a standpoint that is free of necessary contradiction.  I 
maintain that, in the Bible, treating oneself and others with dignity, i.e., as ends and 
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not as means to an end, fulfills the covenant between human beings and God in 
totality.  For the biblical basis of truth is neither the law of contradiction nor the 
appearances of nature but love, a love that is comprehended not as natural feeling 
but as moral will.  I shall argue for this position by examining the meaning of love, 
sin, idolatry, repentance, creation, God, covenant, miracle, eternity, the 
resurrection of the dead, and the kingdom of God as found in the Old and New 
Testaments.  None of these concepts is teleological or found in ancient teleological 
systems of thought. 
The consciousness that human beings are divine ends, i.e., the image of 
God, is the fount of Jewish and Christian morality.  The command that you must 
love your neighbor as yourself, even if she is a stranger to you, is defended by the 
Hebrew prophets who teach that social justice, not ritual observance, is the 
essential concern of the Law.  Knowledge of God is not expressed in bowing one’s 
head but in the serious and committed effort to be faithful to oneself and others in 
everything that one does. 
Jesus teaches that the two greatest commandments of the Law and the 
Prophets are love of God and love of neighbor and that each is “like” the other. (In 
the Gospels, the “neighbor” includes not only the friend and the stranger but also 
the enemy.)  He “sums up” the connection between love of God and love of 
neighbor in the golden rule: in everything that you do, relate to others as you would 
want them to relate to you.  Paul teaches the same: he writes that all of the 
commandments in the Law are “summed up” in the principle of love of neighbor; 
love is the criterion for faith and, he proclaims, is sufficient to fulfill the Law.  I shall 
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argue, then, that, in both the Old and New Testaments, human beings are 
envisioned to be ends in themselves from a perspective that is inconceivable 
through the categories of ancient teleology.  In ancient teleology love in human 
relationships is a natural appearance that is fundamentally indistinguishable from 
hatred; for it expresses one’s opposition to the end in itself, an end that cannot be 
shared and in relation to which everyone is a means.  The biblical idea of love is 
completely different.  It is not determined by natural feeling (in terms of which there 
is no clear or sustainable difference between friends and enemies) and it 
constitutes a critique of the view that the law of contradiction (according to which 
enemies are not loved) is a sufficient ground for the discovery of truth.  
At first glance, many of the biblical narratives, both Jewish and Christian, 
might appear to resemble myths that are common to the Babylonians, Greeks, 
Romans, and other neighboring populations.  However, the fact that these 
narratives, when viewed within the framework of biblical thought as a whole, are 
enveloped by, and subsumed under, a constellation of ideas that expresses the 
necessary relationship between thought and existence suggests that the biblical 
authors and editors self-consciously appropriated these myths in order to express 
their independence from them.  Indeed, the Bible itself counsels against a purely 
literal, i.e., unspiritual, reading of its narratives.  For not only does it interpret and 
critique itself but its attack on pagan teleology is also an attack on the conflation of 
pagan teleology and biblical morality, i.e., on idolatry.  To be sure, the most 
important issue is not what particular stylistic devices the authors use to 
communicate their ideas but, rather, what the content is of the ideas they 
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communicate.  The facts that the biblical authors and editors interweave 
teleological narratives with values that are not teleological and that the golden rule 
is regarded as the highest principle of truth and interpretation indicates, again, that 
biblical myth is an appropriation, and not an imitation, of pagan myth and is unlike, 
for example, Roman myth, which is an imitation, and not an independent 
appropriation, of Greek myth.  The strategy of appropriating pagan myths in order 
to subvert a literal reading of them reveals in and through this transformative 
process that an authoritative consciousness hovers above (and beneath) the 
surface of the uncreated and uncreative letter to which it gives meaning and 
through which it communicates meaning.  
When I examine the idea of sin, I shall argue that it is only from the biblical 
perspective of moral truth that evil is revealed to be sin – against oneself, others, 
and God.  What distinguishes the biblical conception of evil from the teleological 
conception of evil is that, in the teleological conception, evil is ignorance of the 
good in itself (and is thus both identical with and opposed to what is good relative 
to the individual), whereas, in the biblical conception, evil is the willful evasion of 
moral responsibility.  In ancient teleology there is no sin because there is no idea of 
freedom as moral obligation; the inevitable consequence is that people treat one 
another as means and not ends.  It is in the Bible that we find the paradox that, 
while there is no sin without freedom – for without freedom there is no perversion 
of freedom – sin manifests lack of freedom, i.e., freedom turned against itself.  It is 
not ignorance but the refusal to acknowledge sin under the pretense of ignorance, 
or under the pretense of a concept of morality one knows in one’s heart is not 
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moral, that is in the Bible called the sin against the spirit.  It is the one type of sin 
that cannot be forgiven because the sinner here chooses not to acknowledge that 
there is any wrong to forgive and so not to repent for her sin.  From the biblical 
standpoint, true freedom is expressed in one’s commitment to atone for one’s sins 
through repentance.    
The strident call to repent charges the individual as wholly responsible for 
her sins because she has chosen them.  To repent is to acknowledge that no one 
except oneself is to blame for the immoral choices that one has made.  This 
acknowledgment demands sincere remorse of the kind that leads to a fundamental 
change in how one thinks and lives such that one demonstrates that one has 
learned from one’s mistakes, has taken the required steps to repair the wrong as 
far as is possible, and has become a better person as a result.  Here, the sins of 
the past are not taken to be a determining ground for the will and, therefore, for the 
future.  The future is not a blind, karmic effect; rather, it must be created anew 
through the power of freedom.  
In my analysis of the biblical idea of creation I indicate that the two accounts 
of the creation of the world with which Genesis opens contradict both themselves 
and one another explicitly at the surface of the literal narrative.  I argue, however, 
that when we read these accounts closely in relation to each other and in light of 
the ethics of interpretation that I show is developed in the Bible as a whole, we are 
then able to see that they do not refer to a time of cosmological beginnings that 
cannot be thought.  Rather, what these accounts teach is that human beings are 
free, knowing good and evil, and are, therefore, responsible for the creation of the 
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world at each and every moment.  In fact, it is because the human being is not an 
effect of inner or outer natural or supernatural causes but is, rather, intimately 
involved in creating the world through the choices that he makes, that he is 
exalted, in both Genesis 1 and 3, as the image and likeness of God.  This position 
is supported by the creation account in the Gospel of John, in which the God that 
creates all things is the “Word.”  The Word, the consciousness of the Word, is that 
through which all things have come into being.  I argue that the consciousness of 
the Word/God is the essential spirit of the Ten Commandments: it is the Ten 
Words, the tenfold word that commands love of God and love of the neighbor and 
that Jesus and Paul crystallize in the golden rule which, they claim, sums up the 
Law and the Prophets.  (The boldest expression of the connection between [the 
Word] God and love is in 1 John: “God is love.”)  I take the position, then, that what 
the creation accounts communicate is, first, that all things come into existence 
through human beings who are aware of themselves and one another as the true 
light of the world, i.e., as beginnings and ends in themselves, and who, therefore, 
are aware that nature is not a beginning and end in itself, i.e., a creator.  I shall 
argue that it is human beings who must create all things in nature at each and 
every moment by giving a meaning to them that is consistent with, and that 
supports, human dignity.  Second, the creation accounts reveal (communicate) 
that, because those who do not know God have no knowledge of good and evil, 
pagan contradiction is not sin, evil, untruth, or even error.  Rather, it is the empty, 
dark, and formless void of teleological consciousness in which, to repeat, the 
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appearances of evil are indistinguishable from the appearances of the good 
because all appearances are opposed to the good in itself.  
The fact that the biblical authors conceive of themselves as having the 
authority, right, and, indeed, the obligation, to proclaim the standpoint of God 
demonstrates quite decisively that they do not think of God as a cosmological 
beginning and/or teleological end.  It is because the idea of God is inseparable 
from the consciousness that moral life in this world is the highest good that the 
command to worship God is so often coupled with an excoriation of natural and 
supernatural idols, all of which, the Bible shows, impugn human dignity.  I shall 
argue that the idea of God in the Bible expresses the maturing vision that human 
beings have of their own existence as ends and not means.  God is not an 
immortal and unchanging substance but an idea whose content is revealed through 
metaphors, metaphors that express the manner in which the biblical people 
understand, represent, and struggle to come to terms with the truth of their own 
lives.  True, God is an ideal to which no human being is equal; but the relationship 
between God and human beings is not hierarchical but covenantal.  God and 
human beings are subject to the same moral standard.  The story of this 
covenantal relationship, a relationship that is described variously as a marital bond, 
as the bond between parent and child, and as the bond between friends, is the 
story of how human beings see and judge themselves from a standpoint that 
transcends formal logic and nature.  It communicates that the self-consciousness 
of the necessary relationship between thought and existence is the cradle of true 
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life and that the biblical people are free from the fatal contradictions of pagan 
teleology, a freedom that the Bible depicts as a miracle. 
I shall argue that the stories of miracles in the Bible are metaphors that 
communicate and affirm the power of love and that they do not imply or refer to a 
supernatural power that can effect impossible outcomes in nature.  The miracle of 
the resurrection from the dead is no exception.  I shall attempt to reconcile Paul’s 
remarkable claim in 1 Corinthians 15 that, if there is no resurrection of the dead, 
then faith is futile, with his fundamental teaching that love is the sole criterion of 
faith.  I note instances in his other epistles in which Paul works with a metaphorical 
idea of death (which he connects to sin) and contrasts it with true life as the 
righteous life that overcomes death through repentance.  I examine what it means 
for Paul to bind the idea of resurrection from the dead to the consciousness that all 
human beings must die and, also, to the idea, the ideal, of the kingdom of God in 
which death will be destroyed when moral life, i.e., love for self, others, and God, is 
universal.  
In discussing the resurrection, Paul describes the kingdom of God as the 
world in which human beings are not dead but, rather, alive in Christ, such that 
“God is all in all.”  In and through this vision Paul depicts a kingdom of ends that 
both he and Jesus, not to mention the Book of Revelation, speak of as a world that 
is beyond, although near to, the world that surrounds them.  It is not of the world 
under Roman occupation in which the Jews who hungered and thirsted for 
righteousness, the peacemakers, were persecuted by the Romans who viewed 
them within their social hierarchy as meek, poor, foolish, and weak.  The Gospels 
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describes life in the kingdom of God as “eternal” not because it is everlasting but 
because it transcends the world in which birth, rank, honor, and natural power 
define who and what a person is.  Eternal life expresses moral life to be without a 
teleological end because it is an end in itself.  It resurfaces as a postulate of moral 
reason in Kant’s daring discussion of “immortality” as the necessary relationship 
between freedom and God.    
 Once I have shown in Chapter 2 that the first principle of ancient Greek 
teleology is that human beings are not beginnings and ends in themselves and 
that, therefore, the mind is dependent on formal logic and natural perception, both 
of which, when taken as sufficient conditions for truth, lead to contradiction; and 
once I have shown in Chapter 3 that biblical thought is not only not teleological but 
is also opposed to pagan teleology, and this because its core ideas are rooted in 
the consciousness that human beings are ends in themselves and are, therefore, 
obligated to will their existence on moral grounds; I shall then proceed to argue in 
Chapter 4, “Kant’s Critical Revolution: Human Beings are Ends in Themselves,” 
that necessary existence in what Kant calls the “theoretical” (scientific) and the 
“practical” (moral) realms is grounded on the biblical (“Christian”) idea of freedom 
and its moral and ontological presuppositions, and not on the formal logic of 
contradiction and/or natural perception.   
 Kant declares that the fundamental purpose of his critical project is once 
and for all to place metaphysics on a secure path by demonstrating that the key to 
the solution of all metaphysical problems, theoretical and practical, is the power of 
human beings to think (will) their existence.  He sees that tradition of metaphysics 
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has, for the most part, followed the path of ancient teleology in depending on sense 
perception and logic as the principal instruments for their investigations.  The result 
is that metaphysics has become a “dialectical” battleground of “mock” combats, 
i.e., it is contradictory, and that metaphysicians are either unable to detect the 
errors for which they are themselves responsible or, alternatively, they are 
unwilling to account for and address these errors, choosing instead to rest content 
in exposing the contradictions of their opponents.   
 Kant presents the essential problem with which he is concerned in the 
question: “[h]ow are synthetic a priori judgments possible?”  He sees that “analytic 
a priori” (Aristotelian) logic establishes conclusions that necessarily follow from 
given premises, but that it cannot establish whether its premises are true, and that 
“synthetic a posteriori” judgments are drawn from real experience, but that 
experience only tells us what appears to be and not what is or what must be.  
Synthetic a priori judgments, on the other hand, express necessary existence.  The 
question that needs to be addressed, then, is how, not if, judgments of this kind are 
possible.  What constitutes their possibility?  What are the transcendental grounds, 
the grounds that fall outside the limits of teleological cognition, that allow for the 
possibility of the question of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible?  What 
allows for the success of the sciences?  What is the foundation of moral necessity?  
In order for Kant to demonstrate that formal logic and (sense) experience are 
empty and blind unless disciplined by moral reason, it is necessary for him to 
establish the nature and a priori limits of logic, possible experience, and reason.  
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Only then can he demonstrate that the mind creates nothing but confusion and 
contradictions insofar as it does not respect the limits of each sphere. 
 Kant shows that Aristotelian logic is a closed and complete system of the 
formal rules of thought; it can produce no insight because it is limited to deducing 
whether or not given judgments agree with the principle of contradiction.  If the law 
of contradiction is employed as an “organon,” i.e., as a sufficient condition for truth, 
it leads to contradiction.  In so doing, it annihilates itself.   
 In Kant’s critical philosophy, the field of “possible experience” refers to 
causally determined objects in nature.  In the doctrine of “transcendental idealism” 
Kant consigns all empirical objects to “appearances” and distinguishes them from 
“things in themselves” which, he makes clear, cannot be known.  The reason that 
he maintains that things in themselves are unknowable is not that human 
consciousness is an appearance that is opposed to what is in itself; this position is 
what Kant calls the “dialectical” “illusion” of ancient teleology, against which he 
distinguishes his own position “as a critique of dialectical illusion” (Critique of 
Pure Reason, B 86/A 62).  The reason that Kant maintains that things in 
themselves are unknowable, I argue, is that the thing in itself is human self-
consciousness.  It cannot be known as an object of nature because nature can be 
known only through it, and the necessary condition for possible experience cannot 
itself be an object of possible experience.  It is because the mind is the free cause 
of itself, an end in itself, that it can know that nature is not free but must conform to 
the categories of the mind, categories through which nature is itself conceptualized 
as the sum total of that which can be a possible experience for us.  
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 Once Kant establishes the nature and limits of logic and experience (and 
with it, theoretical knowledge) and shows, first, that using Aristotelian logic as an 
organon leads to contradiction and, second, that objects of possible experience are 
not things in themselves, he is then able to show that the fruitfulness of logic and 
experience presupposes the idea of freedom and, therefore, the categorical 
imperative, which is identical to the golden rule: treat all persons at all times as 
ends in themselves and never as means to an end.  In the categorical imperative, 
the mind must not conform to nature; nature must conform to the mind.  The 
fulfillment of the moral law is the autonomy of reason, i.e., the self-determination of 
reason through the consciousness of its moral necessity which cannot be thought 
except as existing as the end in itself.  Thus, Kant demonstrates that the moral law 
is the first principle, the categorical imperative, of both reason and the Christian 
faith, a faith that Kant calls the “pure religion of reason.”  (While he does not see 
clearly that Christianity is itself rooted in the Jewish religion, I defend this position 
in Chapter 3.)   
 I shall explore the biblical bases of Kant’s transcendental philosophy more 
fully by examining the postulates of practical reason, which Kant defends as 
necessary presuppositions for the consciousness of the moral law.  In interlocking 
the synthetic a priori ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, Kant signifies that 
God and immortality have the same moral and ontological status as freedom: they 
cannot be thought except as existing, together, and cannot exist except in (being) 
thought, together.  Kant absolutely rejects the notion that God is a first or a final 
cause; this is not a Christian, or a rational, idea at all and it contradicts both 
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science and morality (and so thought and existence).  He argues that in the 
Christian idea of God is found nothing but what is required for the possibility of 
willing the moral law and, therefore, a kingdom of ends.  Hence, he claims that 
what it means to be faithful to the God of Christianity is to fulfill one’s obligations to 
oneself and others, no more and no less.  Pretending to serve God in any other 
way is “religious delusion” and “counterfeit service.”  Consistent with this position, 
to repeat, Kant denies validity to the notion that the soul is a simple, unchanging, 
everlasting substance.  “Immortality” does not refer to the concept of the soul as a 
simple substance but to the time that is necessary to fulfill the moral law.  This idea 
of time, I maintain, expresses the metaphysical distance (connection) between 
human beings and God (and also between thought and existence).  It is a distance 
that prevents human beings and God from being ontologically identified with 
themselves and one another and, therefore, from being ontologically opposed to 
the thing in itself.  Immortality is found only in the consciousness of freedom, i.e., in 
the necessary relationship (distance and connection) between thought and 
existence (and between human beings and God).  It is the time of what may be 
called “infinite existence” conceived as the trial of endless spiritual testing and 
moral struggle that expresses the essentially human.  It is, therefore, entirely 
consistent with the biblical idea of eternal life in the covenant.     
 Thus I argue that Kant’s critique of uncritical (dogmatic, irrational, pseudo-
teleological …) metaphysics follows the biblical polemic against teleological 
metaphysics and shows that moral life is that than which nothing greater can be 
conceived: it is the “supreme” and “highest” good and is the “condition” of every 
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other good.  It is when rational persons posit an end beyond the good will, i.e., 
outside of what it is within the power of human beings to accomplish in and through 
their loving relationships with one another, that we have idolatry (or dialectical 
illusion) as the forfeiture of both faithful reason and rational religion.  
The idea of freedom, Kant shows, is decisive proof that we are ends and not 
means and that there can be no self-subsistent existence (which cannot be 
thought), no thing in itself (or end in itself) either in the world (of nature) or out of it 
(in a supernatural world) that fatally moves us.  This revolutionary insight that, 
because we are free, the relationship between our thought and our existence is 
ontologically and morally necessary, is the general answer to the question of how 
synthetic a priori judgments are possible.  They are possible because they are 
actual, and their actuality is demonstrated through the consciousness of the 
question and its necessary biblical presuppositions: God, freedom, and immortality. 
These three chapters – on the teleology of Plato and Aristotle (Chapter 2), 
biblical metaphysics (Chapter 3), and Kant’s critical philosophy (Chapter 4) – 
constitute the body of my dissertation.  In them I shall defend the position that 
modern thought is not teleological but is, rather, rooted in the biblical idea of 
freedom, which expresses the necessary relationship between thought and 
existence to be both ontological and moral.  There is no freedom, golden rule, or 
categorical imperative in pagan teleology because thought and existence are there 
ontologically opposed to, and identical with, one another.  I contend, then, that, 
because ancient teleological thought begins and ends in necessary contradiction 
and not with necessary existence, it is fruitless to study modern life through the 
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lens of ancient teleology or ancient teleology through the lens of modern life except 
insofar as the latter effort allows us the opportunity to confront the inexorable 
contradictions that ensue.  The serious examination of these contradictions shall 
reveal that all similarities that we pretend to discover between ourselves and the 
ancient teleologists are our own surreptitious interpolations.  I shall now proceed to 
offer what I hope will be a convincing defense of this thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Ancient Greek Metaphysics: the End in itself in Plato and Aristotle 
 
The teleological metaphysics of both Plato and Aristotle is based upon the 
ontological opposition between thought and existence: thinking has no being and 
what has being – the end in itself that is one, unchanging, undifferentiated, and 
immortal – cannot be thought.  I speak of this ontological opposition as 
“teleological” because for Plato and Aristotle human beings are not ends in 
themselves.  At the same time, both thinkers maintain that the essence of thought 
is its existence (or being), what Plato calls its “form” and what Aristotle calls its 
“end.”  Hence, I maintain that, according to Plato and Aristotle, existence is the 
essence (end) of thought, yet it cannot be thought and, since the human being 
cannot know what his essence (end) is, he cannot account for his beginnings.  His 
thought is necessarily blind: it is left with no content other than inner and outer 
perceptions, i.e., what Plato and Aristotle regard as contradictory appearances, 
and is dependent on formal logic, whose basis is the law of contradiction (which is 
alternatively expressed as the law of the excluded middle or the law of identity).  
The fact that thought and existence are in themselves opposed to (and identical 
with) themselves and each other, thus leaving thought dependent on formal logic 
and perception, renders the limit of human wisdom in the metaphysics of Plato and 
Aristotle, we are able to see, as the “knowledge” that human life is necessarily 
contradictory.    
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Plato shows in his dialogues that Socrates is the wisest of men because he 
“knows” that he has no knowledge at all.  He seeks knowledge – he loves wisdom6 
– because he lacks it.  What propels Socrates to search for knowledge of the form 
is that he does not know what the form is.  The core idea in Aristotle is the same: 
all things aim at an end that they lack in the beginning.  The end at which all things 
aim is in itself and by itself.  It is not relative to any individual and, therefore, no 
individual can relate to it.  All seeking must therefore be in vain, i.e., it must be 
blind and unending.  I maintain that, while Plato and Aristotle are able to point out 
the contradictions that ensue in human experience from the fact that thought and 
existence are ontological opposites (and identities), neither philosopher is able to 
overcome these contradictions.  For the consciousness of contradiction reflects the 
contradiction of consciousness and is merely one more appearance that does not 
exist and has no bearing on existence.     
I want to begin my examination of the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle by 
thinking about what Socrates says in his own defense at his trial.  To understand 
the trial of Socrates, it is important to understand some basic facts about courtroom 
cases in ancient Athens.  In Law, Violence and Community in Classical Athens7 
David Cohen offers a brilliant analysis of courtroom orations by Lysias, 
Demosthenes, Isaeus, and other Greek orators in order to show that the 
                                            
6 In this chapter, I do not distinguish between knowledge and wisdom except in discussing 
passages in which this distinction is made or implied. 
7 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.   
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institutional adjudication of conflict in classical Athens reflects the pursuit of 
agonistic goals, i.e., self-interest, honor, and power over one’s rivals.  He argues 
that for Plato and Aristotle (and also Thucydides) conflict and civil strife are 
inevitable because of the nature of men.  It is natural for men to desire honor and 
gain – and so the feeling of being superior to others – and to fear dishonor and loss 
– and so the feeling of being inferior to others.  Those who have honor despise 
those who do not and those who do not have honor are resentful and envious of 
those who do (pp. 29-34, 66).8  In Athenian society, “social relations are essentially 
evaluative and competitive” (emphasis added).  Men strive to  
 
establish their own worth by monitoring their standing vis-à-vis 
other men.  ... Because honor is established through 
comparison with others it is a limited good and competition for 
it can take the form of a zero-sum game.  One man enhances 
his standing at the expense of those who are his rivals; his 
elevation involves their defeat (pp. 62-63, emphasis added).  
Cohen argues that since conflict is a central feature of social and political life in 
ancient Athens, litigation “should be seen not as separate and removed from the 
realm of conflict, but rather as part of the process of conflict itself” (p. 194).  The 
notion, then, that the Athenian judicial system is aimed at resolving conflicts or 
maintaining social equilibrium could not be further from the truth.  Rather, the 
                                            
8 Throughout this dissertation, I do not mention the name of the text in parenthetical references 
where the text that I am discussing is evident. 
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courts are “a natural arena” for “settling relative standing,” for “clarifying hierarchies 
of honor among rivals,” and for pursuing “private animosities” (pp. 78, 82).9   
 Cohen demonstrates that hostile parties use the legal process as a 
“weapon” to pursue conflict (p. 92) and that the contradictions that emerge are 
irresolvable.  For it is through the courts themselves that violence and revenge 
obtain legal sanction (p. 183).  Court cases produce more enmity, not less enmity, 
and the more disputes are settled, the more they erupt (p. 22).  Trial and litigation 
in the Athenian judicial system are for these reasons “fundamentally alien to the 
contemporary [modern] ideology of judicial process and the rule of law” (p. 183).  
This insight is supported by the facts that (1) the judges10 have no access to well-
defined statutes on the basis of which to interpret objective evidence, (2) the cross-
examination of witnesses is not permitted, and (3) there is no fixed standard for 
admissible evidence.  Both the prosecution and the defense attempt to manipulate 
the judges’ perceptions through whatever means are available in order to achieve 
their own ends.  For example, each party will appeal to wealth, friends, family, 
public service, reputation, status, etc. in order to win the judges’ favor.  This 
strategy involves showing that the opponent is manipulative and unjust when he 
appeals to the same factors to win the favor of these same judges.  Cohen notes 
                                            
9 In places where I do not indicate in a series of citations the specific page or line reference for each 
citation, the references for all of the citations in the series are noted at the end of the last citation. 
10 The judges at Athenian trials were lay citizens who were selected by lot.  Women, slaves, 
foreigners, and certain social outcasts could not serve as judges (p. 64). 
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that it is common for the opposing litigants to appeal to the judges to consider what 
is in their (the judges’) best interest before making up their minds (pp. 112-113).  It 
is also common for both prosecutors and defendants, if they have the money, to 
buy the testimony of witnesses who will say whatever they are told to say (pp. 107-
108).  In this connection, Aristotle maintains in Rhetoric11 that a person who is not 
eloquent or who does not have money or friends will not even attempt to prosecute 
because he knows from the beginning that his case is lost (1373a5-7).12  
Since the categories on the basis of which cases are won and lost “are 
readily available to manipulation by either party” (p. 104), the courtroom in ancient 
Athens is a stage for dramatic “rhetorical performances” in which (1) the “facts” 
presented by the opposing sides utterly contradict one another, (2) these opposing 
accounts are supported by a phalanx of witnesses from each party, and (3) both 
sides appeal to the judges to consider how their own interests would be best 
served by giving a “just” verdict.  Cohen writes, 
 
[i]t cannot be underscored strongly enough that, in principle, in 
an Athenian trial all the untutored judges knew about the facts 
of the case, and, to a very significant extent the applicable 
laws, was what the two contesting litigants chose to tell them.  
In that process of selecting the “available means of 
persuasion” litigants used the statutes as they used the other 
material which they represented, interpreted, manipulated, 
                                            
11 All works by Aristotle cited in my study are taken from the two-volume edition of The Complete 
Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (edited by Jonathan Barnes.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995.)  On the Soul is in Volume One; Metaphysics, Nicomachean 
Ethics, and Rhetoric are in Volume Two. 
12 We see here that witnesses, though “inherently unreliable,” are “nonetheless indispensable” 
(Law, Violence, and Community, p. 174).   
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concealed, and lied about to suit the needs of the moment (p. 
180).  
 
Because of the “structural impediments to establishing with certainty the most 
basic facts” of the case, the “controlling interpretation was what a particular group 
of judges, as individuals,13 thought on a particular day” (pp. 176, 180, emphasis 
added).  For this reason, the outcome of a courtroom case is much like the 
outcome in a game of chance.14 
 In light of the idea that the trial at Athens is a competitive struggle or fight 
(agon) between opposing parties, each of whom desires for himself the honor that 
he wants to deny to his opponent, let us now think about how Socrates defends 
himself at his trial, as it is depicted in Plato’s Apology.15  Socrates is prosecuted for 
believing in false gods and for corrupting the youth by teaching them also to 
believe in false gods.  He argues that, in more than seventy years, he has never 
taught anyone anything.  Therefore, people could not have learned anything from 
him: “I have never been anyone’s teacher.  … If anyone says that he has learned 
anything from me … be assured that he is not telling the truth” (33a-b).  The reason 
that he is on trial is that his accusers are offended.  For, as we shall see in a 
moment, he has dishonored them in showing them that they are ignorant like him.  
                                            
13 In Athenian trials, judges are not allowed to deliberate among themselves (ft. 19, p. 176). 
14 Cohen makes this analogy when he considers the unusual nature of inheritance cases, in which it 
was “commonplace” for prowling estate hunters to cook up counterfeit claims replete with “false 
children, lying witnesses, fictive genealogies, forged wills, and fraudulent adoptions.”  “Athenians 
seem to have regarded such inheritance litigation as an agon much like a game of chance: you 
come forward with a perhaps unlikely or totally fraudulent case, but you rely upon the difficulty of 
clarifying such cases and the clout of your supporters, and hope that the wheel of fortune stops on 
your number.”  He observes that unlike games of chance the game does not end with the outcome 
of the case.  For more cases may be brought forward against the victor during his lifetime (and 
beyond) (pp. 169-170). 
15 Unless I note otherwise, all texts that I cite from Plato are taken from Plato: Complete Works 
(edited by John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).   
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The proof that he speaks the truth is that he is on trial.  Socrates thus 
communicates to the Athenian jurymen that it is his goodness, his guiltlessness, 
which creates resentment among his opponents, who are not good.  The real guilt 
lies with his accusers.16  
Socrates claims that he has never taught anyone anything or learned 
anything from anyone in the context of recalling Chairephon’s visit to the oracle at 
Delphi.  Chairephon asked the Pythian priestess if any man is wiser than Socrates 
and she answered him, on behalf of the god Apollo, that no one is wiser.17  
Socrates says that the oracle’s reply perplexed him:  “I asked myself: ‘Whatever 
does the god mean?  … I am very conscious that I am not wise at all; what then 
does he mean by saying that I am the wisest?’” (21b, emphasis added.)  He 
remarks that he conversed with accomplished politicians, poets, and artisans in 
order to show that he could not be wiser than they.18  However, after proceeding 
“systematically” in his conversations with different people, he says he discovered 
that no one has knowledge of anything worthwhile.  What distinguishes him from 
his interlocutor, he continues, is that his interlocutor “thinks he knows something 
when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am 
likely to be wiser than he … [because] I do not think I know what I do not know” 
                                            
16 “In an Athenian trial,” Cohen observes, “the plaintiff is also the accused, in the sense that the 
defendant will always put the plaintiff’s life, character, and reputation at stake” (p. 186). 
17 Chairephon’s question and the oracle’s answer are wholly indeterminate.  Is any man wiser than 
Socrates in what?  Socrates is wisest in what?  There is no indication that either Chairephon or 
anyone else in the Apology finds anything strange in the question.  It is we who see that the 
question is purely formal. 
18 The point to be noted here is that, while Socrates cannot account for what the priestess has said, 
for he intimates that it is the opposite of his expectation, he is compelled to accept it.  For the god 
does not lie.  
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(21d).  Socrates explains that, despite becoming unpopular, he continued to serve 
the god Apollo, who “is using my name as an example” for everyone,  
as if he said: “This man among you, mortals, is wisest who, 
like Socrates, understands that his wisdom is worthless.”  So 
even now I continue this investigation as the god bade me – 
and I go around seeking out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom 
I think wise.  Then if I do not think he is, I come to the 
assistance of the god and show him that he is not wise (23a-
b). 
    
Socrates is arguing that the reason that his accusers seek revenge against 
him is that he questions people on behalf of the god Apollo.  Apollo himself has 
confirmed that he is the wisest man and Apollo does not lie.  This means, Socrates 
is implying, that if anyone can understand the oracle’s message, it is he himself.  
To convict him is to declare Apollo a liar.  When his opponents accuse him of not 
believing in the gods, they only demonstrate that it is they who do not believe in the 
gods.  For if they believed in the gods, they would believe in him.  So, again, the 
people who feel dishonored by Socrates and who seek revenge against him only 
confirm that he is right: they deserve to be dishonored.  It is they who aim to 
dishonor him, unjustly, when they do not acknowledge that he has the divine right 
and, indeed, the divine duty, to dishonor them. 
The fact that Socrates invokes Apollo at his trial is a simple but crucial point.  
Not only does it imply to the prosecutors and judges that he considers himself to be 
allied with the god, it shows that, at the end of his life, he is still absolutely 
dependent upon the gods and oracles, the same gods and oracles that, in Greek 
myth, reflect the fatal ignorance of human beings.  (In Greek myth, human beings 
are fated; they are not in control of their own lives.)  While Socrates depends upon 
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being ruled in order to establish that his position has authority, the fact that he is 
ruled shows that he has none.  There is a close parallel, then, between the 
relationship that Apollo has with Socrates and the relationship that Socrates has 
with his fellow Athenians.  Just as Socrates’ honor depends upon dishonoring 
others – for agonistic relations are zero-sum: “his elevation involves their defeat,” 
to recall Cohen – Apollo’s honor depends upon dishonoring Socrates.  Thus, when 
Socrates offends more and more people and generates more and more 
resentment, Apollo tells him to continue doing what he is doing.  The trial is the 
fulfillment of Apollo’s wish.   
As Apollo moves Socrates while showing Socrates that he is unmoved by 
him, Socrates wants to move his opponents while showing them that he is 
unmoved by them.  It is for this reason that he proceeds to compare himself to 
Achilleus, the greatest of the Greek mythic heroes and beloved of the gods (28b-
d).19  Socrates is here indicating that what he is doing when he talks to people is 
analogous to what Achilleus did when he killed his enemies: he is taking just 
revenge against those who are unjust towards him and, therefore, against those 
who are impious20 toward the god.  Socrates sees that no judge at his trial would 
                                            
19 The greatness of Achilleus is a contradictory appearance; it involves his equally great reversal.  
For, when he kills Hektor in Book 22 of The Iliad (translated by Richmond Lattimore.  Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1961), he dooms himself to a humiliating death at the hands of the 
cowardly and effeminate Paris.  It is perhaps for this reason that, in Book 11 of The Odyssey 
(translated by Robert Fitzgerald.  New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), Achilleus spurns the 
praise that Odysseus gives him and claims that he would rather be a slave of a poor man on iron 
rations in the world of the living than king of all the dead.   
20 In making the point that Athens had no authoritative interpretation of the laws, Cohen notes that 
the statute under which Socrates was charged was impiety (asebeia).  The stated charge in his trial, 
however, is that of corrupting the youth, which, Cohen indicates, implies “sexual excess and 
wrongdoing” whose relation to impiety is unclear (pp. 188-189).   
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claim that Achilleus was wrong when he chose revenge over life.21  In comparing 
himself to Achilleus, Socrates is communicating that he is not wrong for the same 
reason.  This is what enrages his antagonists in the jury.  They are not insulted by 
the fact that Socrates compares his trial to a war but by the fact that he thinks he is 
the victor.22   
In Aeschylus’ Agamemnon,23 when Clytemnestra learns that Troy has been 
sacked, she compares the discordant cries in the fallen city to the mingling of oil 
and vinegar, “unfriendly in their separation, so the voices of captives and victors 
may be heard separately, in their double fortune” (321-326).  There can never be 
any common ground between Greeks and barbarians, friends and enemies, or 
between free men and slaves.  When Socrates implies that he is the hero of the 
Greeks, he suggests that those who do not acknowledge him as such are the 
enemies of the Greeks.  For just as the Greeks could not sack Troy without 
Achilleus – as Achilleus forced them to concede before he returned to battle24 – 
Socrates indicates that the city cannot succeed without him.  He communicates to 
the court that he is a gift from the god and a blessing to the city, and that, in killing 
him, the city is killing itself (30b-31a).  
Socrates, however, is contradicted by the same principles that he uses to 
contradict others.  After all, he claims that he speaks from the point of view of a 
                                            
21 In 18.115-126 of The Iliad. 
22 In contrast, Socrates’ prosecutor Meletus plays to the interests of the judges.  When Socrates 
challenges Meletus to tell the jury who helps the Athenian youth if not he himself, Meletus’ mentions 
the judges first (24d-e).  
23 In Oresteia.  Translated by Christopher Collard.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
24 Donna F. Wilson has written an outstanding analysis of the agonistic nature of this concession – 
and of Achilleus’ agonistic responses to it – in Chapters 3 and 4 of Ransom, Revenge, and Heroic 
Identity in the Iliad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
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god who declares that his (Socrates’) point of view is worth nothing.  He wants to 
show that he moves others and that others do not move him, but he does this on 
the authority of a god who moves him but is not moved by him.  He considers 
himself good and his inferiors not good on the ground that Apollo has used him as 
an example for everyone.  The jurymen take revenge on Socrates and counter the 
revenge that Socrates wants to take upon them.  Socrates himself has said that the 
god has indicated that he (Socrates) is ignorant; how, then, can he claim to speak 
the truth?  Is he calling Apollo a liar?  Or does he not believe in the gods?  The 
majority of the judges convict him.  If all men are ignorant, as Socrates says, then, 
because he cannot distinguish between justice and injustice, justice must be 
decided by the stronger.25  
From the point of view of Socrates, however, a guilty verdict only confirms 
that those who condemned him are ignorant.  When Socrates is asked what he 
thinks his penalty should be, he says that he should be given free meals at the 
Prytaneum, the prestigious hall that was used to entertain Olympian victors (36d-
37a).  Once again, Socrates drives home the point that he is the victorious hero in 
an agonistic arena in which his opponents are unheroic losers.  The judges 
respond by sentencing him to death.  For Socrates, however, the jurymen are 
                                            
25 In Book 1 of the Republic, Thrasymachus defends the position that justice is nothing other than 
what is of advantage to the stronger (e.g., 338c).  Socrates shows that, on this view, justice is 
indistinguishable from injustice, as Thrasymachus himself implies when he argues that injustice is 
profitable and that justice is not (e.g., 348b-c).  If justice is the advantage of the stronger, then how 
can injustice be profitable for them?  The fact that Socrates concludes the discussion in the final 
lines of Book 1 by claiming that he knows nothing and that he does not know whether justice is a 
virtue or not shows, however, that Socrates accepts the position of Thrasymachus.  For if men are 
ignorant of what justice is, then justice is indistinguishable from injustice, i.e., justice is decided by 
the stronger.  
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doing the opposite of what they think.  There is every reason to believe, he argues, 
that, according to what the poets have said, the dead are better off than the 
living.26  The judges deserve blame for wanting to hurt him, but not for actually 
hurting him.  For those who do evil cannot harm the good man (41c-e), since it is 
the good man who moves them and not the other way around.27 
In light of the above, we see that Socrates is not fighting for justice.  His fight 
is not based upon a fixed standard of justice but, rather, upon the fact that no one 
knows what justice is.  Socrates is also not fighting for his life.  He himself says that 
he is indifferent to the fact that he is going to die, for he does not know what death 
is.  He contends that death is either like a dreamless sleep, in which case it is even 
better than the days and nights of a king, or else death is a relocation to a different 
place, in which case he would be quite happy to keep company with the heroes of 
Troy, spending time in the land of the dead “testing and examining people there, as 
I do here, as to who among them is wise, and who thinks he is, but is not” (40c-
41b).  In other words, if he were dead, he would not hesitate to put himself in the 
same position that he is in now.  
                                            
26 This is the position of Achilleus in The Iliad: he would rather die with glory than live in shame.  As 
I noted earlier, however, he holds the opposite position in Book 11 of The Odyssey.  It is instructive 
to see that the moment after Achilleus claims that he would rather be a living slave than a dead 
hero, he inquires about the status, rank, and honor of his son and father, and he glories in hearing 
of his son’s successes on the battlefield (582-643).  This shows that Achilleus is dependent on what 
contradicts him and that his understanding of his contradictory situation is itself contradictory.  
27 As Bertrand Russell notes in A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Stratford Press, Inc., 
1960), Socrates anticipates both the Stoics and the Cynics in maintaining that no one can do harm 
to a good man (p. 91).  For both the Stoics and the Cynics, the supreme good, virtue in itself, is not 
affected by life (life is not affected by virtue).  Thus, both the Stoics and the Cynics respond with 
indifference to the world.  The Stoics withdraw from life because it is shameful to them; the Cynics 
live like dogs because nothing is shameful to them. 
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 It would be a mistake to think that Socrates does not say what he means or 
mean what he says when he indicates to the judges that he does not mind being 
put to death.  There is no indication anywhere in Plato’s dialogues that Socrates 
has a concept of death that is substantially different from his concept of life.  In 
fact, in the Phaedo, again appealing to what the poets have said, he argues that 
the dead come from the living and that the living cannot come from anywhere but 
the dead (70c-d).  This endless, cyclical metamorphosis of death into life and life 
into death is the central idea of the myth of Er, which is perhaps Socrates’ most 
complete account of death (Republic, 614b-621b).  In this account, the soul is 
“understood” to be separate from the body.28  Socrates says that when Er died, his 
soul left his body and arrived at a place where he saw just souls arriving, pure, 
from a thousand-year journey in the heavens and unjust souls arriving, parched 
and dusty, from under the earth.  He says that upon their return the souls had to 
take another journey to another place and that this journey preceded their reentry 
into the world of the living.  Meanwhile, other just souls were sent for a thousand-
year journey in the heavens and other unjust souls were sent for a thousand-year 
journey under the earth.  Life is a cycle that ends in death and death is the 
beginning of another cycle of life.   
                                            
28 Like the poets, Socrates has no option but to discuss the soul in terms of the body because the 
opposition between the body and the soul reflects the opposition between thought and existence.  
The parallel between thought and the embodied life indicates that the content of all thought is 
sensible perception, i.e., appearances.  Hence, it is only in terms of the categories that structure 
sensible perception that one can attempt to conceptualize what the soul is.  Socrates’ account of 
the soul-body separation, then, expresses a logical division that is on the one hand necessary – for 
human beings cannot live without a soul – and on the other hand unthinkable because the soul is 
separate from, and opposed to, the body, as we shall see.  
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 About the next life, Socrates says four noteworthy things, each of which 
informs the others.  First, a man in a previous life can live as an animal, an insect, 
or as something else in the next life, “and all sorts of mixtures occurred” (619e-
620d).  This means that the soul of a man and the soul of an insect are the same.29  
Second, the order in which souls choose the next life is decided through a lottery; 
when a particular soul’s turn comes to choose its next life, the next life that it 
chooses is “bound by necessity” and there is nothing that it can do to change its 
chosen fate (617d-e).  Third, the fortunes of the dead are likely to be reversed in 
the next life: just souls, untrained in suffering, are likely to make bad decisions and 
unjust souls, having suffered themselves and seen others suffer, are likely to make 
good decisions (619c-d).  Just as life and death metamorphose into each other, so, 
too, do good and bad fortune.  Fourth, souls reenter the living after they have drank 
from the Lethe, the river of forgetfulness, and all their memories are expunged.  
Socrates is here indicating that people are blind to, and ignorant of, their own lives 
and cannot account for what happens to them.30  This message is the core 
                                            
29 It is because human beings and things in nature are viewed as having a common soul that 
human beings throughout the pagan world regard natural occurrences as omens and depend upon 
these omens, and the seers who interpret them, to understand their own lives.  
30 In Book 6 of The Aeneid (translated by Robert Fitzgerald.  New York: Random House, Inc., 
1990), the Roman poet Virgil provides an account of the cycle of life and death that is the same in 
all important respects to the myth of Er.  When Aeneas visits the soul of his father, Anchises, in the 
underworld, the shade teaches him that all things – the sky, the land, the moon, the stars, men, 
beasts, birds, sea creatures, etc. – have a common soul from a “heavenly source.”  The “free 
essence” of the soul is, however, “poisoned” and “clogged” by mortal bodies.  Aeneas sees a throng 
of souls on the banks of the Lethe and asks the shade what they are doing there.  The shade tells 
him that these souls are waiting to return to the upper world.  Aeneas, perplexed by this response, 
asks the shade why souls would ever want to return to the “dead weight” of bodies: “[t]he poor 
souls, [h]ow can they crave our daylight so?”  Anchises replies that once souls in the underworld 
have been cleansed of the stains retained from embodied life, “[t]he god calls [them] in a crowd to 
Lethe stream, [t]hat there unmemoried they may see again [t]he heavens and wish re-entry into 
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teaching of Greek tragedy, as we find expressed, for instance, in the accounts of 
the lives of Agamemnon, Oedipus,31 and Pentheus.32   
 In Section 10 of Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle asks if any 
man at all, whether he is living or dead, can be at his happy end.  At the end of 
section 9, he recalls Priam, King of Troy, as an example of a man that no one calls 
happy; for in old age he suffered the “many turns of fortune’s wheel” and “ended 
wretchedly.”  The fact that men suffer reversals of fortune makes it difficult to 
answer the question of whether the dead can ever be happy.  For it is not clear, 
Aristotle writes, that the dead are safe from experiencing the reversals that befall 
their descendants.  While it would be odd for men who are dead to suffer these 
reversals also, it would be equally odd if they do not.  While Aristotle seems to 
recognize that there must be some fundamental difference between the living and 
the dead, he, like Socrates, cannot conceptualize what this difference could be.  
He makes some logical distinctions and indicates, for example, that while the future 
is obscure (because it changes), happiness is final (because it is unchanging), 
before he concludes the discussion of whether the dead suffer the reversals of the 
living with his “answer” to the problem at the end of Section 11: it seems that the 
reversals of the living do affect the dead, he writes, but not in such a manner as to 
make unhappy those who are happy (or vice-versa).  
                                                                                                                                     
bodies” (943-1008).  This is the answer to Aeneas’ question of why souls would want to return to 
bodies’ dead weight: they do not know what life has in store for them.   
31 See, for example, Oedipus the King.  Translated by David Grene.  In Greek Tragedies: Volume 1.  
Second edition.  Edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore.  London: The University of 
Chicago Press, Ltd., 1991. 
32 See The Bacchae. Translated by William Arrowsmith.  In The Complete Greek Tragedies: 
Euripides V.  Edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore.  London: The University of Chicago 
Press, Ltd., 1968. 
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The reason that Plato and Aristotle do not have an idea of death as real and 
absolute non-existence is that, like the poets, they cannot think existence as the 
end in itself.  For their first principle, we are able to see, is that they themselves do 
not exist except as opposed to their form, end, essence, or soul.  Their notion of 
death, therefore, is, and must be, another contradictory appearance of life.  Hence, 
death could be like sleep or it could be like being awake.  No third possibility is 
mentioned, presumably because the law of the excluded middle does not allow it.  
 There are three engines that drive the train of Greek thought, all of which 
work together and reinforce one another.  The first engine is the ontological 
opposition between, and identity of, thought and existence.  In the writings of Plato 
and Aristotle, the belief that thought and existence are dependent contradictories is 
expressed as ignorance of the essence and end of things that appear; in Greek 
myth and drama, it is expressed in the doctrine of fate.  The second engine is 
formal logic.  In the Metaphysics, Aristotle explains its three main laws.  The law of 
contradiction is the principle that no thing, at the time in which it is what it is, can 
express contradictory predicates: “the same attribute cannot at the same time 
belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect” (1005b19-20).  A 
cannot be not-A.  The law of identity, which follows from the law of contradiction, is 
the principle that “a thing is itself” (1041a14-16).  A is A.  The law of the excluded 
middle, which also follows from the law of contradiction, is the principle that “there 
cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must 
either affirm or deny any one predicate” (1011b23-24).  A thing cannot be both A 
and not-A but must be either A or not-A at a given time: a third alternative is 
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excluded.  The third engine that drives the train of Greek thought is sense 
perception.  The human being who is ignorant of the essence (end) of things that 
appear must rely upon the world of changing appearances.  All of the content of his 
thought is, and can only ever be, taken from this world.  However, perceptions are 
relative to the perceiver and, as Aristotle argues, concern objects that are “capable 
both of being and of not being; for which reason all of the individual instances of 
them are destructible.”  They belong to the realm of opinion, which “deals with that 
which can be otherwise than as it is,” and not to the realm of knowledge, which 
involves “definition” and “demonstration.”  Since “demonstration and definition 
cannot vary … clearly there can neither be definition nor demonstration of sensible 
individuals” (Metaphysics, 1039b20-1040a7).  Since, however, perceptions are the 
only content of the mind, perceptual objects must be taken as “facts” and “the 
decision rests with perception” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1109b23; Metaphysics, 
1062b33-1063a6).33  It is time to look more closely at each of these three engines 
as they operate in the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle. 
 Aristotle begins the Metaphysics with the assertion that “All men by nature 
desire to know” (980b22).  In the Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics, he divides 
knowledge into two kinds: knowledge that is relative to the human being and 
knowledge that is in itself.  “Let us not fail to notice … that there is a difference 
between arguments from and those to the first principles,” he writes.  “For, while 
                                            
33 Aristotle writes that the decision rests with perception unless the sense organs have been 
perverted or injured.  However, there is no criterion for distinguishing between true and false 
perception that does not itself rest upon perception.  Thus, a man’s attempt to defend his decisions 
on the basis of the facts against others who disagree with him on this same basis leads to 
irresolvable contradiction. 
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we must begin with what is familiar, things are so in two ways – some to us, some 
without qualification.  Presumably, then, we must begin with things familiar to us” 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1095a31-1095b3).  Aristotle does not discuss what this 
object “without qualification” is from the outset, but the fact that he distinguishes it 
from what is familiar to us – not in terms of its appearance but in terms of its 
ontological being, mode of existence, or “principle” – suggests that the human 
being does not begin with it, that he is not familiar with it, and that he argues “to” it 
and not “from” it.  In light of this division between knowledge that is relative to 
human beings and knowledge that is in itself, the question is: is the object that all 
men desire to know – by nature – relative to human beings?  Or is it in itself?   
 Aristotle indicates in the opening of the Nicomachean Ethics that the actions 
and choices of human beings are a part of a universal teleological process in which 
all things aim at an end that itself aims at nothing.  This end is the object that all 
men by nature desire to know.  He begins thus:   
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, 
is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has 
rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.  ... If, then, 
there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own 
sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we 
do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that 
rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be 
empty and in vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief 
good (1094a1-23, emphasis added).   
 
The primary premise that all things must either aim at an end – or else they are 
aimless forever – is re-articulated at different times and in different ways in both the 
Nicomachean Ethics and in the Metaphysics.  Aristotle writes in the Metaphysics,  
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all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike … 
fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one 
thing has nothing to do with another, but they are connected.  
For all are ordered together to one end (1075a15-19).   
 
The notion that the end is the reason for all things indicates that, for Aristotle, it is 
central to the very being, essence, or definition of human reason.  This point is 
captured in Aristotle’s assertion that “the principles of the things that are done 
consist in that for the sake of which they are to be done” (Nicomachean Ethics, 
1140b15-17, emphasis added).  If there were no end, then there would be no 
reason, for what it means to have reason is to aim at the end, an end that Aristotle 
at times refers to as “the good” and as the “final cause”: 
the final cause is an end, and that sort of end which is not for 
the sake of something else, but for whose sake everything 
else is; so that if there is to be a last term of this sort, the 
process will not be infinite; but if there is no such term there 
will be no final cause.  But those who maintain the infinite 
series destroy the good without knowing it.  Yet no one would 
try to do anything if he were not going to come to a limit.  Nor 
would there be reason in the world; the reasonable man, at 
least, always acts for a purpose; and this is a limit, for the end 
is a limit (Metaphysics, 994b11-15, emphasis added). 
 
Aristotle also uses the terms “potentiality” and “actuality” to reassert the opposition 
between, and identity of, what lacks its end and the end in itself.  The potential is 
not actual and the actual has no potential, but the potential is inconceivable without 
the principle of actuality.   
[E]verything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e., 
an end.  For that for the sake of which a thing is, is its 
principle, and the becoming is for the sake of the end; and the 
actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the 
potentiality is acquired (Metaphysics, 1050a7-10).  
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The potential, the world of becoming, has no being insofar as it lacks its finite end 
and is in the process of coming to be.  It has being, however, when it has reached 
the limit of the process of its coming to be.     
Again, nothing infinite can exist ... if generation and movement 
exist there must also be a limit; for no movement is infinite, but 
every movement has an end, and that which is incapable of 
completing its coming to be cannot be in process of coming to 
be; and that which has completed its coming to be must be as 
soon as it has come to be (Metaphysics, 994b27, 999b9-13).     
 
 For Aristotle, as for Plato, the end is both the end of all goods (i.e., the final 
cause), the nature of all goods (i.e., the formal cause), and the source of all goods 
(i.e., the first cause).  Everything is judged with reference to the good and nothing 
has valid currency except the good (Nicomachean Ethics, 1101b30-1102a4).34  
Aristotle is adamant, however, that the good is not an object that is chosen or 
about which one can deliberate.  Choice, he says, does not relate to the end but 
only to what “contributes to the end.”  It “cannot relate to impossibles, and if any 
one said he chose them he would be thought silly.”  While all choice aims at an 
end, the end in itself is an object of “wish,” which Aristotle classifies under the 
category of impossibles, i.e., as that which “could in no way be brought about by 
one’s own efforts.”  That is, “we wish to be happy and say we do, but we cannot 
well say we choose to be so; for, in general, choice seems to relate to the things 
that are in our power” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1111b20-30).  The agent who is the 
                                            
34 In the Greek tragedies, human beings are dependent on that which they cannot know.  See, for 
example, lines 160-166 of Agamemnon, where the chorus of Argive elders recollects the fatal 
predicament (or “futile burden”) of the Greeks at Aulis and sings the praise of Zeus while claiming to 
know nothing about him: “Zeus, whosoever he is, if to be called by this name is well pleasing to him, 
with this I address him.  I have nothing to compare though I measure all things against him – only 
Zeus, if I am to cast out of my mind its futile burden truthfully” (emphasis added).  
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moving principle for his actions can deliberate about the things that he must do in 
order to attain the end, Aristotle maintains, but he cannot deliberate about the end.  
For since deliberation is reasoning with a view to an end, the end constitutes the 
nature of deliberation and is in itself a first principle.  Thus, while “thinking is the 
starting point” in one respect, “thought is moved by the object of thought, and one 
side of the list of opposites is in itself ... simple and exists actually” (Metaphysics, 
1072a29-36, emphasis added). 
If one cannot deliberate about the end, which is opposed to (or the opposite 
of) thought while yet being the necessary object of thought, then what is the 
standard for right deliberation that leads to it?  How is one to know if one 
deliberates rightly or wrongly?  Aristotle takes up these questions in the 
Nicomachean Ethics.  In Book 2 he argues, on the basis of the law of contradiction, 
that there must be an excess, a mean, and a deficient within the continuum of 
excellence and that right deliberation aims at the intermediate that is equidistant 
from the extremes (1106a24-1107a7).  He notes, however, that what is too much, 
too little, and neither too much nor too little are relative to each other and to the 
observer, “and all are in a sense opposed to all” (1108b12-15).  In Books 3 and 4 
he proceeds to define various intermediate states in terms of their extremes – e.g., 
courage is the mean between cowardice and rashness – before he returns in Book 
6 to the question of what, precisely, is the fixed standard for right deliberation.  At 
this point he writes that “there is a standard which determines the mean states 
which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance 
with right reason.”  He notes, however, that “such a statement, though true, is by 
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no means illuminating.”  For “if a man had only this knowledge he would be none 
the wiser.”  Hence, “it should be determined what right reason is and what is the 
standard that fixes it” (1138b18-1138b30).   
In discussing this problem, Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of 
wisdom.  He links the first to “comprehension” and “knowledge.”  This kind of 
wisdom possesses truth about first principles “for which no reason can be given” 
(1142a26).  (The reason that no reason can be given is that the end in itself cannot 
be an object of deliberation.)  The second kind of wisdom is “practical.”  Its objects 
are taken from perception and concern human affairs in general.  It is deliberation 
to and not from first principles.  Since “man is not the best thing in the world,” 
Aristotle writes, “it would be strange to think that … practical wisdom … is the best 
knowledge” (1141a20-21).  In fact, that “practical wisdom is not knowledge is 
evident” because it is “opposed … to comprehension” (1142a23-25).  The reader is 
therefore taken by surprise when Aristotle “resolves” the problem of what is the 
standard of right reason as follows: 
right reason is that which is in accordance with practical 
wisdom.  All men, then, seem somehow to divine that this kind 
of state is excellence, viz. that which is in accordance with 
practical wisdom.  But we must go a little further.  For it [the 
state of accordance of right reason and practical wisdom] is 
not merely the state in accordance with right reason, but the 
state that implies the presence of right reason … and practical 
wisdom is right reason about such matters (1144b23-28).   
 
 Earlier, Aristotle noted that the truth that right deliberation must be in 
accordance with right reason is not illuminating and leaves a man none the wiser.  
Thus, it is necessary to determine what right reason is.  Here, he indicates that 
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right reason not only accords with practical wisdom (right deliberation), but that this 
accordance must also involve the presence of right reason.  For it is evident that 
practical wisdom is not itself knowledge.  The addition that Aristotle has made to 
the claim that right reason must be in accordance with practical wisdom amounts to 
the claim that right reason must involve the presence of right reason.  This does 
not shed light on the problem of how to distinguish right reason from wrong reason, 
given that practical deliberation (right reason) is opposed to comprehension and 
knowledge (right reason).  Aristotle arrives at the contradiction that he undertook to 
resolve because he is dependent on the end that he cannot know and, therefore, 
on perception and the principle of contradiction (or the principle of identity: right 
reason implies the presence of right reason).  His deliberation, itself identical to 
itself, manifests its necessary opposition to (the end in) itself.35   
 The opposition between things that are familiar to human beings and the 
end in itself, as presented by Aristotle, is expressed by Plato as the opposition 
between appearances and their essence (or form).  Socrates sees that all thinkable 
objects change relative to the manner in which they are thought.  The same things 
appear in different ways at the same time to different people and in different ways 
at different times to the same people.  Socrates does not claim to know, however, 
what these changing objects are in themselves; for he cannot distinguish between 
                                            
35 To be sure, Aristotle does provide many “practical” examples of the ends of action: one exercises 
to be healthy, one eats to be nourished, one becomes a doctor to heal patients, and so on.  
However, he abandons these examples when he considers more seriously the nature of the end in 
itself, which is opposed to appearance altogether.  
 Health, nourishment, and healing are indeed ends for us in the modern world.  What makes 
them good in themselves is that they are good for human beings, who are ends and not means.  
Aristotle’s position, that the end in itself is the chief good and that human beings by nature seek it 
because they are not ends, is entirely opposed to the modern conception. 
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the object that changes and the object into which it changes except at the level of 
sense perception, which is relative to each man.  He also cannot explain change 
since there are as many types of change as there are changing objects.  There 
must be something unchanging in which, he claims, a thing “participates” or 
“shares” in order for it to be able to change; change must participate in a sort of 
change that does not change if one is to be able to account for a common process 
in different kinds of change.  If this abiding being – form – could change, it would 
have to be explained along with the rest of the appearances, and one could not 
escape an infinite regress.  The essence of change is therefore unchanging.  For 
the same reason, the essence of everything that is sensible, different, and divisible 
must be insensible, without difference, and one.  The essence of all appearances 
must be the opposite of appearances.  If one wants to know what an object that 
appears is in itself, one must think the contradiction – through the law of non-
contradiction! – of how the object can appear.  One must put an end to thought if 
one is to escape from (and reach the end of) the contradictions of thought.   
In the Phaedo, Socrates describes appearance and form as “two kinds of 
existences” (79a).  These existences are structured according to principles that are 
opposed to each other.  In appearance, opposites must come from their opposites.  
This kind of “existence,” we see, violates the law of contradiction, the law of 
identity, and the law of the excluded middle because changing things are what they 
are not, are not what they are, and both are and are not – at one and the same 
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time.36  Socrates maintains that all change is the cyclical metamorphosis of 
opposites and, if things did not always turn in a circle, then nothing would change 
(70c-72b).  To explain change in a way that is not contradictory, one must explain 
how change and the objects that change are unchanging (and are contradictory 
appearances only). 
While opposites come from opposites in the world of appearance, opposites 
do not admit of opposites in themselves (103b).  If form could admit, i.e., relate to, 
appearances, then it would itself be an appearance, in which case appearances 
would be inexplicable.  We see that there is no way to relate these two types of 
existences together because they are defined in opposition to each other.  
However, since form is the essence of appearances and appearances are the 
appearances of form, it is not possible to separate appearances from form, or vice-
versa.37  Thus, both appearances and form are inexplicable either apart from, or 
through, one another, as we shall see Plato himself argue in the Parmenides. 
Socrates remembers that there was a time when he took an interest in what 
he calls the “natural sciences.”  (This is what Aristotle calls “physics,” or “second 
philosophy.”)  He says that he gave up this interest when he learned that they do 
not investigate the true causes of things.  (The true cause of things for Aristotle is 
the subject of “metaphysics,” or “first philosophy.”)  His study of the natural 
sciences, he continues, blinded him to such an extent that he had to unlearn what 
                                            
36 All appearances violate the law of contradiction in ancient Greek thought because they are 
ontologically opposed to their essence.  Their fundamental structure is, essentially, to be what they 
are not.  
37 This means that form violates the law of contradiction although it expresses the law of identity. 
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he thought he clearly knew before.  The examples of the kinds of questions that 
Socrates claims he was no longer able to answer are striking.  He says that he 
once thought that men grew because they ate and drank and that a tall man was 
taller than a shorter man because his body stood taller.  Even clearer than this, he 
continues, he thought that ten was more than eight because two had been added 
to it.  But now,  
I will not even allow myself to say that where one is added to 
one either the one to which it is added or the one that is added 
becomes two, or that the one added and the one to which it is 
added become two because of the addition of the one to the 
other.  I wonder that, when each of them is separate from the 
other, each of them is one, nor are they then two, but that, 
when they come near to one another, this is the cause of their 
becoming two, the coming together and being placed closer to 
one another.  Nor can I any longer be persuaded that when 
one thing is divided, this division is the cause of its becoming 
two, for just now the cause of becoming two was the opposite.  
At that time it was their coming close together and one was 
added to the other, but now it is because one is taken and 
separated from the other (Phaedo, 96e-97b). 
 
In this passage, Socrates argues that if one is one, then it cannot become two.  If it 
becomes two, it could not have been one.  If one becomes two, two becomes one, 
and one and two are identical.38  No sum can be accounted for.  If the true cause of 
two is addition, it cannot be division.  For addition and division, coming together 
and coming apart, are opposites.  So, too, with all other mathematical operations.  
It is not merely doubtful, then, that one plus one is two.  It is impossible, just as it is 
impossible for a man to grow because he eats (for he grows when he does not eat 
and is not always eating when he grows) or for him to be taller than another by so 
                                            
38 In the Republic, Socrates claims that all numbers are in themselves one (525b-526a). 
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many inches because his body stands taller by the same amount (for men appear 
to grow in different ways, and a father is taller than his son when he is born but 
may be shorter than him when he grows into a man).  All the natural sciences, in 
seeking to explain appearances on the basis of appearances, are blind because 
they contradict both logic and perception.39    
Socrates goes on to say that, instead of “groping in the dark,” he concerned 
himself with another kind of cause that he cannot demonstrate but that he is 
compelled to assume.  The sole reason that big things are big, that numbers are 
numbers, etc., he tells his friend Cebes, is because of “the presence of, or the 
sharing in,” form.  “I will not insist on the precise nature of that relationship,” he 
says, and will hold to “the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.  And if I 
stick to this I think I shall never fall into error” (100d-e).  Everything that is bigger is 
bigger because it shares in Bigness; two is two because it shares in Twoness, etc.  
There is no other cause of things that appear except form and, if pressed to 
provide a further account of the matter, he advises Cebes, it is best to   
cling to the safety of your own hypothesis and give that 
answer.  If someone then attacked your hypothesis itself, you 
would ignore him and would not answer until you had 
examined whether the consequences that follow from it agree 
with one another or contradict one another.  And when you 
must give an account of your hypothesis itself you will proceed 
in the same way: you will assume another hypothesis, the one 
which seems to you best of the higher ones until you come to 
something acceptable, but you will not jumble the two as the 
debaters do by discussing the hypothesis and its 
consequences at the same time, if you wish to discover any 
truth (101d-e). 
                                            
39 Socrates has no difficulty in using numbers and mathematical operations when it suits his 
purposes, as he does, for example, in Meno (82b ff.).  
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Socrates cannot account for the relationship between form and appearance, 
but he is nevertheless compelled to explain each in terms of the other, and he goes 
back and forth between these two opposites.  If anyone demands that the 
relationship between form and appearance be justified, then, in order to avoid 
being contradicted, one must generate a hypothesis that is better than the original 
one.  Socrates does not elaborate upon what this other hypothesis could be 
because the safest hypothesis is one that conforms to the law of contradiction, i.e., 
one that cannot be contradicted.  No hypothesis could be safer than form because 
form admits of no opposite, i.e., it cannot appear.  If someone wants to put forward 
a hypothesis that he thinks is better, as the poets, artisans, and others have tried to 
do, then it should be brought forward for examination (logical analysis).   
Socrates “knows” – at the level of appearance – that, when one begins with 
the opposition between thought and existence, logic will show that all appearances 
are contradictory.  When he says that one should examine whether the 
consequences that follow from the primary hypothesis agree with one another or 
contradict one another, and that one should not jumble these consequences with 
the primary hypothesis, we must ask whether, for Socrates, the contradictory 
conclusions that follow from the contradictory hypothesis are themselves 
consistent or contradictory.  What does Socrates mean by “agreement” and 
“contradiction”?  What Plato’s dialogues show, time and time again, is that when 
Socrates’ opponent professes to have a better hypothesis than Socrates, Socrates 
demonstrates that the conclusions that follow from it are contradictory.  He then 
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uses these contradictions against his opponent.  When contradictions arise from 
Socrates’ own hypothesis, however, Socrates is able to view these contradictions 
as proof that he is consistent.  Here, too, he can use contradictions against his 
opponent.40  The key point to note is that Socrates does not overcome the 
contradictions that he exposes.  For the logic that he follows in order to attain 
knowledge begins with the premise that thought and existence are, at one and the 
same time, identical opposites. 
Aristotle is no different from Plato in being able to expose, without being 
able to overcome, the contradictions that follow from the ontological opposition 
between thought and existence.  In Section 6 of Book 1 of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle notes that the form cannot be one if it is the form of particular 
things, which are in as many ways as they appear.  Is the form isolated from the 
particular?  If so, what meaning could it have?  Or is the form expressed in the 
particular?  If so, how could it be a thing in itself?   
[I]s nothing other than the Idea good in itself?  In that case the 
Form will be empty.  But if [other things] are also things good 
in themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as 
something identical in them all (1096a12-1096b26, emphasis 
added). 
  
From these observations, the reader may expect that Aristotle will reject the 
form because it cannot be thought.  Yet, Aristotle draws the opposite conclusion.  
Just after he rejects the position that distinct and diverse goods are good because 
they participate in one form, Aristotle asks, “[b]ut then in what way are things called 
                                            
40 This is what Socrates does at his trial.  He indicates to the judges that it is because he does not 
have any knowledge of the good that his accusers are not good in accusing him, a good man, of not 
being good.  
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good?  They do not seem to be like the things that only chance to have the same 
name.”  His point is that, if there is no common meaning of “good” when different 
things are called good, then these things are called good in ignorance of what 
makes them good.  For if the good can mean different things, then it has no fixed 
meaning and cannot be the good.  Aristotle says that he will leave this question for 
other philosophers to work out, but he does not, in fact, let it go.  He pursues the 
issue and writes:   
even if there is some one good which is universally predicable 
of goods or is capable of separate and independent existence, 
clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; but we are 
now seeking something attainable.  Perhaps, however, some 
one might think it worth while to have knowledge of it with a 
view to the goods that are attainable and achievable; for 
having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods 
that are good for us, and if we know them shall attain them.  
This argument has some plausibility, but seems to clash with 
the procedure of the sciences [that deal with particular things] 
... .  It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or carpenter will be 
benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this ‘good 
itself’, or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a 
better doctor or general thereby.  For a doctor seems not even 
to study health in this way, but the health of man, or perhaps 
rather the health of a particular man; for it is individuals that he 
is healing.  But enough of these topics (1096b32-1097a14).   
 
 To the reader, Aristotle’s train of thought has derailed.  Aristotle rejects form 
because it is unattainable and, since it cannot be predicable of things that are 
attainable, it is useless for living, thinking, and acting human beings.  Why, then, 
does Aristotle conclude that it is not probable that persons would not seek 
knowledge of the unattainable?  Why would Aristotle conclude that it is plausible to 
think that the unattainable is worthwhile for helping one achieve what is attainable?  
How is what human beings cannot know a “pattern” for what human beings do 
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know?  Aristotle does not answer these questions.  Instead, he closes the 
discussion and begins the next section with the sentence, “Let us again return to 
the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be” (1097a15).  Thus, whereas we 
observe serious problems that need to be addressed, Aristotle proceeds as if 
nothing unusual has occurred.      
 Aristotle is not able to overcome the contradictions that he exposes in 
Plato’s thought because he begins with the same contradictory premise as Plato.  
The telos of all things that all men by nature desire to know is structurally identical 
to Plato’s form.  Aristotle offers his most sustained accounts of the telos in Book 10 
of the Nicomachean Ethics and in Book 12 of the Metaphysics.  In the former, he 
argues that the telos is the “natural ruler” of a man (1177a11-18).  It is, however, 
not a state in which a man can be insofar as he lives, for it is whole, complete, self-
sufficient, unchanging, and lacking in nothing (1097a24-1098a20 and 1176a30-
1177a18).  
[S]uch a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as 
he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine 
is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our 
composite nature [of body and soul] is its activity superior to ... 
[human] excellence.  If intellect is divine, then, in comparison 
with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with 
human life.  But we must not follow those who advise us, 
being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of 
mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves 
immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the 
best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does 
it in power and worth surpass everything.  This would seem, 
too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and 
better part of him.  It would be strange, then, if he were to 
choose not the life of himself but that of something else … 
since intellect more than anything else is man.  … Now if you 
take away from a living being action, and still more production, 
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what is left but contemplation?  Therefore the activity of God, 
which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be 
contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is 
most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b27-1178b23).   
 
 We see in this account that the relationship between the telos and the 
human being is a purely logical, or formal, relation.  Something divine is present in 
a man, and in fact is each man himself, but this something is too high for a man’s 
“composite nature.”  It is the divine, immortal and indivisible soul that both Socrates 
(Phaedo 79b ff.) and Aristotle (Book 3, On the Soul) argue is separable from the 
body.  Aristotle has, then, drawn these parallels: just as the immortal soul is greater 
than the mortal body, so the activity of the immortal soul is greater than the activity 
of mortals, and so too is the divine life greater than human life.  In other words, the 
divine life, which more than anything is man and has authority over his lesser part, 
is a man’s contradictory – just as the indivisible soul of all things (form) is the 
contradictory essence of divisible bodies (appearances).  The end for human 
beings involves no action or production.  This notion, that no man can be happy 
until he is dead to mortal life, is also the prevailing theme in the Greek tragedies.41   
 Aristotle discusses the nature of contemplation, or the blessed soul 
(eudaemonia), at the end of Book 12 of the Metaphysics when he deliberates 
about the nature of God.  He argues that God cannot be otherwise than it is when it 
moves things that are capable of being otherwise.  For, if this were not the case, 
one would be involved in an infinite regress in trying to explain the first cause of 
                                            
41 See, for example, the counsel of the chorus of Theban elders which concludes Oedipus the King: 
“[c]ount no mortal happy till he has passed the final limit of his life secure from pain.”   
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motion.42  Thus, it is a “first principle” that God is the “mover which moves without 
being moved” (1071b29-30, 1071a25-26, 1072b8-14).  The life of God, the 
unmoved mover that is the object of all desire and thought, Aristotle continues, is 
the contemplative life in which the best thinking thinks in the best way about the 
best object.  Since the divine is “that which is best in itself,” or else it would not be 
what it is, it follows that divine thought “shares the nature of the object of thought; 
for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its 
objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same” (1072b18-31).   
 Aristotle, like Plato, does not discuss how the end can be realized in human 
life.  His analysis of God consists in listing the predicates that are contained in the 
notion of God as a thing in itself, and then he offers this list as an explanation of 
what God is, as though he were discovering something new.  Since the relationship 
between the notion and the predicates that necessarily belong to it is logical and 
not existential, Aristotle does not advance his discussion beyond a formal analysis 
of the notion that he wants to think about.  God is the end of all action; therefore, 
God is immortal, unmoved, the first mover, unchanging, self-sufficient, the object of 
its own thought ... .  Two sections after arriving at the assertion that divine thought 
thinks itself, Aristotle returns to the problem of what the nature of divine thought 
could mean.  What is thought thinking itself?  Is its object nothing?  If so, God “is 
just like one who sleeps.”  If God depends on something else, however, then “it 
                                            
42 Aristotle is here consistent with the Eleatic philosophers who argue that, since the cause (nature) 
of motion is unmoved, all appearances of motion are necessarily contradictory.  See, for example, 
Zeno’s demonstrations as discussed in H. D. P. Lee’s Zeno of Elea: A Text, with Translation and 
Notes (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1967). 
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cannot be the best substance” (1074b15-20).  Aristotle rejects both of these 
alternatives.  God must think something and, according to the law of the excluded 
middle, this something must be either itself or something else.  He writes, 
what does it think?  Either itself or something else; and if 
something else, either the same always or something different.  
Does it matter, then, or not, whether it thinks the good or any 
chance thing?  Are there not some things about which it is 
incredible that it should think?  Evidently, then, it thinks that 
which is most divine and precious, and it does not change; for 
change would be change for the worse, and this would be 
already a movement.  … Therefore it must be itself that 
[divine] thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), 
and its thinking is a thinking on thinking (1074b22-34). 
 
Aristotle concludes this section by distinguishing between, on the one hand, divine 
thought and, on the other hand, perceptual knowledge and opinion, the latter of 
which “have always something else as their object.”  He reaffirms that the object of 
divine thought cannot be composite, and so is unlike “human thought, or rather the 
thought of composite objects” (1074b35-1075a10).       
 The premise that all things by nature aim at an end has led Aristotle to 
inquire about the nature of this end.  He has concluded that, while the end in itself 
more than anything else is man, it would be incredible if men could think it; for God 
must think nothing but itself.  For this reason, Aristotle concludes, as he does in his 
criticism of Plato’s form, that, although he cannot think of what he is saying, it is 
evident that what he is saying is true.  Rather than give up on his notion of God, he 
gives up on his own thought.  This is the central point to remember.  For Aristotle, 
being able to think what he says is not a condition for making assertions that what 
he says is necessarily true.  There is a standard of truth that does not involve any 
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existential relationship between thinking and its object, and this standard is formal 
logic.43   
 Plato brilliantly depicts his own dependence upon what contradicts him in 
Books 6 and 7 of the Republic and in the Parmenides.  Adeimantus asks Socrates 
in Book 6 of the Republic if there is anything more important than Justice.  
Socrates replies that, yes, the form of the Good is more important, but “it isn’t 
enough to look at a mere sketch, as we did before, while neglecting the most 
complete account” (504d).  (The “sketch” that Socrates wants to abandon is 
everything that has been discussed in Books 1-5.)  Socrates first states his position 
that good things are good, useful, and beneficial because of their relation to the 
form of the Good (504e-505a), but then he tells Adeimantus,   
                                            
43 In On the Soul, Aristotle follows the same line of reasoning as he does in both the Nicomachean 
Ethics and the Metaphysics.  He begins his analysis of the soul with an account of the ways in 
which the soul appears to affect the growth, decay, and general functions of living things.  When he 
investigates further into the nature of the soul, however, he sees that, in itself, it cannot relate to the 
body.  What, then, could the soul think?  What could its object be?  He questions, “if thought is 
simple and impassible and has nothing in common with anything else ... how can it come to think at 
all?  For interaction between two factors [i.e., between thought and its object] is held to require a 
precedent community of nature between the factors.  Again it might be asked, is thought a possible 
object of thought to itself?” (429b22-26) 
 Aristotle addresses this problem as best as he can; he restates the opposition between the 
soul and the body and makes logical distinctions in order to express his position more clearly.  
Thought is potentially actual insofar as it is “capable of being disengaged from matter.”  Insofar as 
the object of thought is matter, however, thought is actually nothing (429b31-430a10).  For “[a]ctual 
knowledge is identical with its object … .  It does not sometimes think and sometimes not think.  
When separated it is alone just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal … and without this, 
nothing thinks” (430a17-26).  However, having made no advance into the problem, he postpones 
for a later time consideration of the question of whether it is possible to think of something that is 
separate “while not existing separate from spatial conditions” (431b16-19). 
 Aristotle is not able to distinguish between articulating a contradiction and resolving it 
because he is not able to distinguish between logic and what Kant, we shall see in Chapter 4, 
develops as reason.  For Aristotle, reason is deductive logic; what deductive logic shows on the 
bases of teleological premises is that thought is opposed to existence.  It might be thought that 
Aristotle recognizes, substantively, that the problem that he wants to solve is the problem of how 
thought and existence relate to one another when they are opposed to one another.  How can 
human beings reach their end?  But the only tool that he has to deal with the problem of existence 
that cannot be thought is thought that cannot exist.   
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we have no adequate knowledge of it.  And you also know 
that, if we don’t know it, even the fullest possible knowledge of 
other things is of no benefit to us, any more than if we acquire 
any possession without the good of it.  Or do you think that it is 
any advantage to have every kind of possession without the 
good of it?  Or to know everything except the good, thereby 
knowing nothing fine or good? (505a-b, emphasis added).   
 
It is ridiculous, Socrates carries on, for those who speak about knowledge of the 
good to do so when they do not know what it is, and then to  
blame us for not knowing the good and then turn around and 
talk to us as if we did know it.  They say that [the good] is 
knowledge of the good – as if we understood what they’re 
speaking about when they utter the word “good” (505b-c). 
 
Adeimantus agrees with Socrates and asks him to say something about the good, 
given that he has spent a great deal of time thinking about what it is.  Socrates, 
however, repeats that he does not know what the good is.  “What?  Do you think 
it’s right to talk about things one doesn’t know as if one does know them?” (506c)  
When Adeimantus asks Socrates to speak, not as though he knows what the good 
is but merely to opine about the good, Socrates replies that even the best opinions 
are blind.  Glaucon enters into the conversation and pleads with Socrates not to 
“desert us with the end almost in sight.  We’ll be satisfied if you discuss the good 
as you discussed justice, moderation, and the rest’” (506d, emphasis added).  
Socrates remarks that he would be satisfied to do so, adding, however, that, in 
trying, he would disgrace himself and look ridiculous.  He then says:   
let’s abandon the quest for what the good itself is for the time 
being … .  But I am willing to tell you about what is apparently 
an offspring of the good and most like it.  Is that agreeable to 
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you, or would you rather we let the whole matter drop? (506d-
e)   
 
Glaucon does not want to let the matter drop and Socrates agrees to speak about 
the offspring of the good without speaking about the good.  It is at this point that 
Socrates introduces the analogy of the divided line, to which I shall return in a 
moment.  
 The discussion between Socrates and his friends is both ordinary and 
extraordinary.  It is ordinary because it reflects the basic structure of Plato’s 
dialogues.  Socrates does not know anything, but the knowledge of not having any 
knowledge does not prevent him from talking about knowledge.  When he speaks 
about form, he thinks about appearances.  His speech contradicts his thought.  But 
he thinks what he says and he says what he thinks: he just does not know that of 
which he speaks.  What for us is so extraordinary is that Socrates and his 
interlocutors continue the discussion despite the fact that it is fruitless.  Let us 
review the central points of the passages cited above.  Socrates insists that he has 
no adequate knowledge of the form of the Good.  He also insists that, without 
adequate knowledge of this form, nothing can be good, useful, or beneficial in any 
way.  Given these two positions, if the dialogue does not stop, we expect that 
someone would raise the question of why it should continue.  But no one raises 
this question.44  Instead, the dialogue goes in the opposite direction.  Socrates 
                                            
44 It may be suggested that the reason that the dialogue continues is that Socrates aims to carry out 
his divine mission to reveal the ignorance of everyone, i.e., to “come to the assistance of the god 
and show [my interlocutor] that he is not wise” (Apology, 23b).  The fact that Socrates serves Apollo 
does not mean, however, that Socrates does not seek knowledge.  For all men by nature desire to 
know because thought is for the sake of an end (to recall Aristotle).  The knowledge that no one 
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says that it makes no sense for him to talk about what he does not know.  But he 
also says that what he does not know is the most important thing to talk about.  He 
says that it is ridiculous for one to blame him for not knowing the good and then to 
speak to him as though he does know it.  But then he speaks to his friends as 
though he does know the good through its “offspring,” which, he says, is not the 
good.  He discusses the relationship between form and appearances through 
analogies, but these analogies are meant to demonstrate that all analogies, 
including his own, are contradictory.45   
In the analogy of the divided line presented at the end of Book 6, Socrates 
distinguishes among four activities of the mind: imagination, belief, thought, and 
reason.  The objects of imagination, he says, are images of their originals.  For 
example, the image of a tree is the reflection of a tree on the surface of a pond 
(509d-e).  The object of belief is the sensible original of its image; for example, the 
tree whose image is reflected on the water (510a).  The object of thought is form.  
Thought tries to use the objects of sense perception, which Socrates here calls 
“hypotheses,” to reach the form.  However, thought never attains the form “since it 
cannot reach beyond its hypotheses” (510b, 511a).  Reason, like thought, also 
proceeds from hypotheses.  Unlike thought, however, it does make its way to a first 
principle that is not a hypothesis.  This first principle, form, is what Socrates calls 
                                                                                                                                     
knows the form does not lead either Socrates or his friends to abandon the search for it.  If 
anything, it propels the search.  
45 In Greek teleology, all appearances, without exception, are contradictory.  For they necessarily 
speak against their existence.  The consequence of the fact that existence cannot appear – for 
appearances do not exist – is that the opposition between appearance and existence cannot be 
contradicted.  The ontological opposition between appearance and existence is, therefore, the 
ground of the necessary contradictions of appearances in general.   
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“the unhypothetical first principle of everything.”  Having grasped it, reason moves 
“from forms to forms, and [it ends] in forms” (511b-c).46  
The main reason that Socrates differentiates among the four activities of the 
mind is to distinguish reason from imagination, belief, and thought.  Reason alone 
reaches the end and attains knowledge.  However, Socrates is not able to account 
for how reason reaches the end, which is what the modern reader wants to know.  
If imagination, belief, and thought cannot attain knowledge because each begins 
with the hypotheses of sense perception, how can reason, which also begins with 
hypotheses, use them as “stepping stones” to reach the unhypothetical form?  How 
can the explanation for why imagination, belief, and thought fail to reach form also 
be the same explanation for why reason succeeds?  Socrates does not say.  He 
does not provide a secure criterion for one to distinguish between knowledge and 
ignorance, although it is precisely in order to determine the grounds for this 
distinction that he finds it necessary to invoke the analogy of the divided line. 
Plato leaves the analogy of the divided line as a contradiction.  He then 
regenerates what amounts to the same contradiction in the analogy of the cave 
that immediately follows at the beginning of Book 7.  Here, Socrates describes all 
human beings as slaves who are imprisoned in a cave from childhood.  They are 
fettered, unable to turn around, and all that these slaves see in front of them on the 
wall of the cave are shadows.  If a prisoner were freed, Socrates says, he would 
see that the shadows are only reflections of what truly is, i.e., being itself.  Being is 
                                            
46 Socrates speaks of form in the plural, i.e., as an appearance, because he does not know what it 
is. 
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like the sun that is “in some way” the cause of visible things (516b-c).  Whether this 
analogy is true or not, Socrates continues, he does not know. 
But this is how I see it: [i]n the knowable realm, the form of the 
good is the last thing to be seen, and it is reached only with 
difficulty.  Once one has seen it, however, one must conclude 
that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in 
anything, that it produces both light and its source in the 
visible realm, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and 
provides truth and understanding, so that anyone who is to act 
sensibly in private or public must see it.  ... [T]he ones who get 
to this point are unwilling to occupy themselves with human 
affairs (517b-c). 
  
As in the analogy of the divided line, the opposition between form and 
appearance leaves Socrates contradicted by the very logic and perception upon 
which he depends.  The sun is what Socrates has just called “belief”: it is merely an 
appearance that is outside the cave and not inside the cave.  The opposition, then, 
between form and appearance in the cave analogy amounts to the similarity 
between belief and imagination in the line analogy.  Socrates attempts to show that 
the appearance of the sun is not like other appearances when he claims that the 
sun is blinding (517a).  For this reason it is the last thing to be seen: it is the end in 
itself.  One never sees anything ever again.  To know the Good is to be the Good.  
The sun, then, is an absolutely contradictory analogue for the form.  It appears to 
Socrates as the visible source of light in the visible world.  It is perceived, not 
known.  Form, however, is not a part of the visible world.  It is known, not 
perceived.  Yet, the primary opposition between form and appearance leaves 
Socrates with no choice but to think about form as an appearance (and vice-versa). 
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Plato’s most sustained deduction of the contradictions that follow from the 
ontological opposition between appearance and form is found in the Parmenides.  
Here, Parmenides does to Socrates what Socrates does to his interlocutors in 
other dialogues.  He shows Socrates that, while the notion of the form is absurd 
because of the interminable contradictions that follow, the notion that there is no 
form is even more absurd, because in that case nothing can be explained at all.  
What is form?  If the form is the essence of appearances, it is an appearance, and 
appearances are forms.  In order, then, for either to be, the form must relate to 
appearances and appearances must not relate to the form.   
Form must be, in itself, one, if it is not to be an appearance whose form is 
one.  If the form is one, however, it would both be and be one, which would make it 
not one.  Thus, if it is one, it cannot be; if it has being, it cannot be one.  There is 
no difference between being one and being infinite because what is one, is, and is 
therefore two, three (one, being, and two), four ... and an infinite multitude of forms 
must appear if the form cannot appear.  Parmenides tells Socrates,  
nothing can be like the form, nor can the form be like anything 
else.  Otherwise, alongside the form another form will always 
make its appearance, and if that form is like anything, yet 
another; and if the form proves to be like what partakes of it, a 
fresh form will never cease emerging (132e-133a).   
    
Parmenides and Socrates make several fresh beginnings, all of which lead 
to contradiction.  Since it is absurd for appearances to be without being 
appearances, what is this abiding (unchanging) being that is itself by itself?  Is it 
large?  Is it small?  Is it in time?  Is it timeless?  Is it divisible or indivisible?  Is it 
somewhere or nowhere?  Is it knowable or unknowable?  It cannot be large 
 66 
because the larger the form is the smaller it must be.  For it must contain more 
small parts, and that which has more small parts has a greater share of the Small 
and is smaller.  The Small, however, must be larger than the parts that it contains 
and must, therefore, participate in the Large.  The form is therefore both large and 
small and neither large – because it is small – nor small – because it is large.  If it 
exists in time, it must be both young and old and neither young nor old, which is 
absurd.  But if it is timeless, how can appearances in time share in it?  Is it a part or 
whole?  It cannot be a part without being within a whole that is not one.  It also 
cannot be a whole without containing parts.  But if it is neither part nor whole, then 
what is it?  And where?  Is it in itself or in another?  It cannot be in itself because it 
would then be in something that contains it.  It would thus be one thing as a 
container and another thing as contained.  But it also cannot be in another, for it 
has no parts that can touch other parts.  The form is therefore nowhere and 
nothing.  Or is it?  After all, not to be, to be a not-being, is to be!  If it is by itself 
then it must be unknowable.  But it is only if it is by itself that it can be known.  
Through what properties can it be known?  If it could have properties, it could not 
be one.  If it cannot have properties, it also cannot be one.  If it is one, however, 
then it is infinite … . 
The final words of the dialogue show that Parmenides and Socrates are 
trapped in the excluded middle with no way out.  Parmenides summarizes the 
conclusion at which he and Socrates have arrived as follows: “whether one is or is 
not, it and the others [that are not one] both are and are not, and both appear and 
do not appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in relation to 
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each other” (166c).  This means that because form and appearance are dependent 
contradictories, the law of contradiction is in contradiction with itself and there is no 
escape from the excluded middle (A is not-A).  
 The Greek explanation for why the human being is opposed to his end in the 
beginning presupposes this opposition47 and is developed through a logical 
analysis of it.  The human being aims at his end because he does not possess it, 
i.e., he is not an end in himself.  This is what Aristotle communicates when he 
writes that God “produces motion in being loved” (Metaphysics, 1072b3-4): love 
consists in the opposition between the lover and the end in itself.  The desire a 
man has to attain his end originates in, and it is sustained by, his awareness that it 
is opposed to him.  It is the natural dependence between desire and its opposite 
that makes the desire for knowledge necessary but, from our point of view, futile.
 Plato drives home the same point as Aristotle when he demonstrates in the 
Symposium that because the form is necessarily the highest object of love, it is not 
possible for a man to love what he possesses.  Rather, these appearances block 
him in the pursuit of knowledge.  Socrates asks Agathon whether, at the time a 
                                            
47 In Greek myth for a mortal to question why he is fated is to resist, in blindness and ignorance, the 
inexorable force of tradition which the Greeks accept to be as old as time.  This tradition teaches 
that no mortal has the right to question the gods.  In The Bacchae, Teiresias tells Cadmus, “[w]e do 
not trifle with divinity.  No, we are the heirs of customs and traditions hallowed by age and handed 
down to us by our fathers” (200-203).  Later, before the tragedy unfolds, the chorus of Bacchae 
chants, “[b]eyond the old beliefs, no thought, no act shall go.  Small, small is the cost to believe in 
this: whatever is god is strong; whatever long time has sanctioned, that is a law forever; the law 
tradition makes is the law of nature” (891-896, emphasis added). 
 The question of why the Greeks viewed tradition as a law of nature (or why the worldview of 
the Greeks is the way it is), i.e., as though a fundamentally different perspective is possible, is not 
one that can be posed (or answered) from within ancient teleology.  It presupposes the necessary 
relationship between thought and existence, i.e., the consciousness that human beings are ends in 
themselves.  
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human being desires something, he is in possession of it, and Agathon replies that 
this is not likely.  Socrates counters, 
[i]nstead of what’s likely, ... ask yourself whether it’s necessary 
that this be so: a thing that desires desires something of which 
it is in need; otherwise, if it were not in need, it would not 
desire it.  I can’t tell you, Agathon, how strongly it strikes me 
that this is necessary.  But how about you? (200a-b) 
 
Agathon agrees with Socrates.  It is not possible, then, for a healthy man to want to 
be healthy, Socrates argues, “because no one is in need of those things he already 
has.”  He is what he is, whether he wants to be or not, because of a “logical 
necessity” (a healthy person is healthy because he is healthy).  When a person 
desires what he has, Socrates continues, what is meant is that he desires to 
possess what he has now at a future time (200c-d).  
 Socrates communicates here that, because desire necessarily depends 
upon – it is moved by – not possessing the object that is desired, all desire must be 
unfulfilled.  It is the consciousness of being unfulfilled that alone stokes the flames 
of desire.  To desire something, then, is always to desire what one cannot want, in 
principle, when this desire is fulfilled.  When Socrates says to Agathon that a 
healthy man does not desire to be healthy in the present but that he desires this 
same health in the future, he is indicating that he will be in the same contradiction 
in all future times that he is in now.  Given that human love must be love of 
something and that objects which can be possessed cannot be loved once they are 
attained, it follows that the true object of love cannot be possessed.  After his 
exchange with Agathon, Socrates speaks with Diotima.  There, we learn that the 
true object of love is “not polluted by human flesh or colors or any other great 
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nonsense of mortality” (211e).  It is what Socrates earlier calls “happiness” (205a): 
he uses the same Greek term that Aristotle uses to refer to the end in itself: 
eudaemonia.  Happiness is the blessedness of the immortal soul that produces 
motion in being loved because it is “itself by itself with itself” (211b). 
 The fact that, for Plato and Aristotle, a human being can only love what 
opposes him means that his answer to the question of why he must begin with the 
law of contradiction is itself dependent upon the law of contradiction.  Yet, it is 
precisely this law that drives him to violate the law of contradiction without end.  
Since logic, for the Greeks, is inviolable, the contradictions to which it leads are 
necessary.   
 In the Metaphysics, we see that, for Aristotle, all demonstration must begin 
and end with the law of contradiction.  This means that all demonstration must 
begin with contradiction if it is to avoid contradiction.  Aristotle writes in Book 3:  
[b]y the starting-points of demonstration I mean the common 
beliefs, on which all men base their proofs, e.g. that everything 
must be either affirmed or denied, and that a thing cannot at 
the same time be and not be, and all other such propositions 
(996b27-30, emphasis added).   
 
The law of contradiction, he says in Book 4, is the starting-point for demonstration 
because it is the most certain and “most indisputable of all principles” (1006a4-5).  
If men, however, were to demand a demonstration of this principle itself, they 
would be calling for an  
infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration.  
But if there are things of which one should not demand 
demonstration, these persons cannot say what principle they 
regard as more indemonstrable than the present one (1006a9-
11). 
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It is possible, Aristotle argues, to “demonstrate negatively” that the law of 
contradiction must be the starting point for demonstration “if our opponent will only 
say something ... which is significant both for himself and for another.”  If, however, 
“he says nothing, it is absurd to attempt to reason with one who will not reason 
about anything, in so far as he refuses to reason” (1006a12-22).  Anticipating that 
this will lead some people to ask who is to be the judge of how the law of 
contradiction is to be applied in any given case, Aristotle answers that such people 
“have no conviction” because they “demand that a reason shall be given for 
everything.”   
But their mistake is what we have stated it to be; they seek a 
reason for that for which no reason can be given; for the 
starting-point of demonstration is not demonstration (1011a7-
13). 
 
 According to Aristotle, then, if the starting point were not indemonstrable, it 
would refer to another principle that is less certain.  Thus, the law of contradiction 
obtains authority as a first principle because it is the most indemonstrable principle 
of all.  When Aristotle writes that this can be demonstrated negatively by letting the 
man who denies the primacy of the law of contradiction speak about something 
significant, his point is that in order for a claim to be understood, it cannot 
contradict itself.  However, a statement that does not contradict itself can be 
contradicted by other statements that also do not contradict themselves and the 
law of contradiction cannot determine which of these non-contradictory statements 
are true and which are false.  Hence, when a man begins with the principle of 
contradiction, his opponent will be sure to show him that he is right: what he says is 
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indemonstrable.  For Aristotle, when a man speaks about something seriously, he 
must assert something and deny its contradictory.  This “conviction” is what 
prevents all things from becoming contradictory.  But since there is no basis for this 
conviction other than the fact that the one who defends it claims that it, and not the 
convictions of his opponents, is to be believed, the proof that the highest principle 
of all reasoning is the law of contradiction turns out to be that it leads to 
irresolvable contradictions.  For what reasoning from the law of contradiction 
shows is that all convictions can be overthrown.  
 Reason that lacks its final end is ignorant of its beginnings.  That is why I 
maintain that it is indistinguishable from logic, which cannot account for its 
premises and conclusions.  For the Greeks, logic is not merely what Kant calls a 
“canon” (i.e., a necessary instrument for proof).  It is what he calls an “organon” 
(i.e., a sufficient condition for proof).  Because it is an organon, it ceases to be 
even a canon.  The more the Greeks demonstrate through logic that all 
appearances are contradictory, the more they confirm the truth of their teleological 
premise that thought is ontologically opposed to existence.  This premise, in turn, 
confirms that the law of contradiction is the first principle of thought.  Logic 
supports the primary premise because it begins and ends with it.  Not only is 
thought that is dependent upon logic blind, but it is dependent upon its blindness in 
order to “see.”  Thus, while every person must, if his speech is to be understood, 
assert a position on something, no individual can account for, i.e., know, his own 
beginning, which is relative to him and opposed to the beginnings of those who 
oppose him.  The result is that, as Cohen shows in his analysis of Athenian 
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litigation, everyone can contradict, and be contradicted by, everyone else.  Just as 
the end in itself is held to be the end of contradiction in human life while, in fact, it 
is the principle that necessitates it, so, too, the law of contradiction is the first 
principle for avoiding contradiction while, in fact, it is on the basis of this law that 
human beings reproduce contradictions without end.       
 The principle that it is essential to have no explanation for one’s beginnings 
in order to be able to explain anything and, therefore, that all explanations can 
have no explanation, describes perfectly the deductive reasoning of Plato and 
Aristotle.  It leads to conclusions that are contradictory but, from both philosophers’ 
point of view, necessary.  It is important to understand that the reason that Aristotle 
argues that the law of contradiction is the indemonstrable basis of demonstration is 
to show that his own position has authority; in this respect, he is no different than 
Hesiod and Homer, both of whom appeal to the Muses at the outset of their poems 
in order to justify what they say.  But the Muses themselves tell Hesiod that they 
tell lies (Theogony, 27-29) and Homer says to the Muses that “you know all things, 
[while] we have heard only the rumor of it and know nothing” (The Iliad, 2.484-86, 
emphasis added).  How, then, can Hesiod and Homer judge, authoritatively, the 
reports that they hear?  What are the Greek poets and philosophers 
communicating if their authority derives from the fact that they have none, i.e., if 
they have no way of knowing whether what they say is true or false?48   
                                            
48 The fact that the poet seeks authority because he does not possess it means that he is 
dependent upon his ignorance in order to have knowledge.  In the Theogony, Hesiod says that 
Memory bore the Muses “to be a forgetting of troubles” and a “pause in sorrow” (55-56).  Anyone 
who is grieved or troubled and who hears the sweet voice of Muses’ servant chanting the deeds of 
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 Aristotle notes that philosophy and myth share a common nature, a common 
beginning, and a common end, in a brief but instructive discussion in Book 1 of the 
Metaphysics (982b11-983a20).  He writes that it is owing to the wonder and 
puzzlement of the lovers of myth “that men both now begin and at first began to 
philosophize.”  The lovers of myth are therefore “in a sense” lovers of wisdom 
because “they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, … pursuing [the] 
science [of knowledge] in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end.”  Aristotle 
explains that the man who attains knowledge “is free” because he “exists for 
himself and not for another,  … for [knowledge] alone exists for itself.”  The earliest 
philosophers “advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater 
matters,” he writes; yet, the privilege of possessing knowledge “might justly be 
regarded as beyond human power; for in many ways human nature is in bondage.” 
Aristotle supports this position by making reference to the Greek lyric poet 
Simonides, who recognized that “God alone can have this privilege [of knowledge]” 
and, Aristotle continues, “it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the 
knowledge that is suited to him.”  It follows that if there is something to what the 
poets say, then “all who excelled in this knowledge [that is suited to God alone] 
would be unfortunate” because the gods, according to the poets, are jealous.  At 
                                                                                                                                     
past heroes or the blessed gods “soon forgets his heartache, and of all his cares [h]e remembers 
none” (55-104).  The fact that Hesiod praises the daughters of Memory for helping men to forget 
suggests that true memory is the song of the immortal gods and that happiness (eudaemonia) 
involves forgetting the appearances of one’s life.  Hesiod himself communicates that his own 
thought is not involved in the song that he sings, for it is the gods who have “breathed into me a 
voice divine, so I might celebrate past and future” (32-33).  When Hesiod does speak of his era in 
Works and Days, he says that he would prefer to be dead or unborn (201-203).  See Works & Days, 
Theogony.  Translated by Stanley Lombardo.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
1993.   
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this point, Aristotle distances himself from the poets who, he notes, are known to 
lie.  In fact, nothing is more “honorable” and “necessary” than the pursuit of divine 
knowledge, though the acquisition of it “must in a sense end in something which is 
the opposite of our original inquiries.”  A few lines later, he stops the discussion 
and resumes his inquiry into what this knowledge could be.    
 What is Aristotle doing when he distances himself from the poets?  If the 
poets lie, then why does Aristotle, like Plato, appeal to them to support his own 
position?  Aristotle does not want to claim that his own thought has not progressed 
beyond the poets; at the same time, however, he cannot distinguish himself 
substantively from them.  For we see that, like the poets, philosophers pursue 
knowledge in ignorance of what it is and advance their thought little by little in 
exposing the “difficulties” (contradictions) that are entailed in their pursuit.  It is 
through this kind of advance that Aristotle is led to the realization that the poet 
Simonides was indeed correct in concluding that human beings cannot have 
knowledge of God; for the search for knowledge is opposed to knowledge.  When 
Aristotle seeks to distinguish himself from the poets while observing that the 
philosophers, like the poets, do not have the knowledge that they seek, he 
confirms that he is, as the poets are, dependent upon the opposition between 
thought and existence.49     
                                            
49 Plato is in the same position as Aristotle with respect to his critique of the poets.  In the Republic 
Socrates banishes the poets from the just city (595b), the kallipolis, because poetry, which 
concerns appearances and not form, has a corrupting influence on the people.  However, as we 
have seen, Socrates indicates that his own account of the just city is an appearance only.  For he 
does not know what justice is.  Thus, it is not at all clear how Socrates is different from the poets.  
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 Aristotle resumes his discussion of the connection between myth and 
philosophy in Book 12 of the Metaphysics (1074b1-14) in the midst of his analysis 
of God.  He indicates that he has inherited a tradition “in the form of a myth” that 
“the divine encloses the whole of nature” (he is speaking here about the heavenly 
bodies, which he believes are divine).  “The rest of the tradition has been added 
later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude,” he continues.  
For many think that the “gods are in the form of men or like some of the other 
animals.”  However,   
if we were to separate the first point from these additions and 
take it alone – that [our forefathers] thought the first 
substances to be gods – we must regard this as an inspired 
utterance, and reflect that, while probably each art and 
science has often been developed as far as possible and has 
again perished, these opinions have been preserved like relics 
until the present.   
 
In these remarks, Aristotle maintains that the images through which the divine is 
depicted in the later (i.e., more recent) traditions of myth are contradictory; men, 
animals, and other things in nature cannot be divine.  He defends his point, 
however, in the context of maintaining that the heavenly bodies are divine.  This 
suggests that the distinction between the depictions of the divine in later myth and 
his own perspective amounts to the distinction between, on the one hand, 
representing the gods as people and/or animals and, on the other hand, 
representing the gods as planets and stars (as follows from the “inspired utterance” 
of his earliest predecessors) but not as people and animals.  The reason that the 
arts and sciences have all failed to acquire knowledge, however, is not that divine 
existence is opposed to this or that perception but, rather, that it is opposed to 
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thought.  When Aristotle rejects the notion that God can be depicted in nature, he 
is in complete agreement with Plato.  Yet, as Plato has no alternative but to depict 
form as an appearance within the context of his proof that form cannot be an 
appearance (as is clear, for example, in the analogy of the cave), so Aristotle views 
the divine in the appearances of the heavenly bodies in attempting to differentiate 
his own position from the position of the multitude.  He, like Socrates, seems to 
recognize that he does so in ignorance when he refers to his own position as 
“opinions,” not knowledge.  (In fact, it is in the section that immediately follows that 
he defines divine thought as thought thinking itself throughout eternity, while 
perception and opinion always have something else as their object.) 
 How are readers in the modern world to think about the ancient Greeks?  
How are we to understand a kind of thinking whose first principle is that it does not 
exist, except as blind to, and ignorant of, its past, present, and future?  If the 
Greeks cannot account for their own speech, whose beginnings and ends are, as I 
have shown, indemonstrable, how can we?  Jean-Pierre Vernant observes in his 
“Introduction” to The Greeks50 that 
[f]rom the start the universe uncovered and imposed itself 
upon man, in its unimpeachable reality, like a primal given … .  
In an attempt to know the world, man could not place the 
starting point of his project inside himself, as if to reach 
something one had to pass through the consciousness one 
had of it.  The world man’s knowledge focused on was not 
attained ‘in his mind.’  There was nothing farther from Greek 
culture than the Cartesian cogito, the ‘I think’ set forth as a 
condition for and a foundation of all knowledge of the world, of 
oneself, and of God (p. 11, emphasis added). 
                                            
50 Translated by Charles Lambert and Teresa Lavender Fagan.  Edited by Jean-Pierre Vernant.    
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
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In the cogito, Descartes grasps that existence is the object of thought and that 
thought is the criterion for existence; there is nothing in existence that does not 
“pass through” the “I think.”  The foundation for modern life is the necessary 
relationship between thought and existence that is established in the cogito, an 
idea that is central to Kant’s transcendental idealism, as I shall show.  At present, it 
is enough to grasp that, and why, the Greeks cannot comprehend the “I think, 
therefore I am” (and vice-versa: I am, therefore I think).  For them, the reverse is 
true: I think, therefore I am not.  The end in itself is ontologically opposed to (the 
appearances of) thought from the beginning, a beginning that, Vernant sees, has 
no beginning.51  The teleological mind is therefore completely dependent upon its 
inner and outer perceptions and the principle of contradiction, as I have argued.  
Consistent with this insight, Erich Auerbach argues in Chapter 1 of Mimesis: The 
Representation of Reality in Western Literature52 that Homer can be analyzed but 
not interpreted (p. 13).  His narrative allows no room for interpretation, i.e., the 
reader’s involvement, evaluation, judgment, and critique, because it is given as 
complete in itself and “contains nothing but itself” (p. 12).  There are no openings, 
                                            
51 Barry B. Powell contends in Chapter 1 (“The Nature of Myth”) of his book, Classical Myth 
(Second edition.  Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1995), that the setting of ancient myths is 
never “in the present or the recent past; the action always takes place in the distant past, or in a 
shadowy time outside of human chronology altogether” (p. 2).  Extant works that are based on 
these myths have identifiable authors, but “no one can say who created the myth[s] in the first 
place” because “the teller of a mythos [story] does not claim personal responsibility for what is said.  
After all, the teller did not invent the story, but only passes it on” (p. 3).  Once more: “[i]t would be 
pointless to ask when these events occurred, even within the context of the story, because they are 
set in a time before human chronology has meaning” (p. 5).  Thus, “the Greeks had no way to 
compare their traditions with historical reality” (p. 7).  While myths themselves have no identifiable 
origin, Powell asserts, myths “explained why the world is the way it is” (p. 6).  This means that the 
basis of explanation has no explanation.       
52 Translated by Willard R. Trask.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 
 78 
spaces, or gaps that would allow one to establish relations and connections that 
are not already fully disclosed at each and every point.  The text cannot be 
interpreted because it is not layered; it is not layered because nothing in it is 
hidden; and nothing in it is hidden because the narrative is nothing but 
“foreground,” i.e., “a continuous rhythmic procession of phenomena” that is “fully 
externalized” in terms “perceptible to the senses” (pp. 6-7, 13).  Homer is not 
arguing for a particular position, as though other perspectives are possible.  He 
does not ask anything; he only tells.  He, like Plato and Aristotle, is moved by that 
which is unmoved when he, unmoved, moves others. 
 In The Dialectic of Biblical Critique: Interpretation and Existence53 and Truth 
and Interpretation: An Essay in Thinking,54 Brayton Polka delivers the most 
exacting, most substantive, and most exhaustive demonstration known to me that 
the Greeks cannot be read (interpreted, comprehended …) through the principles 
that they themselves uphold as sovereign, except only as texts they are not (The 
Dialectic, p. 44).  For what the Greeks demonstrate about themselves, continually, 
is that they are ignorant of and blind to, other than and opposed to, what they are 
in themselves, and it is not possible for us to interpret or comprehend a mind that 
cannot interpret or comprehend itself (Truth and Interpretation, pp. 55, 137-139).  
Polka sees that, while the Greeks say what they mean and mean what they say, 
what is meant cannot be spoken and what is spoken cannot be meant (The 
Dialectic, pp. 77-78; Truth and Interpretation, p. 140).  Saying and meaning, 
                                            
53 New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986. 
54 New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990. 
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appearance and form, are, because opposed to themselves and one another, 
indistinguishable: “in being immediately identified, [they] remain in eternal 
antagonism to each other” (The Dialectic, p. 16).  Polka shows that the Greeks, 
from their archaic myths to their classical philosophy, have no conception of 
existence (they do not exist in their concepts) and that nothing can be imputed to 
that which cannot be known as interpreted or interpreted as known (Truth and 
Interpretation, pp. 68, 198-199).  He writes,  
[t]he development within ancient Greek culture, from oral to 
written epic poetry and then from heroic epic culture to the … 
great … philosophical texts largely associated with Athens, 
shows a natural growth in technical sophistication but no 
transformation of … wisdom (sophia) into wisdom as the 
original practice of interpreting existence as actual.  The 
changes that occur between Homeric epic … and Plato and 
Aristotle … take place within the structure of … the 
oppositions between mortality and immortality, many and one, 
ruled and ruler, body and soul … [and express] constant 
(rather: arbitrary) metamorphosis but no real transformation 
(The Dialectic, p. 64, emphasis added).   
 
Hence, what may appear as growth in the sophistication of thought from Homer to 
Aristotle “is a growth not in comprehension but in non-comprehension,” that is, in 
the increased brilliance (systematization, comprehensiveness, and lucidity) with 
which the fatal reversals and contradictions of human life are articulated (The 
Dialectic, pp. 79-80).  
 I find that Cohen, Vernant, Auerbach, and Polka are rare among 
contemporary scholars who, for the most part, do not examine the ontological 
 80 
(teleological) character of Greek notions (terms).55  In this chapter I have argued 
that, in Greek thought, human beings are not comprehended as beginnings and 
ends in themselves.  Thought and existence are dependent opposites, formal logic 
is the indemonstrable basis of demonstration, and human beings are reliant upon 
the contradictory appearances of both deductive logic and inductive logic.  The 
apex of human wisdom for the ancient Greeks, one discovers in the writings of 
Plato and Aristotle, is the consciousness that human beings are ignorant of what 
they are ignorant of.  The contradictions of human life are therefore infinite and 
irresolvable because the mind depends upon the premise that leads to them.  
Thus, I maintain that it is impossible for the Greeks to exit from, to exist outside of, 
the closed circle of necessary contradiction – and, also, for us to enter into, and 
appear within, it.  In the next chapter, I shall show that, in radical opposition to the 
Greek conception of the world, the biblical conception is not teleological.  For its 
core ideas converge in the golden rule, i.e., the ethic of love.  Once we are able to 
capture the striking distinctiveness of biblical thought and of teleological thought in 
and through their absolute incommensurability, we shall be able to grasp the 
fundamental concern, argument, and insight of Kant’s critical revolution, which 
                                            
55 The result of this grave oversight is that Greek thought is viewed in the likeness of modern 
thought and often as the birthplace, or even as the ideal, of modern culture.  See, for example, 
Jonathan Barnes’ “Aristotle” (in Founders of Thought.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), R. 
M. Hare’s “Plato” (in Founders of Thought), H.D.F. Kitto’s The Greeks (Middlesex: Penguin Books 
Ltd., 1986), John Pentland Mahaffy’s What Have the Greeks Done for Modern Civilization? (New 
York: G. P. Putnam, 1909), Luis E. Navia’s Socrates: A Life Examined (New York: Prometheus 
Books, 2007), John Mark Reynolds’ When Athens Met Jerusalem: An Introduction to Classical and 
Christian Thought (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009), W. Kenneth Richmond’s Socrates 
and the Western World: An Essay in the Philosophy of Education (London: Alvin Redman, 1954), 
and Bruce S. Thornton’s Greek Ways: How the Greeks Created Western Civilization (San 
Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000). 
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once and for all establishes the parameters of all fruitful metaphysics to be biblical 
morality, not ancient teleology.  
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Chapter 3: Why Biblical Metaphysics is Not Teleological: an Examination of 
Core Biblical Ideas56 
 
 
  In this chapter I want to defend the position that biblical thought is not 
teleological but is, rather, a polemic directed against pagan teleology from a 
position that is not, to my knowledge, found anywhere in pagan thought.  For the 
core ideas in both the Old and New Testaments presuppose the ontological and 
ethical relationship between thought and existence and between human existence 
and the existence of God.  Whereas in pagan thought the end in itself is opposed 
to, and therefore indistinguishable from, the perceived inner and outer world (the 
identity of thought and existence merely reflects their fundamental opposition), in 
the Bible the end in itself is the truest expression of human power: love.  I shall 
examine the biblical ideas of love, sin, idolatry, repentance, creation, God, 
covenant, miracle, eternity, the kingdom of God, and the resurrection from the 
dead and show that, from the biblical standpoint, the end in itself that is adequate 
                                            
56 Throughout this dissertation I have used, and shall continue to use, the terms “teleology” and 
“teleological” to describe all systems of thought in which human beings are not comprehended as 
ends in themselves and in which reason is wholly dependent upon deductive logic and inductive 
logic.  I do not speak of biblical thought or of modern thought as teleological in order to avoid 
conflating Greek and biblical ideas (an error that, I argue, is the raw material for idols).  When I 
defend the position that it is in biblical thought and not in Greek thought that human beings are self-
conscious of being ends in themselves under the idea of freedom (i.e., reason conceived as moral 
will), I do not mean to suggest that the Bible does not explicate the nature of human life in terms of 
our common desire to fulfill goals and purposes that lie beyond our immediate perspectives.  In fact, 
it is only on the basis of biblical ideals that we are able to see that our highest aims bear no 
relationship at all to Aristotle’s telos or Plato’s form and are altogether inconceivable from the 
teleological standpoint.  Thus, when I claim that the Bible is not teleological, I always mean, without 
exception, that it is not teleological in the Greek sense.  To establish that Greek and biblical 
ontologies are incommensurable, however, I cannot avoid speaking in terms that I apply to both.  
Only in so doing am I able to show that these terms have nothing in common because the 
ontological structure of these terms in biblical thought is not teleological, but moral.     
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to its idea is love of self, neighbor, and God at one and the same time and is alone 
creative of the highest possible existence: heaven on earth.   
 The golden rule is the basis of the teaching of both the Old and New 
Testaments.  A clear formulation of it appears in Chapter 19 of Leviticus, after God 
commands the Israelites to be “holy,” to respect their mothers and fathers, not to 
reap their entire harvest but to leave food for the poor, not to steal, not to lie, not to 
deceive one another, not to defraud the neighbor, not to hold back the wages of a 
laborer, not to curse the deaf or be a stumbling block for the blind, not to pervert 
justice by showing partiality either to the poor or to the rich, and not to slander 
others, but “to judge your neighbor fairly.”  When the neighbor is guilty, you must 
“[r]ebuke your neighbor frankly so you will not share in his guilt.  Do not seek 
revenge or bear a grudge against one of your people, but love your neighbor as 
yourself.  I am the Lord” (19.9-18, emphasis added).57   
 The fact that the command to love the neighbor follows immediately upon the 
command not to seek revenge against “one of your people” suggests that, here, 
“neighbor” refers to a fellow Israelite.  However, as Erich Fromm argues in You 
Shall Be as Gods: A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and its Tradition 
(pp. 182 ff.),58 Leviticus 19.33-34 leaves no doubt that one’s neighbors include 
those who do not share the same blood or religion:  
[w]hen an alien lives with you in your land, do not mistreat him.  
The alien living with you must be treated as one of your native-
born.  Love him as yourself, for you were aliens in Egypt.  I am 
the Lord your God. 
                                            
57 All citations from the Bible are taken from the New International Version, unless otherwise noted.  
58 New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1976. 
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The alien is a neighbor of the Israelite, but he is not native-born and he does not 
share the same religion.  The principle that one must love the alien as oneself 
reappears in the Gospels, where Jesus teaches that there are no natural enemies 
in the human community and that one must love not only the neighbor but also the 
enemy (Matt. 5.44, Lk. 6.35).  The Greeks, and their Roman conquerors, would 
have found this principle inconceivable.  
 The principle of love is the basis of the Ten Commandments (literally, “Ten 
Words”) that are the foundation of the Torah.  The first three commandments forbid 
(1) worshipping other gods, (2) making God into an idol, and (3) misusing His 
name.  The fourth commandment demands observance of the Sabbath.  The next 
six commandments are (5) honor your parents, (6) you shall not murder, (7) you 
shall not commit adultery, (8) you shall not steal, (9) you shall not give false 
testimony against your neighbor, and (10) you shall not covet your neighbor’s 
belongings.  Thomas Cahill argues in The Gifts of The Jews: How a Tribe of Desert 
Nomads Changed the Way Everyone Thinks and Feels59 that the Ten 
Commandments are absolutely unique in history and that nothing like them 
appears in any other ancient literature.  For they do not merely describe a set of 
fixed rules and punishments for disobeying these rules, as we find in the legal 
codes that precede it, such as the Code of Hammurabi some eighteen centuries 
B.C.E.60  Equally, they are not propositions for debate that can “be argued away” 
and “set aside because of special considerations,” as Cohen shows is the case 
                                            
59 New York: Random House, Inc., 1999. 
60 The text is available at http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/ancient/hamcode.asp 
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concerning the laws of classical Athens, as we have seen.  “There is no document 
in all the literatures of the world that is like the Ten Commandments,” Cahill 
asserts.  “Here for the first – and, I think, the last – time, human beings are offered 
a code without [natural, instrumental, or supernatural] justification” (p. 140, 
emphasis added).  This moral code is, Cahill writes, “necessary” and “unalterable” 
because it is “God’s code,” i.e., it is “written on human hearts” and constitutes “the 
inner core of the human person” (pp. 140, 142).  We see, then, that, for Cahill, the 
Ten Commandments express a moral law that is at once divine and human and 
that is not in need of any justification that is extraneous to itself. 
 The fulfillment of the Ten Commandments expresses love of God 
(commandments one through four) and love of the neighbor (commandments five 
through ten), the two principles that Jesus defends in the Gospel of Matthew as the 
greatest of all laws.  When Jesus is asked which commandment in the Law is the 
greatest, he cites Deuteronomy 6.5 and Leviticus 19.18: “‘Love the Lord your God 
with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.’  This is the first 
and the greatest commandment.  And the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbor as 
yourself.’  All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments” (Matt. 
22.36-40).  The fact that Jesus grounds all of the teachings of the Torah and the 
Jewish prophets on love makes plain that, from his point of view, love is the central 
teaching of the Hebrew Scriptures and is the basis for interpreting them.  But what 
is Jesus communicating when he says that the commandment to love your 
neighbor as yourself is “like” the commandment to love God above all others?  
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How is love of God to be distinguished from love of the neighbor?  What is the 
relationship between God and the neighbor?  
 There is, in fact, a close relationship between love of God and love of the 
neighbor, and so between the first four commandments, which require further 
explanation, and the last six commandments.  The reason that the first 
commandment forbids worshipping other gods is that these gods reflect either the 
fact that human beings do not comprehend themselves, as is the case with the 
non-biblical peoples, or the fact that they choose not to acknowledge their moral 
responsibility to live as ends, a condition that is unknown to the pagans but is the 
plague of the Israelites and is, in the Hebrew Bible, known as idolatry.  
 Ezekiel depicts the fundamental difference between the God of Israel and the 
pagan gods when, on behalf of God, he scolds the people of Jerusalem for 
abandoning the God who saved them from death.  
On the day you were born your cord was not cut, nor were you 
washed with water to make you clean, nor were you rubbed 
with salt or wrapped in cloths.  No one looked on you with pity 
or had compassion enough to do any of these things for you.  
Rather, you were thrown out into the open field, for on the day 
you were born you were despised.  Then I passed by and saw 
you kicking about in your blood, and as you lay there in your 
blood I said to you, “Live!”  I made you grow like a plant in the 
field.  You grew up and developed and became the most 
beautiful of jewels.  Your breasts were formed and your 
[pubic] hair grew, you who were naked and bare.  Later I 
passed by, and when I looked at you and saw that you were 
old enough for love, I spread the corner of my garment over 
you and covered your nakedness.  I gave you my solemn oath 
and entered into a covenant with you … and you became 
mine.  I bathed you with water and washed the blood from you 
and put ointments on you.  I clothed you with an embroidered 
dress and put leather sandals on you.  I dressed you in fine 
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linen … .  But you trusted in your beauty and used your fame 
to become a prostitute (16.3-15). 
 
 The contrast that Ezekiel depicts between the God of Israel and the pagan 
gods, and between their corresponding values, is both shocking and illuminating.  It 
is the difference between, on the one hand, leaving an uncut, unclean, unfed, 
unloved, and helpless newborn out to die in the open fields, and, on the other hand, 
tending to her with love and compassion and, eventually, marrying her.61  This 
contrast reflects directly upon the people who recognize it.62  The first 
commandment, in which God instructs Israel not to worship other gods, shows that 
the ancient Israelites understand themselves to be entirely different from their 
neighbors and that worshipping pagan gods cannot ever fulfill the life that they 
desire.  
 The second commandment is like the first in that it directs the human being to 
acknowledge her dignity before God.  It prohibits making God into an idol, i.e., of 
representing the divine “in the form [image] of anything in heaven above or on the 
earth beneath or in the waters below” (Ex. 20.4), a practice that was common 
among Israel’s neighbors.  The commandment against idolatry is especially 
interesting because human beings are made in the image of God (Gen. 1.26-28).  
                                            
61 Stephen L. Cook notes that marriage is symbolized in the spreading of a garment over the young 
woman and perhaps also in the fact that God washes the blood from her, which could signify the 
tearing of the hymen.  (See footnotes 7 and 8 in Ezekiel 16 in The New Oxford Annotated Bible: 
Third Edition: New Revised Standard Version with the Apocrypha.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
Inc., 2001).  In 16.30-32, God chides his “adulterous wife” for preferring “strangers to your own 
husband!”, leaving no doubt that God views his relationship to Israel as a marriage.     
62 Cf. Ex. 9.14: Moses says on behalf of God, “there is no one like me in all the earth.”  This means 
that the people of Israel see themselves as unique.  In this light it makes perfect sense that the 
story of the Israelites’ freedom from bondage in Egypt is depicted through the metaphor of the 
exodus into the desert. 
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Thus, on the one hand, the commandment prohibits understanding God as a 
creature in nature rather than as the creator of nature, to cite Paul’s definition of 
idolatry in his letter to the Church in Rome (1.25).  On the other hand, it demands 
that the human being recognizes that he is the image of God precisely because he 
is, like God, the creator of nature, as we shall see.  To reify God is to hypostatize 
human consciousness (and vice-versa). 
 The third commandment, which prohibits using the name of God in vain, bears 
the same structure as the second.  The name of God is used in vain, i.e., falsely or 
wrongly, when it is distorted or manipulated in order to attain private ends that are 
not consistent with God’s ultimate demands upon human beings: the practice of 
love and justice.   
 The importance of the fourth commandment, on Sabbath observance, is 
explained in Exodus in terms of God’s resting after creating the world.  However, in 
Deuteronomy 5.15 the Sabbath commemorates the freedom of the Israelites from 
bondage in Egypt.  In both Exodus and Deuteronomy, the Sabbath is a day of rest 
and freedom.  Fromm explains in You Shall Be as Gods that the Sabbath was an 
old Babylonian holiday, Shapatu, observed on every seventh day of the moon 
month.  On this day, the people castigated themselves in order to placate the wrath 
of the god of time, Saturn.  In the Bible, Saturn’s day, our Saturday, is transformed.  
The biblical Sabbath is not a day of mourning and punishing oneself in the face of 
time; it is a time to re-create (in) time and to celebrate life’s sexual, sensual, and 
intellectual pleasures.  Thus, “Saturn is dethroned on his very day, Saturn’s-day” (p. 
199).   
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 The last six commandments clearly command love of the neighbor and require 
no further explanation at this point.  In Matthew 7.12 Jesus crystallizes the Ten 
Commandments, i.e., love of God and love of the neighbor, into the golden rule: 
“[s]o in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums 
up the Law and the Prophets.”  He does not find it necessary to use the language of 
God in order to articulate what it means to love God.  For to love God is to love the 
neighbor.  (This idea is explicit in the letters of Paul and in 1 John, as we shall see.)  
Yet, Jesus does not want to identify directly love of God with love of the neighbor 
when he says that the latter is “like” the former, perhaps because he wants to call 
attention to the fact that there are adequate and inadequate ideas of love of the 
neighbor and that adequate ideas alone are rooted in love of God.  Love of God is a 
special kind of love of the neighbor, a moral love that Kant calls “good will” and that 
consists in treating persons as ends in themselves and not as means to an end.  
Jesus tells his disciples in the Gospel of John (14.20) that when you and I are both 
“in” God, then “you are in me and I [am] in you.”  To see yourself in others and 
others in yourself from the standpoint of the golden rule, which is the standpoint of 
God, is to treat everyone as you would want to be treated, whether or not you have 
a corresponding sense-feeling.  Love that is based on nature is not genuine love.  
Genuine love is always love of God, and it is for this reason that Jesus proclaims 
that to love God above all others is “the first and the greatest commandment.”63   
                                            
63 In Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Circle (see “An Experiment in Love” in A Testament 
of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr.  Edited by James Melvin 
Washington.  New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), Martin Luther King, Jr. distinguishes the 
biblical conception of love – as active, willful, and creative – from passive sentiment and natural 
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 In the vision of the Bible, love is not uncritical acceptance (which is 
sometimes wrongly mistaken for “unconditional love”).  When Jesus teaches in 
Matthew 7.1, “[d]o not judge, or you too will be judged,” he qualifies this counsel 
with the words “[f]or in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with 
the measure you use, it will be measured to you” (7.2).  For one to judge another 
as one would want to be judged requires that one is fair and compassionate in 
one’s judgments such that one examines where one stands within them and does 
not make oneself an exception to the moral demands that one places upon others.  
Everyone must be held to the same divine standard, the golden rule, and whatever 
our natural differences are in upbringing, class, status, race, or gender, we must all 
do our part to fulfill our commitment to those values to which we want others also 
to be committed, regardless of whether our love is reciprocated.  Only thus do we 
help to create a better world.64  In the Bible, then, the moral standard for action 
does not derive from, but lies beyond the world of, nature and experience; its 
                                                                                                                                     
affection, which, he observes, cannot be commanded.  Only love that is directed to both friends and 
enemies is redemptive and restorative because all persons belong to a common humanity.  Such 
love is “not set in motion by any quality or function of its object.  It is the love of God operating in the 
human heart” (pp. 19-20).    
64 In his essay “The Will to Believe” (available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/26659/26659-
h/26659-h.htm), William James shows that how I respond to you is creative of how you respond to 
me.  The relevant text reads: “Do you like me or not? … Whether you do or not depends, in 
countless instances, on whether I meet you half-way, am willing to assume that you must like me, 
and show you trust and expectation.  The previous faith on my part in your liking’s existence is in 
such cases what makes your liking come.  But if I stand aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I 
have objective evidence, until you shall have done something … ad extorquendum assensum 
meum [to compel my assent], ten to one your liking never comes.  … The desire for a certain kind 
of truth here brings about that special truth’s existence; and so it is in innumerable cases of other 
sorts.  Who gains promotions, boons, appointments, but the man in whose life they are seen to play 
the part of live hypotheses, who … sacrifices other things for their sake before they have come, and 
takes risks for them in advance?  His faith acts … as a claim, and creates its own verification.  … 
There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its 
coming.  … [F]aith in a fact can help to create the fact … ” (23-25).  
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fulfillment constitutes what it means to love God and, equally, what it means to be 
human.  
 In contrast, the Greek ethic among both gods and men is to do to others what 
you would not want others to do to you.  It is better to rule than to be ruled, for the 
good in itself moves without being moved.  The result is that the fortunes of human 
beings are perpetually reversed.  Since the status that a man has depends on his 
rank relative to others, the greater his status, the more vulnerable he is in the 
presence of those who resent him and who want for themselves what he has.  The 
man who wins admiration does not escape envy.  It is perhaps with this in mind 
that Jesus says to his disciples that he teaches what no one can contradict (Lk. 
21.15), i.e., a moral love that he distinguishes from teleological notions of love (as 
absolute privation or as sense-feeling) which, he sees, always lead to 
contradiction.65 
 Love is the central teaching of the Hebrew prophets, who subordinate all 
forms of natural love to moral love when they make social justice the criterion for 
the value of ritual performance, and not vice-versa.  Amos preaches against 
                                            
65 In The Iliad, Achilleus reenters the war to avenge the death of Patroklos, whom he loves as a 
close friend at the level of sense-feeling.  In fact, his love for Patroklos is opposed to the unfading 
glory (kleos apthiton) that he desires.  For, in his mind, to win glory he must lead the Greeks to sack 
Troy, and he does not reenter the war until Hektor kills Patroklos.  This suggests that Achilleus’ 
glory depends on the death of his close friend. 
 When Achilleus kills Hektor in Book 22, he effects his own reversal.  For a hero must not 
only live as a hero, he must also die as a hero.  In Book 21, Achilleus cries to the river god who 
wants to drown him, “[a]h, I wish Hektor had killed me; he’s their best.  Then one brave man would 
have brought down another.  No, I was fated to ignoble death.”  (I use here the translation of Robert 
Fitzgerald.  New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1974, lines 279-283.)  Achilleus wants to be a 
hero so that he will not live in shame; thus, he must kill Hektor.  However, once he kills Hektor he 
dooms himself to an unheroic death.  As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the exchange 
between the shade of Achilleus and Odysseus in Book 11 of The Odyssey shows that Achilleus 
remains wholly dependent on glory and its appearances, which contradict him, each other, and, 
also, his natural love for his close friends.  
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opulent Israel, where the poor were sold into slavery because they could not pay 
for their own shoes.  The rich  
sell the righteous for silver, and the needy for a pair of 
sandals.  They trample on the heads of the poor as upon the 
dust of the ground and deny justice to the oppressed (2.6-7). 
 
  Hosea proclaims to Israel,  
[t]here is no faithfulness, no love, no acknowledgement of God 
in the land.  There is only cursing, lying, and murder, stealing 
and adultery; [the people] break all bounds, and bloodshed 
follows bloodshed (4.1-2).   
 
In first Isaiah God excoriates His people for not realizing that moral love is the 
criterion for the value of tradition: 
[t]he multitude of your sacrifices – what are they to me?  … 
Stop bringing meaningless offerings!  Your incense is 
detestable to me.  … Your New Moon festivals and your 
appointed feasts my soul hates.  They have become a burden 
to me; I am weary of bearing them.  When you spread out your 
hands in prayer, I will hide my eyes from you; even if you offer 
many prayers, I will not listen.  Your hands are full of blood; 
wash and make yourselves clean.  Take your evil deeds out of 
my sight!  Stop doing wrong, learn to do right!  Seek justice, 
encourage the oppressed.  Defend the cause of the fatherless, 
plead the case of the widow (1:11-17).  
 
 In third Isaiah God proclaims that the kind of fasting He desires is the kind 
that loosens the chains of injustice, that sets the oppressed free, that shares food 
with the hungry, that provides the wanderer with shelter, that clothes the naked, 
and that does not turn away from the needy.  
“Why have we fasted,” [the Israelites] say, “and you have not 
seen it?  Why have we humbled ourselves, and you have not 
noticed?”  Yet on the day of your fasting, you do as you please 
and exploit all your workers.  Your fasting ends in quarreling 
and strife, and in striking each other with wicked fists.  You 
cannot fast as you do today and expect your voice to be heard 
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on high.  Is this the kind of fast I have chosen, only a day for a 
man to humble himself?  Is it only for bowing one’s head like a 
reed and for lying on sackcloth and ashes?  Is that what you 
call a fast, a day acceptable to the Lord?  Is not this the kind of 
fasting I have chosen: to loose the chains of injustice and untie 
the cords of the yoke, to set the oppressed free and break 
every yoke?  Is it not to share your food with the hungry and to 
provide the poor wanderer with shelter – when you see the 
naked, to clothe him, and not to turn away from your own flesh 
and blood?  … If you do away with the yoke of oppression, 
with the pointing finger and malicious talk, and if you spend 
yourselves in behalf of the hungry and satisfy the needs of the 
oppressed, then your light will rise in the darkness, and your 
night will become like the noonday (58:3-10). 
 
Finally, Jeremiah preaches at the palace of Jehoiakim, the king of Judah, 
[t]his is what the Lord says: [d]o what is just and right.  Rescue 
from the hand of his oppressor the one who has been robbed.  
Do no wrong or violence to the alien, the fatherless, or the 
widow, and do not shed innocent blood in this place.  … Woe 
to him who builds his palace by unrighteousness, his upper 
rooms by injustice, making his countrymen work for nothing, 
not paying them for their labor.  He says, “I will build myself a 
great palace with spacious upper rooms.”  So he makes large 
windows in it, panels it with cedar and decorates it in red.  
Does it make you a king to have more and more cedar? 
 
God then says of Josiah, the former king of Judah and the father of Jehoiakim, 
“[h]e defended the cause of the poor and needy … .  Is that not what it means to 
know me?” (Jer. 22.3-16, emphasis added.) 
 In these and other passages66 we find that the prophets distinguish clearly 
between love of the neighbor and the observance of rituals.  It is an essential part 
of the law to treat the poor, the hungry, the oppressed, the exploited, the needy, 
orphans, widows, and strangers as you would want to be treated, but it is not an 
essential part of the law to fast, pray, or hold festivals for God, all of which are 
                                            
66 See, for example, Jer. 6.20, 7.3-11, Am. 5.21-24, Hos. 6.6, and Micah 6.6-8.  
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worthless without the right spiritual disposition.  For the prophets, God is not a 
supernatural being beyond the world.  God is known, must be known, and can only 
be known through lawful (just) interpersonal relationships.   
 In the New Testament, Paul sees that the golden rule has its roots in the 
Hebrew Bible and that love of the neighbor is the essential teaching of the Hebrew 
Scriptures.  He leaves no ambiguity about this in his letter to the Romans, which is 
likely his last letter67 and, one assumes, the epistle that expresses his most 
developed position, when he writes,  
[l]et no debt remain outstanding, except the continuing debt to 
love one another, for he who loves his fellow-man has fulfilled 
the law.  The commandments, “Do not commit adultery,” “Do 
not murder,” “Do not steal,” “Do not covet,” and whatever other 
commandment there may be, are summed up in this one rule: 
“Love your neighbor as yourself.”  Love does no harm to its 
neighbor.  Therefore love is the fulfillment of the law (13.8-10, 
emphasis added). 
 
In his letter to the church in Galatia he says simply, “the whole law is summed up in 
a single commandment, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself’” (Gal. 5.13-14).  
Paul, like Jesus, does not mention God when he articulates the golden rule.  He 
takes the position of the prophets: an adequate idea of (obedience to) God is love.  
From the time of the prophets to the time of Paul, nothing had been added to and 
nothing had been subtracted from the fundamental law.  
 The golden rule presupposes that human beings know the difference 
between good and evil, that they are conscious of their freedom, that they are 
conscious that freedom carries with it universal responsibilities and, also, that all 
                                            
67 See Neil Elliot’s introductory remarks to Romans in The New Oxford Annotated Bible: Third 
Edition. 
 95 
people, insofar as they are free, are accountable for their choices.  If these insights 
are not new for us, it is because the modern world is absorbed in the biblical 
tradition in which it is grounded.  If we switch our point of reference, however, and 
compare biblical values not only with our own deepest values but also with Greek 
values, then we will see that the disparity between our values and Greek values is 
utterly incommensurable.68  For the Greeks, it makes no sense to love the enemy 
because in both logic and perception – perception understood as natural affection 
or preference – the enemy is the one whom one should not love.  Indeed, as 
Thucydides makes clear in his History of the Peloponnesian War,69 the power of 
Athens depended upon the Athenians doing to their neighbors what they did not 
want their neighbors to do to them but what their neighbors would have done to 
them if they had the power to do so.70   
                                            
68 The manner in which Greek thought is inconceivable to us is quite different from the manner in 
which our thought is inconceivable to the Greeks.  We are in a position to provide an account for 
why Greek thought is inconceivable on the ground of the cogito, what Kant develops as moral 
reason.  The Greeks, however, have no standard of truth on the basis of which they can 
comprehend not only that their thought is contradictory, but why, i.e., what the contradiction is and 
how to overcome it.  
69 Translated by Rex Warner.  London: Penguin Books, 1972. 
70 The contradictory logic of the Greek position is expressed brilliantly by Thucydides in his report of 
the Mytilenian Debate, where Cleon puts forward a motion to kill the entire adult male population of 
Mytilene and to enslave the women and children, the guilty and innocent together, as punishment 
for daring to revolt against the Athenians.  He counsels those in the Athenian assembly to 
“[r]emember how they would have been likely to have treated you, if they won, especially as they 
were the aggressors.  Those who do wrong to a neighbor when there is no reason to do so are the 
ones who persevere to the point of destroying him, since they see the danger involved in allowing 
their enemy to survive” (p. 217).  Since “it is a general rule of human nature that people despise 
those who treat them well and look up to those who make no concessions,” to give in to “feelings of 
compassion” is to be “guilty of a kind of weakness which is dangerous to you” and is in fact “entirely 
against the interests of an imperial power” (pp. 213, 215).  For “your empire is a tyranny exercised 
over subjects who do not like it and who are always plotting against you; … your leadership 
depends on superior strength and not on any goodwill of theirs” (p. 213).  Cleon sums up his 
argument thus: if the Athenians accept his motion, they will be acting in accordance with those 
policies through which they have acquired the power that they have.  If not, “you will be passing 
judgment on yourselves.  For if they were justified in revolting, you must be wrong holding power.  
If, however, whatever the rights or wrongs of it may be, you propose to hold power all the same, 
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 In biblical thought, love, regarded as doing unto others what you would want 
others to do unto you, is both the standard of truth and the highest expression of 
human power.  Yet, since it is only in the light of truth that we comprehend what it 
means to live in untruth (idolatrously or sinfully), the Bible is also the unique and 
universal source of idolatry, as Polka argues in Truth and Interpretation.  For 
idolatry presupposes the very truth that it subverts (pp. 141, 143).  Truth is the 
standard both of itself and of its falsifications because there can be neither truth 
nor untruth, good nor evil, outside of truth.  Evil that is not willed is ignorance of 
both good and evil.  This is the status of evil in the writings of Plato and Aristotle: 
evil is done in ignorance of the good (e.g., Meno, 77b-78b; Nicomachean Ethics, 
1145b23-27).71  Since everyone is, for Plato and Aristotle, ignorant of the good, 
how is one to comprehend evil in the ancient Greek world?  How can evil be 
                                                                                                                                     
then your interest demands that these too, rightly or wrongly, must be punished.  The only 
alternative is to surrender your empire” (p. 217).  
 The speaker who succeeds Cleon, Diodotus, argues against passing Cleon’s motion, but 
on the same grounds as those offered by of Cleon.  It is true that the Athenians should act for their 
own self-interest; but this involves keeping their neighbors (enemies) as weak as possible.  If 
Cleon’s motion carries, “can you not see that every city will not only make much more careful 
preparations for revolt, but will also hold out against siege to the very end, since to surrender early 
or late means just the same thing?  This is, unquestionably, against our interests … .”  However, in 
“employing moderation in our punishments, we can in future secure for ourselves the full use of 
those cities which bring us important contributions.”  The right way to deal with potential threats is 
the opposite of what Cleon advises; it is “not to inflict tremendous punishments on them after they 
have revolted, but to take tremendous care of them before this point is reached, to prevent them 
from even contemplating the idea of revolt” (p. 221).  He cautions the Athenians not to “be swayed 
too much by pity or by ordinary decent feelings.  I, no more than Cleon, wish you to be influenced 
by such emotions.”  The motion to mitigate punishment should not be adopted because of pity or 
compassion but in order to “make your enemies fear you now.  For those who make wise decisions 
are more formidable to their enemies than those who rush madly into strong action” (p. 222).    
 We see in Thucydides’ report of the Mytilenian Debate that what is most important for both 
Cleon and Diodotus is maintaining the power and status of the Athenian empire.  The sole issue is 
how best to achieve this end.  There is no moral problem in doing “wrong”; in fact, it is right, and, 
indeed, necessary for the Athenians to do wrong to their neighbors, i.e., to rule over them against 
their wishes, in order to prevent suffering this fate themselves. 
71 At the end of Section 3 in Book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle agrees with Plato: it is the 
appearances of knowledge – i.e., “perceptual knowledge” and not “knowledge proper” – that are 
“dragged about” by the passions (1147b14-17). 
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distinguished from the good if, since to seek the good is to lack the good, it is not 
good to seek the good?  The consciousness that evil is not done in ignorance of 
the good, that human beings are responsible for the evil that they do, is equivalent 
to the idea that human beings are ends in themselves.  Idolatry is but the attempt 
to deny this truth and to treat human beings as means to an end.  In this sense, 
idolatry is the conflation of Greek and biblical values.  
Sin and idolatry share a common meaning: prioritizing natural ends (self 
interest, honor, power, wealth …) over moral action.  It is in biblical thought that 
both pagan ignorance and idolatry first obtain “existence.”  It is paradoxical that 
only from the biblical perspective are pagans viewed as sinners and idolaters, 
paradoxical because it is those who comprehend that sin is not ignorance who 
view those who are ignorant as sinful.  Paul, however, distinguishes very clearly 
between pagans (Gentiles) and Jews when he writes in Romans that “[a]ll who sin 
apart from the law [the Gentiles] will also perish apart from the law, and all who sin 
under the law [the Jews] will be judged by the law” (2.12).  For “through the law we 
become conscious of sin” (3.20).  This critical distinction explains why, in the 
Hebrew Bible, the greater part of God’s wrath is directed not towards the pagans 
but towards the Israelites, whom He liberated from ignorance into the world of evil, 
sin, and idolatry.  
 Sin points to the imperfection of human beings, the consciousness of which is 
proof of the perfect standard on the basis of which sin is recognized: God.  Sin 
presupposes that the essence of the human being is not unchanging and immortal; 
it does not precede her existence and it is not, as with the Greeks, given as a brute 
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fact that cannot be accounted for.  Neither does the existence of the human being 
precede her essence; for the fact that she can say, with God, “I am,” entails moral 
obligations to which she is bound and through which sin is recognized as a 
contradiction that is willed and not, as in Greek thought, a contradiction of the will.  
Polka writes, 
[s]in is both human glory and human curse: the glory of 
fulfilling thoughtfully one’s existence and existing fully in one’s 
thought, and the curse of idolatrously contradicting human 
thought and existence by reducing them to the appearances of 
nature.  Both the glory and the curse of thought and existence 
are unknown and unlived within the natural law of pagan 
contradiction (Truth and Interpretation, p. 137). 
 
 Just as the idea of freedom contains within itself the power to turn away from 
God, the power to sin contains within itself the power to (re)turn to God.  The 
Hebrew word for repentance, tesuba, derives from the root word sub, which 
means, literally, to “turn” or to “return” to God.72  Repentance demands a 
willingness to acknowledge wrongdoing.  It demands sincere remorse and a 
genuine commitment to atone for the wrong, a commitment that expresses what 
Jeremiah calls a “singleness of heart and action” (32.39) – at-one-ment.  This 
change is not expressed through external observance but through love; it is not 
circumcision of the body, but circumcision of the heart (Deut. 30.6).  Ezekiel urges 
Israel to repent, to turn away (tesuba) from their offenses, to form “a new heart and 
a new spirit” so as to “rid yourselves” of sin and enter into the world of the living.  
“Why will you die, O house of Israel?” Ezekiel laments.  “Repent (tesuba) and live!” 
                                            
72 See Paula Fredriksen’s discussion of repentance in The Oxford Companion to the Bible, p. 646.  
Edited by Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.  I 
have not accented the Hebrew words in light of their various English transliterations. 
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(18.31-32).73  The past has happened, but it does not determine the future; the 
past is, but its meaning is yet to be given, precisely because it belongs to freedom 
that must reinterpret, recreate, and relive the past at each and every moment.74  
The meaning of the sins of the past is transformed and created anew in the 
recognition of and atonement for these sins.  It is when the individual who 
acknowledges her sins is compelled through moral necessity to change what she 
wills – not tomorrow, but now – that she transforms her past transgressions into the 
creative force of a new moral commitment.  Sin, for Ezekiel, is death, a spiritual 
death.  But as we read in 1 Corinthians and in the Gospel of John, what you sow 
does not come to life unless it dies.  True life is not ignorance of sin, but, we shall 
see, resurrection from the dead.  
 To repent is to atone for sin.  The repentant person understands that she 
alone is responsible for the choices that she has made and thus sees all fingers 
pointed towards her.  No one else is to blame and there is nowhere to hide.  It is 
not the one who errs, but the one who sins and who refuses to repent, who lives in 
untruth.  Consistent with the prophets, Jesus teaches that the worst possible kind 
                                            
73 See Jim Myers’ article “Rediscovering the meanings of the teachings of the historical Jesus” at 
http://biblicalheritage.org/DTB/0210_DTB_TESHUVAH.pdf. 
74 The relationship between freedom and the past in the context of repentance is explored by 
Kierkegaard in Philosophical Fragments, pp. 77-78 (translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. 
Hong.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) and by Nietzsche in the section entitled “On 
Redemption” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (pp. 249-254 in The Portable Nietzsche.  Translated by 
Walter Kaufmann.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).  Kierkegaard shows that, while it is 
unchangeable that what has happened has happened in the way that it happened, it is not 
“necessary” because its “existence” is given in freedom.  In this way, the past is not necessary for 
the same reason that the future is not necessary (fated).  Nietzsche expresses essentially the same 
insight when he speaks of the past as “fragment,” “riddle,” and “accident” insofar as its meaning and 
significance are viewed as unchangeable and immovable.  Redemption is the creative process of 
willing “backwards,” i.e., of subjecting the “it was” to the “thus I will it” and so liberating the will from 
the fetters of its own human, all-too-human folly. 
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of sin is the sin against the spirit, the sin in which the sinner uses her will, which is 
the only power that she has to repent for her sin, to sin.  This sin cannot be 
forgiven because the power of forgiveness consists in its being received as a gift.  
The person who can be forgiven must acknowledge that she has done something 
wrong; otherwise, she sees no wrong to forgive and forgiveness falls on deaf ears.  
When Jesus says in the Gospel of Matthew that he comes to save not the 
“righteous” but the sinners (9.12-13), or when he says in the Gospel of John that 
he comes to make the blind see and those who see blind (9.39), he communicates 
that only those who acknowledge that they need help can be saved (healed).  No 
one can force another to do good (or to repent for doing evil) because the good 
must be chosen.  Its goodness consists in being chosen, i.e., it consists in the good 
will.  
 The idea that the will is a creator of the past, present, and future and that it is, 
therefore, central to the nature of time itself, brings us to the idea of creation, the 
meaning of which I shall now develop in light of a close reading of the two creation 
accounts with which Genesis opens.  Before proceeding further, however, I must 
take a moment to explain and justify the hermeneutic that I use in reading the 
Bible.   
 It is widely accepted among biblical scholars that the Bible is a collection of 
writings that have different authors who write with different purposes and that these 
writings were produced over the course of approximately one millennium, from the 
tenth century before the Common Era to the end of the first century of the Common 
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Era.75  However, it is entirely justifiable to read the biblical texts as unified wholes 
in cases where several different contributors appear to be involved and, also, as 
one unified whole once these texts have been edited and arranged in a particular 
order.  For the process of editing is itself an act of authorship.  For these reasons, 
my focus in this dissertation is not on collating the known facts about the Bible in its 
so-called “proper historical context,” as though this context is an objectively neutral 
standpoint that is independent of the context of the unified whole.  In fact, it is only 
in light of the Bible being (read as) a unified whole that the question of its proper 
historical context is relevant.  There is no Bible outside of the Bible that is received 
as the Bible, and this Bible is a unified whole.  The object of my study is its 
ontology and ethics; that is what the Bible is in itself.  I am less concerned with the 
“external conditions” that are associated (correlated) with the formation of the Bible 
and more concerned with thinking seriously about the meaning of its core ideas.  
 The creation stories might appear on the surface to be about cosmological 
and anthropological beginnings, following the law of contradiction into a teleological 
world in which, from the perspective of a free and critical self-consciousness, 
impossible things happen for no reason.  While the biblical authors are not shy 
about borrowing material from the surrounding pagan cultures, their work is a 
polemic directed against pagan practices and pagan values.  It does not make 
sense, therefore, to read the biblical narratives as we do pagan myth.  In fact, the 
Bible itself counsels us to distinguish between how an idea is communicated and 
                                            
75 See, for example, pp. 70 ff. in Christian E. Hauer and William A. Young’s An Introduction to the 
Bible: A Journey into Three Worlds.  (Seventh Edition.  Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2008).      
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what idea is communicated, i.e., between outward appearance and the “heart” (1 
Sam. 16.7), perceptual judgment and moral judgment (Is. 11.3-5), body and soul 
(John 7.24), and between letter and spirit (2 Cor. 3.6).  
 In the previous chapter we observed that what we learn from the texts of 
Plato and Aristotle, when these texts are allowed to speak for themselves, is that 
they are not texts at all insofar as a text is understood to express the relationship 
between thought and existence such that it itself exists as an object (or subject) of 
interpretation to itself and to others.  In contrast, the fundamental teaching of the 
Bible is the necessary relationship between thought and existence (human beings 
are ends in themselves).  If the Bible is allowed to speak for itself, it must be 
interpreted from the golden rule; to do so demands that the reader does not view 
the text as given outside of (her) moral interpretation.  Rather, she must respect 
herself as its sovereign interpreter.76  In upholding the golden rule as the highest 
principle of thought and existence, the Bible indicates that its truth is not given 
outside of interpretation and that its interpretation is to be judged in light of truth.  
                                            
76 When a reader reduces her own thought to the immediacy of the text, she reduces the text to the 
immediacy of her thought.  Both her thought and the text become idols.  It is perhaps in order to 
prevent his listeners from turning his teaching into an idol that Jesus prefers to communicate in 
parables.  When his disciples ask him to explain why he speaks in parables, he refers to Is. 6-9: 
“[t]hough seeing, [people] do not see; though hearing, they do not hear or understand” (Matt. 13.10-
13).  He knows that understanding is not given through natural perception.  Speaking in parables 
that do not make sense at a natural (literal) level encourages those who have the eyes to see and 
the ears to hear to acknowledge their authority as interpreters.  For it is only through this 
acknowledgement that they can grasp, authoritatively, the authority of his teaching. 
 It is fruitful to read Jesus’ response to his disciples in the context of the parable of the sower 
(Matt. 13.3 ff., Lk. 8.5 ff.).  If a farmer (teacher) plants seeds (the word of God) in soil (the minds of 
those who listen to him) that is too shallow (literal-minded), the teaching will, Jesus explains, “have 
no root.”  The people who accept the word will “believe for a while, but in the time of testing they fall 
away.”  Only those who have “a noble and good heart” will “hear the word, retain it, and by 
persevering produce a crop” (Lk. 8.13-15, emphasis added).  So Jesus says a few verses later, 
“consider carefully how you listen” (8.18, emphasis added).  The difference between listening 
without understanding and listening and learning is that the latter requires truthful interpretative 
judgment, i.e., a good and noble heart.    
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(Recall Leviticus 19.17: reprove the text where necessary, so that you will not 
share in its guilt.)  The most fundamental reality of things, the ontology of 
existence, is hermeneutical and ethical and is revealed only in and through moral 
interpretation. 
 Our primary focus as readers of the Bible, therefore, cannot be on solving the 
problem of what was in the minds of the biblical authors at the time of their writing, 
two or three millennia ago, if this involves going beyond the project of rigorously 
exploring what is involved in the ideas that they have expressed.  Such an 
endeavor would be fruitless.  There is no way to know what is communicated in 
what is written outside of what is communicated in what is written.  It is 
unreasonable, except in the rarest of cases, to assume from the outset that what is 
in the mind of the writer is different from (what is communicated in) what he has 
written.  The important question to ask is not what is behind what is communicated, 
i.e., what is not communicated, but what is communicated.  The Bible distinguishes 
itself from pagan texts because it insists that its existence is not finished, complete, 
self-subsistent, and uncreated.  Only then can its authority be confirmed and 
accounted for.  What the Bible is in itself is its revelation through the golden rule of 
interpretation: interpret the text as you want to be interpreted, i.e., lovingly, 
respectfully, charitably, critically, fairly … and not with what Ezekiel calls a “heart of 
stone” (36.26).  When in doubt about the text’s meaning, give the text the benefit of 
the doubt until you no longer have reason to doubt where the text stands; see if its 
weaknesses can be redeemed when interpreted in light of its strengths, rather than 
ignoring its strengths because it has weaknesses; have faith in the text, meet it 
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“half-way,” and be open to having the faith that you put into it justified.  Upbuild the 
text – and yourself – by distinguishing between its truths and its contradictions; for 
if a text has contradictions, it does not mean that it is contradictory, and if a text 
expresses truth, it does not mean that it is without contradictions.  If the text 
provides a framework to support a figurative reading that overcomes the 
contradictions of a literal reading, thus saving the literal reading (and you) from 
contradiction, then it follows that the text should be interpreted figuratively.  If not, 
we should not force upon it ideas and values that it does not itself contain, as is the 
case in reading texts that are not texts and that cannot be read.  
 There is no question that, when taken at a literal level, the Hebrew creation 
stories contradict themselves and each other together with our thought and 
existence.  These stories, however, are surrounded by, and, I argue, are to be 
interpreted in light of, a constellation of values that is inconceivable in teleological 
cognition.  Thus, the biblical narrative undermines a literal reading of its own 
surface-presentation and it does so boldly and explicitly.  Its consciousness of 
contradiction is not based on the law of contradiction.  (As I have shown, Aristotle’s 
conviction that the law of contradiction is the first principle of thought reflects the 
ontological opposition between thought and existence; that is, it expresses the 
necessity of beginning and ending in contradiction with one’s beginning and end.)  
The Bible exposes its contradictions as idolatry, as contradictions that are willed, 
and, therefore, from the standpoint of having overcome them.  The contradictions 
in the Bible do not follow from its first principle.  Rather, they are recognized 
because they contradict its first principle.   
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 The main issue, again, is not how an idea is communicated, that is, the terms 
that are used to communicate an idea, but, rather, what idea is communicated, that 
is, the idea that is expressed through the terms that are used.  That the biblical 
writers use the language and imagery of pagan myths is interesting, however, 
because, in transforming pagan myth, they show that they are not dependent upon 
it and that their stories are not imitations but original creations.  The fact that the 
biblical writers use pagan stories in order to express values that are 
incommensurable with a literal reading of these stories accentuates the radical 
opposition between biblical thought and pagan thought.  
 The golden rule is the principle for interpreting a text in which it is upheld as 
the highest principle.  But it must itself be the subject of interpretation if it is to 
serve as the principle for interpreting the subject.  In this sense, it gives rise to the 
very problem that it addresses.  Polka writes in Truth and Interpretation, “[t]he Bible 
demands that the very criterion or standard by which it is interpreted be truthful, but 
it equally demands that its criterion or standard of truth be interpreted” (p. 143).  
The standard for interpreting the golden rule is itself.  Truth is its own standard.  
Yet, this standard demands the continual labor of the spirit.  In this sense, truthful 
interpretation is always original reinterpretation.  Keeping in mind these points on 
biblical hermeneutics,77 we are ready to examine the two accounts of the creation 
of the world with which the Hebrew Bible opens.   
                                            
77 The hermeneutic that I have developed is consistent in all critical respects with the hermeneutic 
for interpreting the Bible that Spinoza expounds in Chapters 7 and 12-14 of the Theological-Political 
Treatise (translated by Samuel Shirley.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998).  Spinoza 
argues that the only truthful basis for interpreting the Bible is the moral law: the practice of justice, 
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 In the chronological order of composition, the second creation account, the 
story of Adam and Eve, is believed to predate the first story by some three to five 
centuries.78  When the Hebrew Bible was canonized, however, these stories were 
placed side by side.  Taken together, they communicate that human beings are 
created in the image or likeness of God – and not in the image or likeness of 
nature – because they comprehend good and evil.  The first creation account 
begins with the distinction between the divine Spirit and nature: “the Spirit of God 
was hovering over the waters.”  The earth is formless, empty, and dark, but is 
illuminated by Spirit: “[a]nd God said, ‘[l]et there be light,’ and there was light” (1.2-
3).  God creates the sky, land, seas, vegetation, celestial bodies, and the creatures 
of the earth and the sea over the course of different days: there is a first day, a 
second day, a third day, etc., and His creations are “good” (Gen. 1.4, 1.10, 1.12, 
                                                                                                                                     
sincerity of heart, and charity (caritas).  For, when the Bible is read from itself alone, “we learn that 
its message … is in essence this, to love God above all, and one’s neighbour as oneself.  … [T]his 
is the basis of the whole structure of [biblical] religion; if it is removed, the entire fabric crashes to 
the ground” (Chapter 12, p. 155, emphasis added).  Again: “obedience to God consists solely in 
loving one’s neighbour [as oneself] … .  Scripture itself tells us quite clearly over and over again 
what every man should do in order to serve God, declaring that the entire Law consists in this 
alone, to love one’s neighbour [as oneself]” (Chapter 13, p. 158; Chapter 14, p. 164, emphasis 
added).  Once more: “[w]orship of God and obedience to him consists solely in justice and charity, 
or love towards one’s neighbour” (Chapter 14, p. 167, emphasis added).  Spinoza sees that what 
the Bible teaches, fundamentally, is that every individual must respect himself and others as 
sovereign and, therefore, as bound to the moral standard of truth and interpretation that is revealed 
in biblical religion to be “divinely inscribed in [all] men’s hearts – that is, in [all] men’s minds” 
(Chapter 12, p. 149).  It is up to every sovereign individual to determine what in the Bible is fruitful 
for his moral edification; “Scripture does not require us to believe anything beyond what is 
necessary for the fulfilling of the [moral] commandment.”  The letter of the text, Spinoza maintains, 
is neither sacred nor profane “in an absolute sense apart from the mind, but only in relation to the 
mind” (Chapter 12, p. 151).  
78 Proponents of the Documentary Hypothesis maintain that the second creation story involves the J 
tradition of the tenth and/or ninth centuries BCE (it may also have elements from the E source of 
around the ninth and/or eighth centuries BCE).  The first creation story is believed to come from the 
P tradition of the fifth and/or sixth centuries BCE.  (See pp. 70 ff. of An Introduction to the Bible: A 
Journey into Three Worlds and p. 72 of Alan F. Segal’s “The Jewish Tradition” in A Concise 
Introduction to World Religions [edited by Willard G. Oxtoby and Alan F. Segal.  Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 2007]).    
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1.18, 1.21, 1.25).  In the verses that follow, the text drives home its main point, one 
verse after the other, that God creates human beings, both male and female, not in 
the image of nature, but in His79 likeness.  Human beings are to “rule over” nature, 
be fruitful, and “fill the earth.” 
Then God said, “[l]et us make man in our image, in our 
likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and the 
birds of the air, over the livestock, over all the earth, and over 
all the creatures that move along the ground.”  So God created 
man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; 
male and female he created them.  God blessed them and 
said to them, “[b]e fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth 
and subdue it.  Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of 
the air and over every living creature that moves on the 
ground (1.26-28).   
 
After the creation of human beings, the creation of the heavens and the earth and 
all things in them is “very good” (1.31).  Human beings are not determined through 
natural or supernatural forces; the birds, animals and plants are not omens, and 
the stars and moon are not gods.  Human beings are themselves in command over 
their own lives and their task is to be productive in the blessedness of the here and 
now, not to aim for a world beyond.  
 The idea that the human being is (created in) the image of God, which the 
author, again, is careful to repeat three times in two verses, is critical.  It indicates, 
first, that from the biblical perspective human beings cannot account for, or think 
their existence outside of, God and that, second, because human beings are like 
God, what is said about God informs us about human beings (and vice-versa).  
                                            
79 I follow the narrative style of the Old and New Testaments when I speak of God in the masculine 
form.  In Hebrew, all nouns, gendered or not, are either masculine or feminine.  See 
http://www.ancient-hebrew.org/26_nouns.html  
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How is the creation of human beings, who are embodied but who are unlike all 
other created things of nature and who are like the creator of all created things, to 
be comprehended within a text that is written by human beings but that appears to 
begin with God and not with human beings?  What implications does the idea of 
being created in the likeness of God have for how one is to read the text that 
makes this principle central to it but that appears, on the surface, to prioritize God 
over human being?  If the human being is like God, then she would have to share 
the attributes of God.  What else could it mean to be like God?  If she shares the 
attributes of God, she must share in God’s creative power.  Indeed, it is because 
she has a spirit and can freely will her existence that she knows that she is 
distinguished from all other creatures of nature.  The fact that the creation of the 
world in Genesis 1 is spiritual – the world is created through Spirit – indicates that it 
is one in which human beings are involved.  Otherwise, the creation account could 
not be accounted for and would express the fate of the pagan generation stories, 
all of which are governed by the law of contradiction.80  The Bible’s essential task, 
however, is, as I have noted, to liberate human beings from the contradictions of 
pagan teleology.  That is why the Bible does not begin with the principle that 
human beings are blind and ignorant but exalts human beings as divine.  
 The second creation account brings to light the meaning of the first (and vice-
versa: the first informs the second).  It confirms that the idea of creation in both 
stories does not concern cosmological or anthropological beginnings.  Here the 
                                            
80 See, for example, Theogony, the Babylonian Epic of Creation (in Myths from Mesopotamia.  
Translated by Stephanie Dalley.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and the Rig Vedas of 
ancient India (found at http://www.holybooks.com/wp-content/uploads/RigVeda.pdf.). 
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human being, Adam,81 is not created last, as in the first account, but when “no 
shrub of the field had yet appeared on the earth and no plant of the field had yet 
sprung up” (2.5).  Placing creation accounts that are irreconcilable with each other 
in their literal presentation, side-by-side in the Bible’s opening pages, offers a silent 
warning to the reader: we must differentiate between letter and spirit, between 
what the text says and what it means, between the text as it appears and the text 
as it is in itself.  This strategy supplements the subject matter of the narratives, 
which teaches that nature is created.  After God creates the man, He creates 
Eden, a garden that is watered by a river that branches out into the Tigris and 
Euphrates rivers (2.14).  This indicates that Eden is in the pagan land of ancient 
Mesopotamia (“Mesopotamia” originates from the Greek words mésos [“between”] 
and potamós [“river”] and means “the land between the [two] rivers”).  God puts the 
man in the garden and creates a woman82 to help and sustain him when He sees 
that no suitable partner is to be found among the birds and the beasts.  For “[i]t is 
not good for the man to be alone” (2.18-20).  We are told that, in Eden, there is a 
tree of life and a tree of knowledge of good and evil.  God says that the man and 
woman are free to eat from any tree in the garden, including the tree of life that, we 
learn in 3.22, offers immortality.  However, He commands Adam not to eat from the 
tree of knowledge: “for when you eat of it you will surely die” (2.17).  The human 
being, at this point, is not depicted as the image of God, which again contradicts 
                                            
81 The word “Adam” means “man” in Hebrew.  It implies that the story that is being told is the story 
not of one man but of every man.  Thus, even the name of the first man betrays a literal reading of 
Adam as the “first” man in anthropological history. 
82 The woman is created from the man’s ribs, i.e., the part of his body that protects his vital organs, 
most notably his heart and lungs.  This suggests that not only is she intimately related to him as 
“flesh of my flesh” but that she is also his protector.    
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the first story at an immediate level.  In Genesis 2, he is ignorant of good and evil.  
But if he is ignorant of good and evil, how can he comprehend the commandment 
not to eat from the tree of good and evil?  What could this commandment mean to 
him and what could it mean coming from God, whose highest commandment is to 
know good and evil?  Who is God in pagan Mesopotamia?  A literal reading of this 
story, as with the first, cannot support itself.  The facts that (1) explicit 
contradictions were left in the story, (2) explicit contradictions between the two 
creation narratives are left unreconciled, (3) the story communicates its ideas using 
imagery that is not to be taken literally but is clearly symbolic,83 and (4) the story is 
found in a collection of writings that polemicize against paganism, when taken 
together, suggest strongly that the contradictions that we find, like the imagery, are 
intended to serve a fruitful purpose, namely, to help the reader to recognize that 
the letter of the text must not be reduced to itself.  
 In this story, it is the serpent who first tells Adam and the woman that their 
eyes will be opened and that they will be like God if they eat from the tree of 
knowledge.   
“You will not surely die,” the serpent said to the woman.  “For 
God knows that when you eat of [the tree of knowledge] your 
eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good 
and evil” (3.4-5). 
 
                                            
83 Both the tree of life and the serpent are allusions to images found in ancient Near-Eastern 
literature.  For example, in Tablet XI of the Epic of Gilgamesh (in Myths from Mesopotamia), 
Gilgamesh, the King of Uruk, appears to have finally attained the object that he has been searching 
for: immortality.  Thinking that he possesses the plant that will give him true life, he does not eat of 
it.  Instead, he inexplicably goes to bathe and leaves the plant unattended, at which point a snake 
secretly carries it away.           
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Hearing this, the woman does eat of the fruit of the tree and also gives fruit to 
Adam.  (Both the woman and Adam leave the tree of immortality alone.)  Then, 
“the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realized they were naked” (3.7).  
They cover themselves with fig leaves, which again points to their capacity to 
distinguish themselves from other natural beings (covering the genitals is a human-
specific activity).  When God sees Adam and the woman covered, He knows that 
they have disobeyed His command; He tells them that because they have done 
this they shall be “cursed.”  He will make the woman suffer greatly in childbearing, 
the man will eat by toiling in the fields, and both will die (3.11-19).  Nowhere in the 
story, however, is it said that either Adam or the woman has sinned, that their 
nature is corrupted, or that they are worse off after eating the fruit than they were 
before.  Rather, three important things take place in the next three verses: first, 
Adam names his wife “Eve, because she would become the mother of all the living” 
(3.20, emphasis added).84  Second, God clothes Adam and Eve in garments of 
skin (3.21).  And third, “the Lord God said, ‘The man has now become like one of 
us,85 knowing good and evil.’”  Adam is like God not because he is able to do 
impossible things, things that human beings cannot do, but, rather, because he is 
conscious that he is a moral being.  It is because he has become aware of his 
humanity that he is divine. 
                                            
84 Segal notes that, according to most interpreters, “Eve” is derived from the Hebrew word for 
“living.”  See p. 66 of Segal’s “The Jewish Tradition,” in A Concise Introduction to World Religions. 
85 It is interesting that God is referred to by way of the plural object pronoun “us.”  For the Bible 
defends the idea of one God, not many gods.  Pluralizing God might support the self-conscious 
recognition that the literal presentation of God in Genesis 2 and 3 is contradictory (there is no God 
in Eden).  Alternatively, the plural pronoun could indicate that God is not alone, self-sufficient, 
unmoved, and knowable only in itself. 
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 As I have stressed, the Greeks do not conceive of the labor and toil that are 
involved in knowing good and evil.  In 150 b-d of Plato’s Theaetetus Socrates tells 
Theaetetus that he (Socrates) is utterly “barren of wisdom,” that “there is no 
wisdom in me,” and that “I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any discovery 
worth the name of wisdom.”  Impotent to produce children, he acts as a “midwife” 
who watches over the labor of others, applying “all possible tests to the offspring” 
in order to determine which are phantoms and which are not.  The result of these 
investigations, we have seen in the Apology, is that Socrates “sees” that no one 
has any wisdom that is worth anything at all.  In the second creation story, the pain 
of childbearing emerges after human beings have knowledge of good and evil and 
have become like God.  The pain is what Hegel speaks of as the sorrow of 
“bringing forth,” the sorrow that belongs to consciousness that has broken from the 
unity of its immediate (natural and sensible) being, a schism that “means that man 
is certainly finite and mortal on the side of his nature, but that he is infinite in 
cognition.”86  To be infinite in cognition is to be a moral being, i.e., an end in 
oneself who hungers and toils in the fields of existence for spiritual bread.  The fact 
that the second creation account ends with the banishment of Adam and Eve from 
the garden communicates that human beings who know good and evil cannot enter 
Eden.  For it is a world that is without knowledge.  
                                            
86 See Hegel’s brilliant treatment of the Adam and Eve story in Section 23, Addition 3, of Hegel’s 
The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences.  (Translated by T. 
F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
1991), pp. 61-63. 
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 To be expelled from the garden is to be conscious that one exists in real time 
as a moral being who will die.  It is for this reason that the knowledge of good and 
evil carries with it the burden of spiritual travail, i.e., moral responsibility, and the 
assurance of death.  To appreciate what it means to die is to appreciate what it 
means to live (and vice versa: the awareness of what it means to live as a moral 
being is necessary in order to appreciate the significance of death).  Unlike the 
ancient pagan religions wherein death is an appearance of life,87 the human being 
                                            
87 In the metaphysics of the ancient Indian traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism, death is an 
appearance in the ever-turning karmic wheel of life that is called samsara.  In Hinduism, the goal of 
the human being is to escape from samsara and attain moksha, or oneness “with” the immortal soul 
of all things: Brahman.  This is clearest in the Upanishads, which are the philosophical 
reformulations of the earlier Vedic texts.  In the Mundaka Upanishad, we read that the universe is 
“nothing but the supreme Brahman” which “rules over the mind and life,” and that in him human 
beings “cross the ocean of ignorance.”  Nothing can manifest the Brahman but all “objects draw 
their radiance from him.” (From “Hinduism.”  In An Anthology of Living Religions, second edition, 
edited by Mary Pat Fisher and Lee W. Bailey.  Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2008, p. 65.)  In 
the words of Hindu scholar Vasudha Narayanan, “Brahman cannot be described any more than 
infinity can be contained” (“The Hindu Tradition,” p. 267, in A Concise Introduction to World 
Religions).  Sankara, the early ninth century CE teacher of the Advaita Vedanta school, writes that 
every thought, even the concept of the “I,” is a “superimposition” on the oneness of the “inner Self,” 
which is “the very opposite” of the self that is experienced.  “Superimposition is the seeing of a thing 
in something which is not that … .  It is for casting away this superimposition which is the cause of 
evil and for gaining the knowledge of the oneness of the Self that all the Upanishads are begun” 
(from “Hinduism,” in An Anthology of Living Religions, p. 72).  
 Buddhism is the child of Hinduism.  The first Noble Truth of Buddhism is that life is suffering 
(dukkha); the second, that suffering comes from desire; and the third, that suffering ceases when 
desire ceases.  In Buddhism, the end of samsara is parinirvana, or nirvana “without remainder” (see 
Roy C. Amore and Julia Ching’s “The Buddhist Tradition” in A Concise Introduction to World 
Religions, pp. 388-389).  This notion is identical to the notion of moksha: it refers to the total 
cessation of suffering and desire that is achieved in the kind of death that does not lead to the 
reentrance into the orbit of karmic fate.  The Indian philosopher-poet Asvaghosha writes in the 
second century CE in his Acts of the Buddha that, for the Buddha, there is “nothing substantial in 
existence, just as no heartwood is found in a plantain tree when it is cut open … .  Alas!  Living 
creatures obtain but toil; over and over again they are born, grow old, die, pass on and are reborn.  
Further man’s sight is veiled by passion and by the darkness of delusion, and from the excess of his 
blindness he does not know the way out of this great suffering.”  The enlightenment that the Buddha 
attained during his meditations – an enlightenment that is with remainder – consists in the 
“tranquility” of his recognition that “from the destruction of existence birth itself is destroyed … .” 
(From “Buddhism.”  In An Anthology of Living Religions, pp. 115-116.)  The end of life is, literally, 
the end of life.    
 In both ancient Hinduism and ancient Buddhism, as in ancient Greek thought, the human 
being is identical with the end to which he is opposed and his dependence on that which contradicts 
him leaves him ignorant of good and evil, which are karmic necessities that are unknowable in 
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who has been expelled from Eden knows that he must “return to the ground” 
(3.19).  Here, time has meaning; there is a reason to establish priorities, priorities 
that shape and define how one lives.  To know that you will die once is to know that 
you will live once and that a moment can never literally be recaptured, changed, or 
lived again: there is a first day, a second day, a third day … .  It is because the 
chronological time of human life is finite that the quality of this time is infinite.  The 
consciousness of death emerges with the consciousness of good and evil because 
the consciousness of good and evil amounts to the consciousness that human life, 
embodied life, is an end in itself.88 
 The Hebrew creation accounts are not only relevant to the Old Testament.  In 
fact, the Gospel of John opens with an interpretation of them and confirms that 
                                                                                                                                     
themselves but indistinguishable from one another in their appearances.  If John kills Peter, he 
fulfills the karma that Peter must deserve, although it is impossible to know why Peter deserves to 
be killed.  John’s karmic consequence, too, must appear at some point, although it is impossible to 
know when or what form it will take. 
 The connection between Greek and Indian thought in antiquity is manifested plainly when 
we compare the last words of Socrates with the last words of the Buddha.  Plato reports at the end 
of the Phaedo that Socrates tells Crito, “Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius; make this offering to him 
and do not forget” (118a).  Socrates wants to thank the god of medicine for the hemlock that will 
cure him of the disease of life.  (Nietzsche understands the passage in much the same manner in 
aphorism #340 of The Gay Science [translated by Walter Kaufmann.  New York: Random House, 
Inc., 1974].)  Similarly, the Buddha teaches in his last words, “[e]verything that arises also passes 
away, so strive for what has not arisen” (“The Buddhist Tradition,” p. 377).  For both Socrates and 
the Buddha, life is a disease. 
 In my bibliography I have not made individual entries for each relevant selection from The 
Anthology.  Rather, I have referenced the individual chapters central to my discussion (with the 
editors’ names appearing in the author’s place). 
88 Pascal is consistent with the biblical (“Christian”) tradition that he defends when he observes in 
his Pensées that the greatness of a human being consists in the consciousness that he will die.  
Nature appears to have an advantage over him because it is so powerful and infinitely vast while he 
is so frail and miniscule in comparison.  “But even though the universe should crush him, [a] man 
would still be nobler than what kills him since he knows that he dies, and the advantage that the 
universe has over him; the universe knows nothing of it.  All our dignity consists then in [this!] 
thought.  It is upon thought that we must raise ourselves up, and not on [natural] space and time 
which we cannot fill.  Let us strive then to think well; that is the foundation of all morality” (#65, 
emphasis added).  In Selections from The Thoughts (translated by Arthur H. Beattie.  Arlington 
Heights: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1965).   
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they are not about scientific origins.  Rather, creation expresses the power of 
human beings who are self-conscious of the Word of God.  The Gospel begins with 
this declaration: 
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, 
and the Word was God.  He was with God in the beginning.  
Through him all things were made; without him nothing was 
made that has been made (1.1-3). 
   
What is the Word?  How does the Word create the world?  What is the Gospel of 
John saying about the meaning of the Hebrew creation accounts to which it refers?  
What do the creation accounts tell us about the opening of John?   
 Cahill explains in The Gifts of the Jews that each of the Ten Commandments 
may have been but one word, that is, a verb in the imperative 
form preceded by a negative prefix of one syllable.  In this 
way, the originals may actually have been Ten Words – utterly 
primitive, basic injunctions on the order of “No-kill,” “No-steal,” 
“No-lie.”  These Ten Words (which is the term the Bible uses, 
not “Commandments”) would have been memorizable by even 
the simplest nomad, his ten fingers a constant reminder of 
their centrality in his life (p. 139).  
  
We have seen that Jesus and Paul encapsulate the tenfold Word in the golden 
rule, which they defend as the essential teaching of the Law.  The claims of biblical 
scholars89 that the Word refers to Jesus as the Christ cannot be correct in light of 
the fact that Jesus grounds his own teaching upon the Hebrew Scriptures from 
where, we see in Luke 2.46, he received his learning and whose law, we read in 
Matthew 5.17-18, he says he comes not to abolish but to fulfill.  (Most of the Old 
Testament writings are believed to predate Jesus by more than five centuries.)  
                                            
89 See William Beardslee’s notes in The Oxford Companion to the Bible (pp. 463-4) and Obery 
Hendricks, Jr.’s comments on the opening verses of John in The New Oxford Annotated Bible: Third 
Edition.  
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Our vision into what is meant by creation will deepen through the course of this 
dissertation.  But it is fruitful at this time to note that in the first epistle of John the 
author binds together God and love when he says, directly, that “God is love” (4.8, 
4.16).  God is love.  Love is the Word.  The Word is God.90   
 The next few verses in the Gospel make clear that the Hebrew creation 
accounts are not here viewed as accounts of the cosmological origins of the world.   
In him was life, and that life was the light of men.  The light 
shines in the darkness, but the darkness has not understood 
it.  … The true light that gives light to every man was coming 
into the world (1.4-5, 1.9). 
 
The light referred to above cannot be a natural light; it does not make sense to 
speak of natural light as “in” the Word, as “true,” as “coming into” (gradually) this or 
that place, or as not being “understood.”  When the Gospel connects the Word that 
creates all things with true light, that is, with the light of truth that is expressed in 
the teachings of Jesus (and the Law and the Prophets), it is evident that the idea of 
creation is comprehended as spiritual, not as material.  Meaning comes into 
existence with moral self-consciousness.  Thus, we read in 1 John: “[t]his is the 
message you heard from the beginning: [w]e should love one another” (3.11).  The 
                                            
90 The meaning of the Word (logos) bears no relationship to the meaning of logos in Greek thought.  
The Greek philosopher Heraclitus, for example, understands logos to be the unmoved principle of 
everlasting flux.  In fragments 1 and 108, he says that logos is the “real constitution” of the world 
that is “set apart from all.”  It “holds forever” but “people forever prove uncomprehending” of what it 
is.  (See Fragments: A Text and Translation with a Commentary by T. M. Robinson.  Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1999.)  Aristotle discusses logos in the Rhetoric as persuasion through 
logical reasoning, i.e., of moving others without being moved by them.  The Greek conception of 
logos is always either supernatural or natural and, therefore, both.  In John, logos, love, is the 
principle that shows teleological conceptions of logos to be contradictory.  
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beginning of the world is the expulsion of human beings from Eden.91  It is the 
liberation of human beings from the formless, empty, and dark void of pagan 
ignorance.92 
 The Bible begins with the creation of God, i.e., with the consciousness that 
human beings are ends and not means.  Martin Buber, scholar and translator of, as 
well as commentator on, the Hebrew Bible, argues in I and Thou93 that in the 
beginning is the I-You relationship (p. 69).  In citing the opening of Genesis, he 
makes it clear that he sees that the creation of the world begins with mutual 
recognition: seeing oneself (seeing oneself) in others and seeing others (seeing 
themselves) in oneself.  Love, reciprocity, is the “cradle of actual life” (pp. 60, 67).94  
                                            
91 The creation narrative is the current that flows through Genesis and Exodus.  Both the story 
about Abraham leaving the pagan land of his ancestors and going forth as God commanded him 
(Gen. 12.1 ff.) and the story about Moses freeing the Israelites from bondage in Egypt (Ex. 3.10 ff.) 
retell the story of the expulsion from Eden.  For they signify the radical break of consciousness from 
a teleological worldview and a coming into existence of the single individual, humanity, and God at 
one and the same time.   
92 As with the ancient Greek and Indian religions, the ancient Chinese religions express no idea of 
creation as conceived in the Bible.  In Confucianism and Daoism, the appearances of the world are 
opposed to the unchanging principle of the cosmos, the Dao.  Since human beings cannot know 
what this unchanging principle is outside of its contradictory appearances, their end is to become 
one with the appearances of nature, e.g., in treating people according to their natural station, in 
following the path of least resistance (as water does), etc.  In “The Doctrine of the Mean,” which is 
one of the Four Books that expresses the central teaching of Confucianism, we read that “[t]he way 
of heaven and Earth may be completely described in one sentence: [it is] without any doubleness 
[in itself] and so [it] produce[s] things [relative to us] in an unfathomable way” (from “Confucianism,”  
in “An Anthology of Living Religions, p. 150, emphasis added).  Similarly, Laozi asserts in his Dao 
de jing that “[w]hat we call ‘the Dao’ is not the Dao” and “[o]ne who knows does not speak; one who 
speaks does not know.  … [I]t is impossible to be familiar with [the Dao], and yet it is also 
impossible to be separated from it. … That is why it is valued throughout the world” (from “Daoism,”  
in An Anthology of Living Religions, pp. 166, 169, emphasis added).  For other instructive excerpts 
from the foundational texts of these two ancient religions, see especially pp. 143-155 and 164-173 
in An Anthology of Living Religions.  
93 Translated by Walter Kaufmann.  New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970. 
94 The moment of mutual recognition is captured in Genesis 16.13, where Hagar, servant of 
Abraham, encounters God (or his messenger: the text is deliberately ambiguous), who recognizes 
her suffering and promises that He will make her prosperous: “I will so increase your descendants 
that they will be too numerous to count.”  Hagar says to God: “You are the God who sees me … I 
have now seen the One who sees me.”  Hagar sees herself as existing – and she sees herself 
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It is from this standpoint that the world prior to creation is recognized as having no 
creative power.  The world prior to creation is not without biological life; it is without 
spiritual life because there is no love as mutual recognition.  The idea of God 
comes into being with moral self-consciousness.  It signifies the beyond in the 
midst of life that calls for a deeper immersion in existence.95   
 Moses teaches his fellow Israelites that the commandments of God are not 
“beyond your reach,” “up in heaven,” or “beyond the sea,” but “very near,” not in 
space but “in your heart” (Deut. 30.11-14).  1 John is clear that God is known only 
through love: 
we know that we have come to know [God] if we obey his 
commands.  The man who says, “I know him,” but does not do 
what he commands is a liar, and the truth is not in him.  … 
Everyone who loves has been born of God and knows God.  
Whoever does not love does not know God, because God is 
love (1 John, 2.3-4, 4.7-8).   
 
While there are as many ways to conceive of God as there are ways to conceive of 
the truth of human existence, all adequate ideas of God must express the moral 
imperative, the Word, to abolish all hierarchical relationships in which human 
beings are not respected as ends, and this includes the relationship between 
human beings and God.96   As I showed in the previous chapter, supernatural 
                                                                                                                                     
seeing herself as existing – in seeing herself being seen to exist in the sight of God.  At this 
moment, she sees God seeing her seeing Him seeing Himself through her eyes.  She affects God 
and is affected by God.  In mutual recognition, seeing is not passive sense perception but active 
moral self-consciousness.  It is what Buber speaks of as the I coming to be through the You (I and 
Thou, p. 80).  
95 John A. T. Robinson defends this position in his daring and provocative book, Honest to God 
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963). 
96 No idea could be more remote from the ancient teleological perspective.  For example, in 
Atrahasis (in Myths from Mesopotamia) the gods create men so that they can be their slaves and 
toil on their behalf.  The epic begins with the older gods complaining about their work.  Because 
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conceptions of God lead to natural conceptions of human beings that lead to 
contradiction.  
 The commandments of God are in the heart because love is the pulse of true 
life.  One loves God in one’s heart when one does not expect extrinsic rewards but 
treats people well simply because it is the right thing to do.  Moral life is the end in 
itself, what in Leviticus is called “holiness” (11.44) and in Matthew “perfection” 
(5.48).  The question of how to understand the dependence of human beings upon 
God when, as Polka observes, “[t]he relation of God and person is the relation of 
person and person, just as the relation of person and person is the relation of 
person and God” (Truth and Interpretation, pp. 171-172), is like the question of 
what it means to love God above all others if the essence of the Law is the golden 
rule.  One is dependent upon God because one cannot exist, i.e., outside of the 
immediacy of natural consciousness (the images of nature), without God 
(relationship, freedom, the golden rule, love of the neighbor …).  Thus, Kant argues 
that the ideas of God and freedom arise together and are inseparable in moral 
consciousness, as we shall see. 
 The I-You relationship among human beings and between human beings and 
God (in contrast with what Buber calls the “I-It” association, which is instrumental 
and involves no true relationship) is expressed in the idea of the covenant.  
Bernhard Anderson observes that the Hebrew word for “covenant,” berit, appears 
                                                                                                                                     
they do not want to work, they make the younger gods carry the workload.  When these younger 
gods also complain, men are created to bear the yoke that none of the gods want.  However, the 
gods become enraged because men are making too much noise in doing the gods’ work, which 
prevents the gods from sleeping.  So they plague men with disease and starvation in order to 
extinguish them.  
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to be derived from the root word that means to bond or to fetter, indicating that God 
and human beings are in a “binding relationship.”97  In this relationship, God and 
human beings are subject to the same moral standard.  If God is held to be the 
standard for morality, it is only because the idea of God is adequate to the moral 
standard by which His laws are judged to be valid or invalid, just or unjust, true or 
untrue.  (Jesus rejects commandments that are not moral when he defends the 
truth of Hebrew Scripture.)  When we believe that God is not subject to the golden 
rule, then, as Nietzsche proclaims, God is dead.98  The insight that what is moral is 
moral not because it comes from a God that is apart from us but that God is God 
insofar as He expresses the moral law within us, is absolutely unique in history.99  
Polka writes in Truth and Interpretation that  
                                            
97 See pp. 138-139 of The Oxford Companion to the Bible. 
98 In aphorism #125 of The Gay Science, Nietzsche tells the story of a “madman” who preaches that 
God is dead to those who do not believe in God: “[w]e have killed him – you and I.  All of us are his 
murderers.”  The madman is actually a prophetic figure and represents Nietzsche’s own position 
(see, for example, #76, where Nietzsche interlinks madness with truth as opposed to the “law of 
agreement” [elsewhere called the “herd instinct”]).  At first, the crowds do not understand him and 
heckle him.  Later, they fall silent and the madman throws his lantern on the ground, an image that 
recalls Exodus 32.19, where Moses throws the tablets of the Ten Commandments on the ground 
after he sees the Israelites worshipping the golden calf.  Nietzsche’s main point is that the 
conventional conceptions of God are not moral at all; they are immoral because human beings are 
viewed as means to an end.   
 Nietzsche defends much the same position in #21, where he argues that what people often 
call “morality” is purely self-serving and, in fact, depends on persons being harmed.  He writes that 
there is a “fundamental contradiction in the morality that is very prestigious nowadays: the motives 
of this morality stand opposed to its principle.  What this morality considers its proof [the virtue of 
self-sacrifice] is refuted by its criterion of what is moral [‘the strength for the highest autonomy’].”  
(Nietzsche is aware that Kant develops an idea of autonomy that is grounded on Christian morality.) 
99 In Greek life, justice is “decided” through violence on the battlefield and in speech.  Because it is 
knowable only in itself, it is unknowable relative to human beings.  Hesiod and Homer depict Zeus 
as just because justice is whatever Zeus does; there is no independent criterion for distinguishing 
between justice and injustice. 
 In the Theogony, Hesiod’s judgment of Kronos is very different from his judgment of Zeus.  
Kronos is presented as foolish, deceptive, and crooked for overthrowing his father to win power and 
for wanting to eat his own child (Zeus) to retain power.  Zeus, however, is viewed as wise, just, and 
sound-minded for overthrowing his father to win power and for eating his pregnant wife Metis to 
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[t]he very notion that God makes a covenant, his covenant, 
with a people in history, that he is bound to the covenant 
which he makes with his people no less than the people are 
bound to the covenant which they make with their God is a 
revolutionary idea, revolutionary for the exacting reason that it 
is based on notions of mutuality, reciprocity, relationship, and 
responsibility… – the golden rule (p. 166).  
 
  Fromm argues for the same position: 
[t]he idea of the covenant constitutes, indeed, one of the most 
decisive steps in the religious development of Judaism, a step 
which prepares the way to the concept of the complete 
freedom of man, even freedom from God.  … [God] is bound, 
as man is bound, to the conditions of the constitution … and 
man has gained the freedom of being able to challenge God in 
the name of God’s own promises … .  Precisely because God 
is bound by the norms of justice and love, man is no longer his 
slave.  Man can challenge God – as God can challenge man – 
because above both are principles [of morality] (pp. 25, 28). 
 
Polka and Fromm show that, since God and human beings are equally obligated 
and accountable to each other, the relationship between them cannot be 
hierarchical.  God is not like Baal or Marduk.100 
 In third Isaiah (54.5), Jeremiah (3.8), and Ezekiel (16.32), God speaks of the 
relationship that He desires to have with His people as one between a faithful 
                                                                                                                                     
retain power.  Hesiod thinks that Zeus is just for the same reason that he thinks that Kronos is 
unjust.  The difference between the two gods is that Zeus has power. 
 It is precisely because justice is decided through power that, in the Greek tragedies, no 
matter how greatly human beings suffer because of the ever-changing preferences of the gods, 
they do not blame the gods.  On the contrary, their most common response is to praise the gods 
while at the same time pitying themselves. 
100 In Tablet VI of the Epic of Creation, Marduk slays the primeval goddess Tiamat and becomes 
ruler of the gods.  When Marduk learns that the lesser ranking gods want to build a ziggurat for him, 
“[h]is face lit up greatly, like daylight.  ‘Create Babylon, whose construction you requested!  Let its 
mud bricks be moulded, and build high the shrine!’” (p. 262)  Genesis 11.1-9 presents a striking 
contrast between God and Marduk.  God stops the people of Shinar (Babylon) from building a tower 
that “reaches to the heavens.”  The city is called “Babel” – a term that sounds like the Hebrew word 
for “confused” but which can also mean “gate of god” (see Carr’s footnotes for verses 8-9 in the 
Fourth Edition of The New Oxford Annotated Bible.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  God 
does not desire honor; the gateway to God is moral action.   
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husband and a faithful wife.  In Hosea 2.14-20, God says to adulterous Israel that 
when she returns to him after worshipping other Gods,  
[o]n that day …  you will call me, “My husband,” and no longer 
will you call me, “My Baal.”  … And I will take you for my wife 
forever; I will take you for my wife in righteousness and in 
justice, in steadfast love, and in mercy.  I will take you for my 
wife in faithfulness; and you shall know the Lord (Hos. 2.16-
20).101 
 
Again we see that to have intimate knowledge of God does not mean to be 
subservient to Him (“My Baal” can also be translated as “My Master”).  It means to 
be faithful, i.e., to live with righteousness, justice, love, and compassion.     
 In light of the above we see that the biblical people are absolutely dependent 
upon God only in the sense that they do not view themselves outside of their 
covenantal relationship with God, i.e., outside of their moral obligations to one 
another.  For this reason, their dependence upon God, and upon one another, 
expresses their absolute independence from teleological notions of God (and 
human beings).  In the idea of the covenant we see that the biblical people 
comprehend God as a power among them, a power that is the source of their own 
empowerment and, indeed, of their very existence.  They comprehend that they 
have dignity not because God says that they have dignity.  Nor does God say that 
they have dignity because they comprehend, outside of God, that they have 
dignity.  God is not the “cause” and moral self-consciousness is not the “effect,” or 
vice versa.  The Israelites and early Christians comprehend the commandment to 
treat themselves and one another with dignity through their relationship with God 
                                            
101 From the New Revised Standard Version.  
 123 
as a commandment that comes from the heart, soul, or mind of each person, which 
is to say that they comprehend love as the source of their lives through their loving 
relationships with one another. 
 The next core biblical idea that I shall consider is miracle, which, I argue, 
does not at all suggest a supernatural occurrence in nature.  The very idea of a 
supernatural (or natural) miracle entails the idea that there can be no account of it 
whereas, in the Bible, miracles have their source in the power of God (and, I argue, 
of human beings).  Paul indicates in 1 Corinthians that miracles (together with 
speech, prophecy, knowledge, and faith) are “nothing” without love: “if I have a 
faith that can move mountains, but have not love, I am nothing” (13.1-2).  A few 
verses later, Paul interprets love as patience, kindness, modesty, trust, 
perseverance, truthfulness, hope, and belief (in oneself and others).  His 
pronouncement in 13.13 that love is greater than faith reaffirms his position that 
there is no faith without love.  As love is the criterion for a true idea of God, it is the 
criterion for true faith in God and His miracles.  The idea that faith that can move 
mountains is nothing without love means that love alone can move mountains, an 
idea that reappears in Matthew, as we shall see in a moment.   
 Both the Old and New Testaments have miracle narratives that provide the 
principle for interpreting them.  In Exodus, Moses performs a number of miracles 
before the Pharaoh.  However, when we are told that the Egyptian magicians can 
do the same things in their secret arts (Ex. 7.8-8.7), we recognize that to 
“understand” Moses’ miracles as supernatural is to render them indistinguishable 
from the pagan secret arts.  Yet, the miracles performed by Moses are supposed to 
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differentiate his teaching from pagan magic.  It is only in the exposition of the Ten 
Commandments a few chapters later that we see clearly that the true miracle on 
the basis of which the Israelites are freed from bondage in Egypt is love of God 
and love of neighbor.  
 The narrative of the miracle in which Moses changes water into blood (Ex. 
7.14-25) is modified in the narrative of the Gospel of John, where we are told the 
story of Jesus turning water into wine at Cana (2.1-10).  In John 15.1, however, 
Jesus pronounces, “I am the true vine, and my Father is the gardener.”  Since wine 
comes from grapevines, the miracle at Cana is interpretable as a metaphor that 
depicts not a material transformation but a spiritual transformation.  It is relevant 
that the metaphor of the vine also appears in Hosea 9.10 and 10.1, where God 
says, “[w]hen I found Israel, it was like finding grapes in the desert … .  Israel was 
a spreading vine; he brought forth fruit for himself.”102  At Cana, water does not 
become wine, literally, just as Jesus is not a vine, literally, and just as the ancient 
Israelites are not grapes, literally, and just as God is not a gardener, literally, and 
so on.  In the Bible, water is often a symbol for nature: the Spirit hovers over the 
surface of the waters (Gen. 1.2), Moses parts the water that engulfs Pharaoh’s 
soldiers (Ex. 15.19), Jesus walks on water (John 6.19) … .  In John 3.5-6 Jesus 
teaches that the human being is born of both Spirit and water and he connects 
                                            
102 This metaphor expresses the miracle of freedom (creation): the fruit of love grows in the pagan 
desert.  Israel is its own miracle.  This narrative positions Israel as prior to God and neutralizes 
narratives that appear to position God as prior to Israel (or to human beings in general), as in the 
Hebrew creation accounts.  Ultimately, the existence of God and Israel emerge in and through the 
vine of (their) loving relationship. 
 To ask how Israel is possible is to ask for the ground of freedom.  Freedom is possible 
because it is actual.  Its actuality as the cause of itself necessitates that it is inconceivable through 
formal logic and sense perception. 
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water directly with the flesh.  After Jesus is crucified, we are told that a soldier 
pierces his body and that water and blood pour out (John 19.34).  In this light, the 
change of water into wine at Cana refers to a spiritual conversion, a transformative 
insight, or a return to God.  The fact that this miracle takes place in the context of a 
wedding adds to the celebratory mood of the occasion.  
 In Chapter 9 of the Gospel of John Jesus heals a blind man (9.1-7).  This 
healing is described numerous times in the same chapter as an opening of the 
eyes (9.10, 9.14, 9.17, 9.21, 9.26, 9.30, 9.32).  Is the blind man like Adam, whose 
eyes are “opened” in knowing good and evil (Gen. 3.5-7)?  At Cana, Jesus says, “I 
am the true vine.”  When he heals the blind man, he says, “I am the light” (John 
9.5).103   The theme of blindness reappears at the end of the chapter.  Jesus says 
that he comes to make the blind see and to make those who see blind.  The 
Pharisees ask him whether he is calling them blind and Jesus replies that, if they 
acknowledged their blindness, they would not be guilty of sin but that, since they 
claim that they see, their guilt remains (John 9.39-41).  Jesus here accuses the 
Pharisees of the sin against the Spirit: the refusal to see that/what one has chosen 
not to see and then to repent.  The important point to note here in reference to our 
discussion of the nature of miracle is that, when Jesus says that he comes to make 
those who “see” (see that they are) blind, he is clearly speaking about a spiritual, 
and not a physical, blindness, an idea which informs the nature of the miracle at 
Cana that precedes it in Chapter 2.  Hence we see that, at times, Jesus ties 
together healing with forgiveness of sin (e.g., Mk. 2.3-12); at other times, he 
                                            
103 In Matthew 5.14, he says to the crowds, “[y]ou are the light of the world” (emphasis added). 
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indicates that those who have been healed have been healed through their own 
faith (e.g., Matt. 9.22, Mk. 10.52, Lk. 17.19 and 18.42); and, on other occasions, it 
is said that Jesus cannot do miracles where there is unbelief (e.g., Matt. 13.58, Mk. 
6.5).   
 The idea of truth that is defended in the Bible – and so of true speech, the 
true prophet,104 the true faith, the true God, and the true miracle – is always bound 
to love and, therefore, to the good will of human beings.  Jesus proclaims that it is 
the wicked and idolatrous generation that asks for supernatural miracles.  For to do 
so is to give up what you know for what you do not know and so to whore after 
foreign gods.  When the devil tries to tempt Jesus to perform supernatural miracles 
in Luke 4.1-14, Jesus quotes Deuteronomy 6.16: do not put the Lord to the test.  
His point is that God is not the contradiction of nature, for nature is not the world of 
contradictory appearance.  If the power of God is shown in doing what cannot be 
done, then there is no God.  The devil shows that he is well versed in the words of 
Scripture when he confronts Jesus (4.10-11), but (that) he is without love.  In the 
words of Paul, he talks like a “clanging cymbal” (1 Cor. 13.2) because he does not 
comprehend either the nature of God or the nature of proof.  The proof of God is 
not doing what cannot be done but doing what ought to be done.  It is noteworthy 
that, while Jesus refuses to do supernatural miracles for the devil, he does not 
                                            
104 Zvi Adar argues in Humanistic Values in the Bible (translated by Victor Cherikover.  New York: 
Jewish Reconstructionist Press, 1967) that, for the true prophet, morality is the content of true 
religion (pp. 151-153).  In You Shall Be as Gods, Fromm sees that, for the prophets, the moral 
imperative “is to become fully human; and that means to become like God.”  The concern of the 
prophet “is the establishment of a society governed by love, justice, and truth … .  His realm is 
never a purely spiritual one; it is always of this world” (pp. 117-118).  
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refuse to feed and to heal people, which, again, supports the idea that the power of 
miracle is love (spiritual bread).   
 Jesus thus makes it clear on a number of occasions that anyone can perform 
the miracles that he performs.  In fact, anyone who has faith “will do ever greater 
things than these … ” (John 14.12).105  In Matthew 17.14-21 Jesus tells his 
disciples, “[i]f you have faith as small as a mustard seed, you can say to this 
mountain, ‘Move from here to there’ and it will move.  Nothing will be impossible for 
you.”  Yet, given the metaphorical context supplied by the Bible when it discusses 
miracles, Jesus is clearly not speaking about moving mountains in nature.  If he 
were, no one could have faith.  The mountain that is moved by faith (love) is the 
crushing sense of hopelessness, injustice, loss, and despair that was felt by the 
Jews and early Christians under Roman rule in the first century CE.  This reading 
is consistent with Paul’s claim in 1 Corinthians that the faith that can move 
mountains is nothing without love.  
                                            
105 Jesus does not imply here that there are miracles “greater” than love.  His point is that he is not 
God.  There are moments in which Jesus appears to align himself with God, as in John 14.6-7 
where he says to Thomas: “I am the way and the truth and the life.  No one comes to the Father 
except through me.  If you really knew me, you would know my Father as well.”  In the very next 
sentence Jesus says that “[f]rom now on you do know [God] and have seen him” (emphasis added).   
 It is important to read 14.6-7 in the context of 15.15 and 13.35.  In 15.15, Jesus says to his 
disciples that he does not call them servants but “friends, for everything that I learned from my 
Father I have made known to you” (emphasis added).  In 13.35 he tells his disciples: “[l]ove one 
another.  As I have loved you, so you must love one another.  By this all men will know that you are 
my disciples, if you love one another” (emphasis added).  A disciple is not an imitator who stands 
before Jesus as an inferior; he stands as an equal in dignity before God in the presence of whom all 
acts of love are completely original.  From Jesus’ point of view, there is no difference between what 
he knows of God and what everyone who loves knows of God, between his power to love and the 
power of other persons to love, and between what he ought to do and what all people ought to do; 
nothing more is required to fulfill the law of God than love for one another.  To welcome the 
neighbor is to welcome God, and vice-versa (Matt. 10.40, 25.31-40).          
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 The fullest realization of human freedom is called the kingdom of God (or the 
kingdom of heaven).  Heaven is the realization of the will of God on earth, as is 
evident from the opening of the Lord’s Prayer: “Our Father in heaven, hallowed be 
your name, your kingdom come, your will be done on earth as it is in heaven” 
(Matt. 6.9-10).  When the will of God is done on earth, then the kingdom of heaven, 
which is always near, will have “come.”  It is a world that human beings must bring 
about through their own efforts and it expresses the time in which, as Paul puts it in 
1 Corinthians, “God may be all in all” (15.28).  First Isaiah describes it as the time 
in which  
[t]he wolf will live with the lamb, the leopard will lie down with 
the goat, the calf and the lion and the yearling together; and a 
little child will lead them.  The cow will feed with the bear, their 
young will lie down together, and the lion will eat straw like the 
ox … for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the Lord as 
the waters cover the sea (11.9).  
  
This extremely unnatural natural image, or metaphor, would not have made sense 
to the ancient Greeks and Romans.  On the basis of both perception and the law of 
contradiction, natural enemies do not lie together and bear young.  In The Iliad, 
when Achilleus finally catches Hektor after chasing him around the walls of Troy 
like a predator chases its prey (this is a natural natural image, or simile, that Homer 
tirelessly reproduces in different ways and combinations), Hektor says to Achilleus 
that there are only two possible outcomes: “I must take you now, or I must be 
taken.”  He then offers to make a pact with Achilleus: whoever is victorious in the 
fight unto death should not defile the dead body.  Achilleus replies, 
Hektor, argue me no agreements.  I cannot forgive you.  As 
there are no trustworthy oaths between men and lions, nor 
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wolves and lambs have spirit that can be brought to 
agreement but forever these hold feelings of hate for each 
other, so there can be no love between you and me, nor shall 
there be oaths between us, but one or the other must fall 
before then to glut with his blood Ares the god (22.261-267). 
 
Achilleus agrees with Hektor: one of the two must kill the other.  There is no 
alternative.  Peace between them is inconceivable.  The only point that Achilleus 
contests is that Hektor has much chance of being the victor.  Hektor is a man: he is 
the son of mortal parents.  For Achilleus, the proper analog of a mere man is a 
lamb.  Achilleus, however, is a demigod, the child of a goddess and a descendent 
of Zeus.  His proper analog is a lion or wolf.106  Face-to-face, no lamb can kill a wolf 
and no hungry wolf would not kill a lamb.  Thus, Achilleus kills Hektor. 
 In stark opposition to the world in which Jesus lived, the world of the Roman 
Empire, whose culture is in all essential respects indistinguishable from ancient 
Greek culture, is the world in which, Jesus teaches, the first, the so-called strong 
and wise, will be last, and the last – the poor, the disadvantaged, the meek, the 
persecuted, the merciful, and the sinners who “hunger and thirst for righteousness” 
– will be first (Matt. 5.3-12, 19.30).  Paul expresses much the same idea in 1 
Corinthians when he says that God’s weakness is stronger than human strength 
and God’s foolishness is wiser than human wisdom.  For, according to Paul, 
“human strength” and “human wisdom” are based on power (over others), wealth, 
                                            
106 Achilleus’ speech betrays the inherent contradiction of his situation (which is the situation of all 
Greek heroes).  If Achilleus kills Hektor, then he precipitates his own reversal because he must die 
at the hands of someone lesser.  It is probably because Achilleus depends upon the status of 
Hektor for his own status that he implies that Hektor is the wolf whereas he is the lion but, 
contradictorily, not the lamb.  For in the above cited passage Achilleus compares “men and lions” to 
“wolves and lambs” and not to “lambs and wolves.”  Thus, Achilleus positions Hektor as both the 
wolf – his worthy adversary – and as the lamb – who is no match for him.  In so doing, he shows 
that he depends upon the status of the enemy he must kill. 
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status, noble birth, and the natural categories in terms of which the Romans 
distinguished the first from the last (1.18-29).  The Jewish vision of the kingdom of 
God is incomprehensible to the Romans, and it is exactly for this reason that Jesus 
teaches in John 18.36 that the kingdom of heaven “is not of this world.”  The 
destruction of the Empire and the emergence of a “new heaven” and a “new earth” 
are anticipated throughout the Book of Revelation (e.g., 21.1-2).107   
 The good news that is explicated in the Gospels disclose that the kingdom is 
“near” and “at hand” (Matt. 10.7, Mk. 1.15, Lk. 10.9, 21.31), that the keys to the 
kingdom are with us (Matt. 16.19), that it shall come through repentance (Matt. 3.2, 
4.17), that it belongs to those “who will produce its fruit” (Matt. 21.43, emphasis 
added), that it is like a mustard seed that a man sows in his own field (Matt. 13.31-
32), and that it is beyond the world that “moth and rust destroy, and where thieves 
break in and steal” (Matt. 6.19-20).  It is the world in which human beings relate to 
themselves and one another with dignity and in which, Isaiah teaches, a person 
does not judge on the basis of appearances but “with righteousness he will judge 
the needy, with justice he will give decisions for the poor of the earth” (Is. 11.3-4).  
Jesus says in Luke that the kingdom of God is not defined in space – it is not 
“here” or “there.”  “For, in fact, the kingdom of God is within [or among] you” (17.20-
21).  Consistent with the other key biblical ideas that I have examined in this 
chapter, the kingdom of God expresses the truth that human beings are not means 
to an end but are ends in themselves.  
                                            
107 For a fruitful commentary on the meaning of the rich symbolism in the Book of Revelation, see 
Jean-Pierre Ruiz’s introductory notes to Revelation and his footnotes in Chapters 8, 12, 14, 17, 18, 
20, and 21 in the Fourth Edition of The New Oxford Annotated Bible. 
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 In the Bible, life in the kingdom of heaven is described as “eternal.”  “Eternal 
life” has nothing in common with the finite, immortal end of the pagan religions.  In 
Matthew 19.16 a man asks Jesus what good thing he must do to inherit eternal life.  
Jesus calls upon Exodus 20.12-16 (or Deuteronomy 5.16-20) and Leviticus 19.18 
and tells the man, “[i]f you want to enter life, obey the commandments.  … ‘Do not 
murder, do not commit adultery, do not steal, do not give false testimony, honor 
your father and mother,’ and ‘love your neighbor as yourself.’”  (As in his 
formulation of the golden rule in Matthew 7.12, Jesus does not mention “God.”)  
We see here that when the man inquires about how to attain eternal life, Jesus 
responds by telling him what he must do to enter “life.”  What does it mean for 
those who are living to “enter” into living?  Jesus is distinguishing between an 
idolatrous conception of life and a moral conception of life.  When he speaks of the 
commandments as the way to (eternal) life, he indicates that eternity is not an 
infinite quantity of years but the quality of the life that is adequately conceived as 
an end in itself.  In Deuteronomy 30.19-20 and elsewhere, life that is separate from 
God is called “death.” 108  Eternal life is freedom from death.109 
 The final idea that I want to work through in this chapter is perhaps the most 
freighted idea in the New Testament: the resurrection from the dead.  The most 
sustained argument for the resurrection, which involves all of the central biblical 
                                            
108 See, for example, Proverbs 18.21, 23.14, Ez. 18.20-22 and 18.30-32.  
109 In Revelation, the kingdom of God is freedom from death in both this spiritual sense and also in 
a literal sense.  For it represents the end of Roman persecution during the reign of Nero (54-68 CE) 
and Domitian (81-96 CE), during which Christians were at risk of being “slaughtered for the word of 
God and for the testimony they had given” (6.9, New Revised Standard Version).  (See Ruiz’s 
introductory notes on Revelation in the Fourth Edition of The New Oxford Annotated Bible.)  In the 
holy city to come, God says, “[d]eath will be no more; mourning and crying and pain will be no 
more” (21.4, New Revised Standard Version). 
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ideas that I have taken up thus far, is in Chapter 15 of 1 Corinthians, where Paul 
makes the staggering claim that “[i]f there is no resurrection of the dead, then not 
even Christ has been raised.  And if Christ has not been raised, our preaching is 
useless and so is your faith.  … [I]f Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; 
you are still in your sins” (15.13-17).  It is astounding that Paul anchors his 
teaching on Jesus’ resurrection when he argues only two chapters earlier that the 
only true (necessary and sufficient) criterion for faith is love.  (He defends this 
position explicitly in Romans and Galatians, as I have noted.)  If faith depends on 
the resurrection of Jesus, why do the Hebrew Scriptures, which, we must 
remember, are the only biblical texts that Jesus ever knew, never explicitly mention 
the idea of resurrection?  In addition, what meaning could a literal notion of 
resurrection have?  The critical issue that we must work through, then, is the 
relationship between love and the resurrection from the dead. 
 Paul argues for the claim that faith is futile unless there is resurrection from 
the dead by first linking the idea of the resurrection to the idea of creation as found 
in the story of Adam and Eve: as “death came through a man, the resurrection of 
the dead comes also through a man.  For as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be 
made alive” (15.21-22).  We have seen how death came through Adam: the man 
whom Paul later calls the “first Adam” was expelled from the world in which human 
beings have no knowledge of good and evil into the world of “the living,” where he 
is conscious of himself as a spiritual and mortal being (Paul later refers to the 
spiritual man as the “second Adam” in verses 45-47).  I shall not here repeat the 
argument that I presented earlier of how the story of the expulsion from Eden 
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retells in a different narrative the story of the creation of the world by God.  What is 
important to note at this point is that the resurrection in Christ is like the death of 
Adam – it is like the realization, in the light of moral knowledge, that human beings 
die – as depicted in the story of the expulsion. 
 Having bound the resurrection from the dead to the creation of the world by 
connecting the idea of the resurrection to the idea of Adam’s expulsion, Paul next 
binds the resurrection to the kingdom of God.  He writes in verses 22-28 that the 
resurrection of Christ, in whom all who belong will be made alive, points to a time in 
which every ruler, every authority, and every power in the world will have been 
destroyed.  We have seen in 1 Cor. 1.18-29 that “the world,” according to Paul, is 
the world of the Jews under Roman rule, the world whose wisdom lies in natural 
power, high rank, and noble birth.  (It is the world against which, Jesus says in 
John 7.7, he has come to testify and whose destruction, I have noted, is foretold in 
Revelation.)  Paul says that after every ruler, authority, and power have been 
destroyed, death itself will have been destroyed.  He is careful to note, however, 
that to destroy every power, authority, and ruler does not mean that there is no 
longer any power, authority, or ruler.  Rather, Paul says that the sole authority that 
is left after every ruler, authority, and power has been destroyed is God.  “The last 
enemy to be destroyed is death … so that God may be all in all” (1 Cor. 15.26-28).  
The world in which God is all in all, and so is not here (and not there) or there (and 
not here), is the kingdom of God.  
 How are we to understand the idea that in the resurrection, in the kingdom of 
God, death itself is destroyed?  Has not Paul just spoken about the resurrection as 
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a new creation, i.e., as the expulsion from the world in which death does not exist?  
If the resurrection, life in Christ, is like the expulsion (for as in Adam all die, so in 
Christ all will be made alive), and if it is in the expulsion that human beings become 
conscious of their existence and of death, then how can death be destroyed in the 
resurrection?   
 In verses 30-31, Paul writes, “why do we endanger ourselves every hour?  I 
die every day – I mean that, brothers … .”  The fact that Paul speaks of death 
metaphorically is crucial, because it is found within the context of an argument 
whose meaning is centered on the idea of death’s destruction.  In fact, it is 
unexceptional for Paul to speak of death metaphorically.  He writes in his letter to 
the Romans that a life of sin leads to death (6.16) and that “the wages of [or 
payment for] sin is death” (6.23).  In this context, he contrasts the life of sin with 
obedience to God, which leads not to death, but to “righteousness,” “holiness,” and 
“eternal life.”  Paul further explains in Chapter 8 of Romans that “[t]hose who live 
according to the sinful nature” do not have their minds set on living “in accordance 
with the Spirit.  … The mind of sinful man is death, but the mind controlled by the 
Spirit is life and peace; the sinful mind is hostile to God.  It does not submit to 
God’s law” (8.5-7).110  A few chapters later, he develops his analysis and indicates 
that sin is “dead” apart from the law.  It is the truth of the law that reveals sin to be 
sin and that, because it brings life, brings death.  Outside of the law, there is 
neither life nor death, neither righteousness nor sin, neither good nor evil.  
                                            
110 Cf. Galatians 5.16-23, where Paul writes that “the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, 
kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control” and those who are alive in Christ 
“have crucified the sinful nature [and] its passions and desires” (5.22-24). 
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I would not have known what sin was except through the law 
… .  For apart from [the] law, sin is dead.  Once I was alive 
[dead] apart from the law; but when the commandment came, 
sin sprang to life and I died [lived].  I found that the very 
commandment that was intended to bring life actually brought 
death.  … So then, the law is holy, and the commandment is 
holy, righteous and good.  Did that which is good, then, 
become death to me?  By no means!  But in order that sin 
might be recognized as sin, it produced death in me through 
what was good, so that through the commandment sin might 
become utterly sinful (7.7-11, emphasis added).  
 
In this extraordinary passage Paul contrasts death not with biological life, i.e., 
being “alive apart from the law,” but with the life of holiness, righteousness, and 
goodness, in which sin is “recognized as sin.”  (Paul invokes the distinction 
between death as perishing apart from the law [through sin that is not recognized 
as sin] and death as perishing under the law [through sin that is recognized as sin] 
in Romans 2.12, as pointed out earlier.)  In Romans 7.24 Paul cries, “[w]hat a 
wretched man I am!  Who will rescue me from this body of death?”  The implication 
is clear: one is rescued from the body of death – one is resurrected – when one no 
longer lives apart from the law or in sin under the law but in love.111  
 Let us return to 1 Corinthians.  Having fastened the idea of the resurrection 
from the dead to the expulsion of Adam and then to the kingdom of God in which 
death has been destroyed, Paul indicates that death is the condition for the true 
life: “[w]hat you sow does not come to life unless it dies” (1 Cor. 15.36).  (Jesus 
teaches in John 12.24 that “unless a kernel of wheat falls to the ground and dies, it 
                                            
111 1 John 3.14-15 plainly supports this reading: “[w]e know that we have passed from death to life, 
because we love our brothers.  Anyone who does not love remains in death.  Anyone who hates his 
brother … [does not have] eternal life in him” (3.14-15, emphasis added).  See also James 5.19-20: 
“[m]y brothers, if one of you should wander from the truth and someone should bring him back, 
remember this: [w]hoever turns a sinner from the error of his way will save him from death and 
cover over a multitude of sins.”  
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remains only a single seed.  But if it dies, it produces many seeds.”)  Given that 
Paul on several occasions refers to the sinful life, the life that is separated from 
Christ, as death, could it be that Paul is arguing that obedience to God, the true 
and resurrected life, must involve the recognition of sin but also the overcoming of 
sin through repentance?  Can true life exist outside of repentance?  Have we not 
just seen, rather, that it cannot exist except through the law and, therefore, with 
death?  Is it not for this reason that Jesus is able to heal those who are blind but 
not those who see, for he cannot heal where there is no faith?  It is important to 
remember what Jesus teaches in John 3.5-6: no one can enter the kingdom of God 
unless he is born of both nature (the flesh) and Spirit.  If sin is the life in which 
human beings allow their decisions to be determined by nature, but if there is no 
kingdom of God outside of nature (the resurrection and the life [in Christ] are 
always of embodied persons), then it has to follow that there is no kingdom of God 
that does not involve the freedom to sin.  There is no true freedom in evil; but there 
is no true freedom without the freedom to do evil.  For what it means to do good, 
recalling Deuteronomy, is to know evil but to “choose life” (30.15-20).112  True life is 
never without repentance because it is never without the freedom to sin.  It is for 
this reason, we have seen, that Jesus calls upon the sinners, who acknowledge 
                                            
112 In Deuteronomy, Moses says to the Israelites: “I set before you today life and prosperity, death 
and destruction.  For I command you today to love the Lord your God, to walk in his ways, and to 
keep his commands, decrees and laws; then you will live … .  But if your heart turns away and you 
are not obedient, and if you are drawn away to bow down to other gods and to worship them, I 
declare to you this day that you will certainly be destroyed.  … I have set before you life and death, 
blessings and curses.  Now choose life, so that you and your children may live and that you may 
love the Lord your God, listen to his voice, and hold fast to him.  For the Lord is your life” (Deut. 
30.15-20, emphasis added).  The fact that Moses connects “death and destruction” to the heart that 
“turns away” from God implies that life and prosperity belong to the repentant heart that turns, or 
returns, to God.   
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their sins and are willing to repent, and not upon the righteous, who do not 
acknowledge their sins and see no need to repent.  For what you sow does not 
come to life unless it dies.  
 From 15.42, Paul develops an important train of ideas in which he 
distinguishes between the body that is sown (buried) and the body that is raised, 
i.e., between the dead body and the resurrected body.  He writes:  
[t]he body that is sown is perishable, it is raised imperishable; 
it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in 
weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is 
raised a spiritual body (1 Cor. 15.42-44). 
   
The dead body is perishable, weak, and natural.  The resurrected body is 
imperishable, powerful, and spiritual.  If what is sown does not come to life unless it 
dies, as is surely the lesson of the story of Adam and Eve, then the imperishable 
body, the body that is raised in glory, must die.  It would not be meaningful to read 
Paul as claiming that the body that is raised does not die, although it “comes to life” 
because it dies; for he has already indicated that we are to interpret the 
resurrection “as” death in Adam, the Adam that is not merely natural but also 
spiritual because he comprehends that he dies (15.21-22).  
 The ideas that Paul is defending here are, at least on the surface, unnatural 
and counter-intuitive.  We would expect to hear that perishable things, things that 
perish, die and that imperishable things, things that do not perish, do not die.  What 
Paul communicates, however, is that imperishable bodies, or spiritual bodies, die 
and that perishable bodies, or physical bodies, do not die.  At this point in his 
argument, Paul again interlocks the idea of resurrection with the idea of the 
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expulsion from Eden.  He says that the physical body is the first Adam and that the 
raised, resurrected, or spiritual body is the second Adam.  The first Adam is a 
“living being” but he is not a “life-giving” spirit (15.45).  (He is a “natural” being “of 
the dust of the earth” who views his life in the contradictory appearances of 
nature.)  The second, resurrected Adam, the Adam who has, one might say, 
“fallen” into knowledge of sin and death, is a life-giving spirit “from heaven” (15.46-
47).  The spiritual body that is raised in power and glory, the body that is 
understood in the light of the knowledge of good and evil, is the body that is viewed 
not as mere dust but as sacred, as what Paul refers to earlier in 1 Corinthians as 
“God’s temple” (3.16-17).  
 Next, Paul transitions from discussing the contrast between the first Adam 
and the second Adam to discussing the present condition of those who accept 
Christ.  He indicates to the Corinthians that, as all of them “have borne” the 
likeness of the earthly man, “so shall we bear the likeness of the man from heaven” 
(15.49, emphasis added).  This expression is curious.  Paul positions those who 
accept Christ as between the first Adam and the second Adam: the first Adam is of 
the past and the second Adam is of the future.  Thus, while Paul argues that Christ 
resurrected (i.e., those who are resurrected in Christ) has the same status as the 
fallen Adam – which implies that resurrection from the dead is won through the 
labor and toil of the life-giving spirit – Paul avoids describing his own struggle (and 
that of his fellow men) in the likeness of the fallen Adam (the resurrected Christ).  
The reason for this is perhaps due to the fact that life within the Roman Empire 
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bears no relationship to the ideal world that he envisions in the kingdom of God.  
Thus, he speaks of the resurrection as a future time. 
 The resurrection from the dead, Paul continues, is a kind of change:   
the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be changed.  
For the perishable must clothe itself with the imperishable, and 
the mortal with immortality (15.52-53).   
 
Note that Paul does not separate the spiritual body from the physical body.  The 
spiritual body is the physical body that is clothed, viewed, or seen in the light of 
what Paul here calls “immortality.”  To clothe the body with immortality cannot be to 
view the body as immortal because, again, the immortality of which Paul is 
speaking belongs to the second Adam who has been banished forever from eating 
of the tree of immortality.  When Paul indicates that the imperishable body is the 
perishable body that has put on immortality, he seems to be speaking in the same 
sense that Jesus speaks of “eternal life” in the Gospels.  Immortality is life that 
overcomes death (sin) through repentance.  It is life in the kingdom of heaven 
where God is all in all.  
 Having linked the idea of the resurrection of the dead to the ideas of 
creation, the kingdom of God, the spiritual body, and immortality – and having done 
so within the broader context of defending love as the essence of the law and as 
the criterion for true faith in God – Paul then indicates again, in the closing remarks 
of his argument, that what the resurrection of Christ means, what it means to be 
resurrected in Christ, is to overcome not the body but sin.  He cites the Hebrew 
Scriptures to support his position:  
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[w]hen the perishable has been clothed with the imperishable, 
and the mortal with immortality, then the saying that is written 
will come true: ‘Death has been swallowed up in victory.’ [Is. 
25.8]  ‘Where, O death, is your victory?  Where, O death, is 
your sting?’ [Hos. 13.14]  The sting of death is sin, and the 
power of sin is the law (1 Cor. 15.54-56).   
 
What, then, does it mean for the physical body to become a spiritual body, for the 
perishable body to become imperishable, and for the mortal body to put on 
immortality?  What does the resurrection from the dead mean?  It means to 
swallow up death.  What does it mean to swallow up death?  Paul writes that the 
sting of death is sin; this means that death comes from sin, or that sin brings death.  
Thus, to swallow up death means to overcome sin.  The paradox is that, in order 
for one to overcome one’s sins, one must acknowledge them, for those who do not 
know the law do not transgress the law (Rom. 4.15). 
 Consequently, when Paul writes in his first letter to the Corinthians that faith 
is futile and that one is trapped in sin if there is no resurrection from the dead, he 
re-expresses his fundamental insight that, without love, faith is nothing.  The 
resurrection from the dead is the resurrection of the living, through repentance, into 
true life.  
 Oscar Cullmann argues in his essay “Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection 
of the Dead?  The Witness of the New Testament”113 that the idea of the 
resurrection in the New Testament rests on ideas of the human being, the body, 
creation, death, and eternal life that are alien to the ancient Greeks.  He writes that 
in Greek thought, “the material, the bodily, the corporeal is bad and must be 
                                            
113 London: The Epworth Press, 1958.  The essay is available online at 
http://www.jbburnett.com/resources/cullmann_immort-res.pdf 
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destroyed, so that the death of the body would not be in any sense the destruction 
of the true life.”  In the Christian (and Jewish) conception, however, “the life of our 
body is true life” (pp. 26, 30).  “The contrast, for the Christian, is not between the 
body and the soul,” Cullmann continues, but between the “creation” of “death by 
sin and new creation,” a distinction that “is not Greek, but is connected with Jewish 
conceptions” (p. 31).   
 Cullmann observes that the New Testament uses the same terms as the 
Greek philosophers when speaking about soul, body, spirit, and flesh. 
But [these terms] mean something quite different, and we 
understand the whole New Testament amiss when we 
construe these concepts only from the point of view of Greek 
thought … .  The contrast with the Greek soul is clear: it is 
precisely apart from the body that the Greek soul attains to full 
development of its life.  According to the Christian view, 
however, it is the inner man’s very nature which demands the 
body (pp. 32-33).   
 
Thus, Cullmann writes that the resurrection of the body 
is not a transition from this world to another world, as is the 
case of the immortal soul freed from the body; rather, it is the 
transition from the present age to the future.  It is tied to the 
whole process of redemption.  Because there is sin there must 
be a process of redemption enacted in time.  Where sin is 
regarded as the source of death’s lordship over God’s 
creation, there this sin and death must be vanquished 
together, and there the Holy Spirit, the only power able to 
conquer death, must win all creatures back to life in a 
continuous process (p. 38). 
 
I have not discussed directly the idea of redemption, but the meaning of the above 
passage would be perfectly intact if we substitute “repentance” for “redemption” 
(both repentance and redemption imply the effort to seek deliverance from, or 
atonement for, past sins by returning to God).  Cullmann’s insight is that the 
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resurrection from the dead is not the separation of the body from the soul, but the 
continuous process to live “not as fleshly bodies but as spiritual bodies,” i.e., 
insofar as the “flesh” is conceived as “the power of death” (p. 46).114  The 
“essence” of the Christian faith, Cullmann writes, is living and thinking in the 
“chronological tension between ‘already fulfilled’ and ‘not yet consummated’” (p. 
43).  (It seems to be for this reason, again, that Paul locates the time of 
resurrection [fulfillment] in the future.)  To be faithful means to live in the glowing 
embers of real time, always reaching for the beyond in one’s midst: holiness and 
perfection.  So it is that “[w]e are already in the state of resurrection, that of eternal 
life – not immortality of the soul” (p. 35).  
 The fundamental ground of the core biblical ideas that I have discussed in 
this chapter, each of which implies the others, is the consciousness that human 
beings are ends in themselves and, therefore, that we are obligated to treat others 
as we would want to be treated.  This moral self-consciousness marks an absolute 
departure from pagan teleology, an insight that I have shown is defended in the 
work of Cahill, Cullmann, Fromm, and Polka, not to mention the Hebrew prophets, 
Jesus, Paul, and the Bible’s various authors and editors.115  It is only in the light of 
the Bible that paganism is comprehended to be ignorant of truth and of its 
falsification and that we see that the real problem for us moderns is not seeking the 
                                            
114 In Galatians 5.19-23, Paul equates “the works of the flesh” with “fornication, impurity, 
licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, jealousy, anger, quarrels, dissensions, factions, 
envy, drunkenness, carousing, and things like these.”  He contrasts the works of the flesh with “the 
fruit of the spirit” which, as noted earlier, is “love, joy, peace … .”  
115 St. Augustine, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche are rare thinkers 
who self-consciously position themselves within the biblical tradition, which they see is radically 
other than the Greek (Roman) tradition, although it is not my task to offer a substantive defense of 
this claim in the present work. 
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truth, as though it were a thing in itself that is apart from us, but willing the truth by 
being truthful to ourselves and others.  
 In the next chapter, we shall see how Kant demonstrates that the mere idea 
of freedom, and so of the moral law to which it is bound, is sufficient proof that 
reason does not conform to nature but that nature conforms to reason and that the 
true end of rational persons is nothing more (or less) than the good will.  Insofar as 
we fail to distinguish between spirit and nature, the moral law and the law of 
contradiction, love and sense perception, sin and ignorance, creation and 
generation, miracle and chance, God and fate, eternal life and the immortality of 
the soul and, in sum, between biblical and teleological metaphysics, we shall mire 
ourselves in contradictions.  The good news of the critical revolution is that we are 
responsible for the contradictions in which we become entangled.  It is because we 
are responsible for these contradictions that they are not necessary and that we 
are therefore able, and, indeed, obligated, to account for them and address them. 
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Chapter 4: Kant’s Critical Revolution: Human Beings are Ends in Themselves 
  
 
Kant demonstrates in his transcendental philosophy that the first principles 
of modern thought and existence are rooted in the biblical idea of freedom and that 
the basis of truth is not formal logic and natural perception but the moral law that 
human beings are ends in themselves.  In Chapter 2 I argued that logic and 
perception are the first principles of ancient Greek teleology because human 
beings are trapped in the excluded middle of dependent opposites: they are in 
contradiction with their essence and are thus dependent on being contradicted.  In 
Chapter 3 I showed that core ideas in the Bible – love, sin, idolatry, repentance, 
creation, God, covenant, miracle, eternity, the kingdom of God, and the 
resurrection from the dead – are not teleological.  Rather, they affirm that the 
power, freedom, and dignity of human beings are adequately expressed only when 
we fulfill our moral responsibilities and obligations.  What Kant shows in the texts 
that are central to his critical philosophy is that thought and existence in the 
modern world are necessarily related, which is proof that we envelop the 
contradictions in our lives because it is we who create and sustain them when we 
think that we cannot will our existence and so do not treat ourselves and others as 
ends.  Kant shows in the Critique of Pure Reason,116 the Critique of Practical 
Reason,117 the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,118 and Religion within 
                                            
116 In The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason.  Translated 
and edited by Paul Guyer and Alan W. Wood.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
117 In The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy.  Translated and 
edited by Mary J. Gregor.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
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the Boundaries of Mere Reason,119 to which one might also add “Conjectures on 
the Beginning of Human History,”120 and the Opus Postumum,121 that human 
beings are the beginning(s) and end(s) of all things.  
In the first Critique Kant maintains that the purpose of his critical project is to 
put an end to the seemingly interminable controversies of metaphysics and to set 
metaphysics on a secure path, once and for all.  The central question with which 
he is occupied, he writes, is: how are synthetic a priori judgments possible? (B 19)  
He makes two distinctions that are central to comprehending this question: first, the 
distinction between “analytic” and “synthetic” propositions or judgments; second, 
the distinction between a priori and a posteriori propositions or judgments.  In 
analytic judgments, the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject; what is 
said about the subject can be deduced from the logical analysis of its concept, i.e., 
through the principle of contradiction.  The claim that “all bodies are extended,” for 
example, is an analytic judgment because the concept of extension is contained in 
the concept of a body.  In contrast, a “synthetic” judgment refers to a relationship 
between the subject and predicate that falls outside the limits of formal logic; 
explication of the concept through the principle of contradiction will not yield the 
                                                                                                                                     
118 In The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. 
119 In Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
And Other Writings.  Edited by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003. 
120 In Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought: Kant: Political Writings.  Second edition.  
Translated by H. B. Nisbet.  Edited by H. S. Reiss.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
121 Edited by Eckart Förster.  Translated by Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
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predicate (A 6/B 10 - A 9/B 13).122  For instance, the judgment that “all bodies have 
weight” is synthetic because the concept “body” does not contain “weight”  
(“weight” concerns the gravitational force between bodies and is affected by the 
masses of these bodies and by the distance between them).  Thus, while it is a 
contradiction to speak of a body that is not extended, it is not a contradiction to 
speak of a body that is weightless.123  Concerning the distinction between a priori 
and a posteriori, Kant argues that a priori judgments are universal, necessary, and, 
therefore, independent of experience.  “Necessity and strict universality are … 
secure indications of an a priori cognition, and also belong together inseparably” (B 
4).  Experience can never establish necessity; it tells us what is, not what (it) is, 
and certainly not that it must be so, and not otherwise (A 1).  Thus, a posteriori 
judgments contrast with a priori judgments because they refer to what is empirical 
and contingent, i.e., to what is but may not be.  
 We shall see that to explore how synthetic a priori judgments are possible is 
to search for the nature of what in thought and existence falls beyond the reach of 
both logic (the analytic a priori) and possible experience (the synthetic a posteriori) 
and provides the grounds of both a priori knowledge of nature, and so of the 
sciences, and of a priori truth in moral life.  These grounds are the proper “objects” 
of meta-physics: freedom, immortality, God ... .  Kant does not ask if knowledge or 
                                            
122 In developing the idea of “synthetic” judgments, Kant distinguishes himself from Leibniz and his 
followers who hold that the predicate is always contained in the concept of the subject and that the 
connection between the predicate and the subject is either self-evident or apprehended through 
logical analysis of the subject-concept.  
123 “Analytic” and “synthetic” merely describe the nature of the relationship between the subject and 
the predicate in a judgment.  They suggest nothing about whether the judgment is true or false, as 
we shall see.   
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morality is possible; he does not reason to existence, i.e., teleologically, but from 
existence, i.e., from its necessary presuppositions or “transcendental conditions.”  
The question of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible is the question of 
how creation is possible.  It is the question of how the necessary relationship 
between thought and existence – that which cannot be thought except as existing 
and cannot exist except in/as thought: God, freedom, immortality … – is to be 
comprehended and lived.  
 Kant writes that, in the time of the ancient Greeks, metaphysics was hailed 
as the “queen of all the sciences” (Critique of Pure Reason, A viii).  (Aristotle, we 
have seen, gives it the name “First Philosophy” because its object is the first and 
final cause of all things.)  In the modern world, however, metaphysics wins rebuke 
and scorn for its groundless pretensions, and deservedly so.  Kant likens it to a 
“battlefield” of “mock combat” in which “no combatant has ever gained the least bit 
of ground, nor has any been able to base any lasting possession on his victory.”  
There is “no doubt that up to now the procedure of metaphysics has been a mere 
groping, and what is the worst, a groping among mere concepts” (Critique of Pure 
Reason, B xv).  The reason for the precipitous fall in the reputation of metaphysics 
is, according to Kant, the revelation of Christianity, the “pure religion of reason” in 
which the moral perfection of human being, “humanity,” is extolled as “the end of 
creation” (Religion, 6:60).  Before Kant establishes that synthetic a priori 
judgments are possible only in light of a biblical framework, however, he first 
proceeds to determine the limits of formal logic and of possible experience, the 
latter of which is limited to the field of natural perception in space and time.  For he 
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wants to show that we cannot think existence in terms of logic and possible 
experience (perception, nature) in order to establish that the meaning of all nature 
– formal, material, inner, and outer – is determined by the human mind (will, 
reason, thought).  It is only when we grasp this fundamental truth that we shall be 
in a proper position to prevent ourselves from confusing nature and freedom, to 
recognize the problems that emerge when we do confuse nature and freedom, to 
hold ourselves responsible and accountable for these problems, and to correct 
them.  Kant’s critical revolution of idolatrous metaphysics, i.e., of the metaphysics 
that proceeds in contradiction with its synthetic a priori transcendental conditions, 
rests upon the insight that the human being is (created in) the image of God, not 
nature.  Thus, the mind must not conform itself to nature but must make nature 
conform to it (Critique of Pure Reason, B xvi).    
The main problem of the first Critique is to determine how synthetic a priori 
“knowledge” of nature is possible.  To answer this question Kant resolves to 
demonstrate how Aristotelian logic and inner and outer perception must be 
confined within fixed limits so that he can establish that logic and perception are 
not sufficient conditions for synthetic a priori knowledge of nature and that such 
knowledge presupposes a moral world that is unknowable in terms of logic and 
sense.  The investigations in the first Critique are aimed from the beginning at 
clearing the way for the investigation of a “transcendental” world.  Kant writes in 
the second Preface:  
I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith; and 
the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice that without 
criticism [of its own powers] reason can make progress in 
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metaphysics, is the true source of all unbelief conflicting with 
morality (B xxx). 
  
The German word that Kant uses for “deny” is aufheben – which means to cancel 
in order to reappropriate.  When Kant writes, “Ich muβte also das Wissen 
aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen …” he means that it is only when 
we limit logic and possible experience to the adequacy of their concepts that we 
can protect them from being misunderstood and misemployed and thus have faith 
(or belief) in them.124  To establish their limits is to secure their meaning and 
validity; it is, we shall see, the first step in establishing that, although human 
existence is unknowable within the perimeters of teleological cognition, it is not 
thinkable without logic and perception.  
It is primarily in the second Critique, the Groundwork, and Religion that we 
see the fulfilled vision of Kant’s project: the demonstration that human beings are 
ends in themselves and, therefore, that logic and knowledge have no worth at all 
unless they are employed for moral purposes in the service of humankind.  
Reason is not logic or sense perception and its highest end is not scientific 
(“theoretical” or “speculative”) knowledge but, rather, moral “practice”: it is the 
fulfilment of one’s moral obligations to oneself, others, and God.  In the Critique of 
Practical Reason, in the section entitled “On the Primacy of Pure Practical Reason 
in its Connection with Speculative Reason,” Kant argues that practical reason is 
                                            
124 I quote the German from Fred Seddon’s essay, “Kant on Faith,” p. 190 (in The Journal of Ayn 
Rand Studies 7, no. 1.  Fall 2005: 189-202).  Seddon argues against the objectivists who, in falsely 
opposing faith and knowledge, accuse Kant of subordinating the real “facts” of perceptual 
observation to a faith that is “without evidence or proof” and contrary to both the senses and 
reason.   
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“the first determining ground” of theoretical reason; it is the self-determining basis 
for connecting “the interest[s] of all the powers of the mind … with respect to the 
final and complete end” (5:119-120).  One “cannot require pure practical reason to 
be subordinate to speculative reason and so reverse the order, since all interest is 
ultimately practical and even that of speculative reason is only conditional and is 
complete in practical use alone” (Critique of Practical Reason, 5:121, emphasis 
added).125   
Let us now discuss Kant’s acute insights into the nature, function and limits 
of logic as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason.  Logic is subsumed under the 
analytic a priori; it is a closed and complete system that articulates the purely 
formal rules of thought: concerning object A, A cannot be not-A, A = A, and 
something is either A or not-A.  Logic cannot go further than what follows from the 
laws of contradiction, identity, and the excluded middle.  Indeed, the reason that it 
has never had to retrace a single step, Kant writes, is precisely because it has 
never advanced a single step.   
That from the earliest times logic has travelled [a] secure 
course can be seen from the fact that since the time of 
Aristotle it has not had to go a single step backwards … .  
What is further remarkable about logic is that … it has also 
                                            
125 The thesis that, for Kant, theoretical reason is, first and last, practical, is defended by Richard 
Velkley in his study, Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant’s Critical 
Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989).  Velkley argues that theoretical 
investigations would be useless without the practical ends that they presuppose (p. 40) and that the 
true function of acquiring theoretical knowledge is defending the rights of humanity (pp. 6, 28, 114 
and 115).  Although Velkley does not provide any sustained analysis of the relationship among 
transcendental philosophy, biblical thought, and Greek metaphysics, he does argue that the 
“revolution in the meaning” expressed in Kant’s account of reason “is summed up in the fact that 
morality or practice becomes the true ‘organon’” and is “the correction of the error of all … culture” 
that “look[s] to nature for the teleological determination of human reason” (pp. 114, 117).  The 
criticism of “the most basic of ancient premises – that nature … gives reason its end [–]” is “entirely 
different from any ‘theoretical’ enterprise of the past” (p. 151).  
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been unable to take a single step forward, and therefore 
seems to all appearance to be finished and complete.  … 
[L]ogic is the science that exhaustively presents and strictly 
proves nothing but the formal rules of all thinking … .  For the 
advantage that has made it so successful logic has solely its 
own limitation to thank, since it … is indeed obliged to abstract 
… from all objects of cognition and all the distinctions between 
them (B viii - B ix).  
 
Consider what Kant has said: in more than two thousand years, the proper 
application of logic has not produced even one insight.  Logic determines whether 
ideas contradict one another; it cannot determine whether these ideas are true, 
which is a synthetic a priori enterprise and “is a problem with which general 
[formal] logic has nothing to do” (Critique of Pure Reason, A 154/B 193).  Reason, 
when confined to its analytic use, is not able to judge its own judgments but only to 
determine whether or not they are formally consistent.  The sole criterion for the 
validity of analytic thought is formal logic.  Thus, Kant writes that, while  
[t]o cognize an object, it is required that I be able to prove its 
possibility … I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not 
contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible 
thought … .  But in order to ascribe objective validity to such a 
concept (real possibility, for the first sort of possibility was 
merely logical) something more is required (Critique of Pure 
Reason, B xxvi [ft.]).   
 
Kant then anticipates that the “something more” outside of logic that is required for 
the cognition of an object may lie in practical sources that are beyond the 
theoretical sphere. 
The principle of contradiction thus counts “as the universal and completely 
sufficient principle of all analytic cognition.”  It is “inviolable” insofar as “no 
cognition can be opposed to it without annihilating itself.”  However, it annihilates 
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itself when it is viewed as the sufficient condition and “determining ground of the 
truth of our cognition” (Critique of Pure Reason, A 151-152/B 191).  For “the error 
that concerns not form but content cannot be discovered by any touchstone of 
logic” and “nobody can dare to judge of objects and … assert anything about them 
merely with logic without having drawn on antecedently well-founded information 
about them from outside of logic” (Critique of Pure Reason, A 60/B 84-85).   
In the ancient world, Kant observes, logic was not employed merely as a 
canon; it was the criterion for truth.  Kant gives the name “dialectic” to this use of 
logic as a “putative organon” (Critique of Pure Reason, A 61/B 85).  For Plato, 
“dialectic” is the teleological search for the end in itself (form) through the logical 
discourse of appearances (e.g., Republic 532a-533d).  It is what Kant calls the 
“airless space” in which Plato met no resistance and “made no headway” (Critique 
of Pure Reason, A 5/B 9).  Kant appropriates the designation “dialectic” from the 
ancients and employs it in a sense of which the ancients could not have 
conceived.  He writes that 
[a]s different as the significance of the employment of this 
designation of a science or art among the ancients may have 
been, one can still infer from their actual use of it that among 
them it was nothing other than the logic of illusion – a 
sophistical art for giving to its ignorance, indeed even to its 
intentional tricks, the air of truth, by imitating the method of 
thoroughness, which logic prescribes in general, and using its 
topics for the embellishment of every empty pretension.  Now 
one can take it as a certain and useful warning that general 
logic, considered as an organon, is always a logic of illusion, 
i.e., is dialectical.  For since it teaches us nothing at all about 
the content of cognition … the effrontery of using it as a tool 
(organon) for an expansion and extension of its information, or 
at least the pretension of so doing, comes down to nothing but 
idle chatter, asserting or impeaching whatever one wants with 
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[the appearance of] some plausibility.  Such instruction by no 
means befits the dignity of philosophy (Critique of Pure 
Reason, A 61-62/B 85-86).  
   
In this passage Kant does not distinguish among (1) the unintentional 
dialectic of reason (what Kant calls “transcendental illusion”), (2) the irresponsible 
dialectic of reason (biblical idolatry, or what Kant designates as heteronomy of 
will), and (3) ignorance, in which thought reflects its fatal opposition to existence.  
Kant does grasp here, however, that the thoroughness that we find in ancient 
pagan thought is anchored in logic and has no content at all from the standpoint of 
moral reason.  There is no critical judgment, creative insight, fruitful labor, or real 
import in pagan thought: there is no meaning in it and that is why it amounts, in the 
end, to nothing but idle chatter. 
 Kant’s insights into the limits of possible, perceptible, or natural experience 
in the first Critique can, for our purposes, be summarized in three main points.  
First, Kant shows that possible experience – and hence knowledge of objects of 
possible experience – necessarily presupposes two distinct contents: sense 
perception (or what Kant calls our “outer” and “inner” “intuitions” in natural space 
and time) and “pure concepts of the understanding” (or “categories” through which 
our intuitions can be conceptualized in the logical form of judgments).  Without 
sense-data, no object can be given; without the categories, no intuition can be 
conceptualized.  “Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other,” he 
writes;   
[t]houghts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind.  It is thus just as necessary to make the 
mind’s concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in 
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intuition) as it is to make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to 
bring them under concepts).  Further, these two faculties or 
capacities cannot exchange their functions.  The 
understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the 
senses are not capable of thinking anything.  Only from their 
unification can [empirical] cognition arise.  But on this account 
one must not mix up their roles, rather one has great cause to 
separate them carefully from each other and distinguish them 
(A 51-52/B 75-76).   
 
If a judgment is made about an object of possible experience that has no 
corresponding sense-intuition, the judgment is meaningless.  It is a judgment that 
is without content, i.e., the mere logical form of a judgment.  Logical judgments 
assert something about the quantity, quality, relation, and modality of the 
connection between the subject and predicate, but this is not sufficient for them to 
have “objective validity,” i.e., meaningful application to possible empirical objects.  
In the first two Antinomies of theoretical reason, Kant demonstrates that it is 
fruitless to debate whether the natural world did or did not come into being (the 
First Antinomy), whether all composite things are or are not infinitely divisible (the 
Second Antinomy), or, in principle, any proposition about objects of possible 
experience that extend beyond the horizon of possible sense-intuitions.  Both the 
thesis and antithesis are dialectical assertions that defy possible verification.  For 
we can never arrive at an intuition, or a collection of intuitions, that will not call for 
further investigative regress in our search for ever more remote causes in time, 
ever smaller particles in space, etc. in our search for a first beginning or primary 
substance.  The victor in the “dialectical battlefield” of opposing logical positions, 
Kant sees, is the fighter who attacks first and compels the opponent to assume a 
position that he must defend (Critique of Pure Reason, A 422-423/B 450).  Each 
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opponent, however, can show that the ground of his opponent’s argument in fact 
leads to conclusions that contradict the conclusions at which he has arrived, and 
this because, Kant sees, the compass of logic, when undisciplined by reason, 
points in all directions.  Nothing is gained in this rhetorical battle.  The law of 
contradiction here serves only to “increase our ignorance, removing one 
inconceivability only to replace it with another, taking us out of one obscurity only 
to plunge us into a still greater one” (Critique of Pure Reason, A 485/B 513).  It is 
not true, consequently, that, of two assertions that contradict one another, one 
must be true and the other false, as the law of the excluded middle might appear 
to suggest: both positions could be equally groundless.126 
 The reason that it must be possible to have empirical intuitions that support 
objectively valid empirical judgments is that these judgments are about a world 
whose objects are possible empirical intuitions.  It is non-sense to talk about sense 
through terms that can never refer to objects that can be perceived through the 
senses.  The empirical world is not governed by the principle of contradiction; it is 
the realm of what Kant calls real appearance.  There can be no content in 
                                            
126 Leibniz writes in “The Nature of Truth” that the solid rock, firm foundation, and Archimedean 
point for all investigations that aim at truth is the principle that “every proposition is either true or 
false” (p. 93).  (All citations from Leibniz in this chapter have been taken from Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz: Philosophical Writings.  Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  Translated by Mary Morris and G. H. 
R. Parkinson.  London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1990.)  Kant addresses the error of Leibniz’ position 
in his resolution to the theoretical antinomies, where he demonstrates that dialectical antinomies 
are neither true nor untrue.  His position does not violate the excluded middle.  In fact, it shows that 
the excluded middle is inviolable, but only from a rational standpoint.  It is only when the principle of 
contradiction is used as an organon that dialectical antinomies are sure to erupt.  From the 
standpoint of reason, it would violate the excluded middle to claim that dialectical assertions both 
are and are not meaningless.  The claim that dialectical assertions cannot be either affirmed or 
denied and that they are therefore meaningless does not violate the excluded middle; it protects the 
role of logic as a negative touchstone for truth, but, again, only in its rational employment. 
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empirical judgments about which one has “neither hope for confirmation in 
experience nor fear [of] refutation by it” (Critique of Pure Reason, A 421/B 449).        
 The second important point that Kant makes in setting forth the limits of 
knowledge is contained in the first two Analogies of Experience.  Here, Kant 
shows that, in the world of finite objects within the space and time of nature, there 
is no creation; nothing comes from nothing.  In the First Analogy, on the “Principle 
of the Permanence of Substance,” Kant argues that, in all objective changes that 
appear in space and time, “substance persists, and its quantum is neither 
increased nor diminished” (Critique of Pure Reason, A 182/B 224).  Kant identifies 
this “substance” with matter (A 185/B 228).127  In order to distinguish between, on 
the one hand, different apprehensions of different objects in space and time and, 
on the other hand, different apprehensions of the same object, there must be 
“something lasting and persisting” on the basis of which change is “nothing but so 
many ways … in which that which persists exists” (A 182/B 226).  It is only on the 
basis of this presupposition that duration, as a mode of time, can have meaning; 
for duration is nothing but the persistence of substance through successive 
moments in time.  Again, all change in outer appearance is a mode of that in 
existence which lasts and persists (A 183/B 227).  This principle, which bears a 
close resemblance to the Law of the Conservation of Energy, restricts the meaning 
of change in the world of nature to alteration of the same substance and denies to 
                                            
127 In the First Analogy, Kant distinguishes his own position from the “dogmatic idealism” of 
Berkeley.  Berkeley rejects the existence of corporeal matter as a meaningless “abstract idea.”  The 
consequence is that he falls into a pit of mysticism and abstraction: natural phenomena are reduced 
to the fiat of the incomprehensible will of God.  See Part 1, Sections 20, 21, 35, 47, 50, 151 and 152 
of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (in George Berkeley: Philosophical 
Works.  Edited by M. R. Ayers.  London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1992). 
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nature “origination out of nothing” (A 206/B 251).  The latter belongs solely to the 
power of freedom.  There is no will in nature, and nature has no power to create 
anything out of itself or to annihilate itself: “[n]othing comes out of nothing, and 
nothing can revert into nothing” (A 186/B 229, ft. b).  The proof offered in the First 
Analogy is defended systematically in the Third Antinomy of theoretical reason, 
wherein Kant accepts both the thesis and the antithesis (unlike the first two 
antinomies).  There, Kant demonstrates that it is true both that freedom is the 
cause of itself and the ground for the explanation of natural causality and that 
“[t]here is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely in accordance 
with laws of nature” (Critique of Pure Reason, A 444-445/B 472-473 - A 451/B 
479).  
 The First Analogy leads directly to the Second Analogy: “[a]ll alterations 
occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect” (B 232).  In 
this section, Kant demonstrates that the very existence of an object in nature 
depends on the principle of causality (A 199/B 244).  For its concept involves its 
specific causal connection with other objects.  The concept of “ice,” for example, 
expresses the consciousness not that water might freeze, but that it must freeze, 
below a certain temperature; the concept is bound to its objective validity.  Further, 
conformity with the principle of causality is the standard for distinguishing between 
dreams, whose appearances follow no particular order in time, and empirical 
events, in which the objective connection between causes and effects in time 
cannot be otherwise conceived.  The very concept of a dream presupposes the 
causal principle to which it does not conform.  It is because science, whose object 
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is the objective determinations of substance, recognizes causality as a priori that it 
has been able to secure a priori knowledge.  The proof that science has a priori 
knowledge is (the idea of) its existence. 
 The first two Analogies have a direct bearing on Kant’s hermeneutical 
approach to the Bible.  The fact that nature is determination of substance through 
the principle of causality means that there are no miracles in nature and, therefore, 
that the miracles found throughout the biblical narratives, together with ideas such 
as God, creation, and resurrection, must be interpreted in a manner that is 
compatible with the principle of natural causality if they are to have meaning.  The 
important question to consider in thinking about whether miracles can happen is 
not whether they are large, small, frequent, or infrequent but, rather, whether they 
violate the laws of nature: “either miracles are to be admitted as daily,” Kant 
argues, “or never” (Religion, 6:86).  In fact, it would take only one miracle for 
reason as a whole, in both its theoretical and practical employment, to collapse.  
“When reason is deprived of the laws of nature, it no longer is of any use in the 
resulting magical world, not even for moral employment,” Kant writes, “for we no 
longer know whether, unbeknown to us, changes have occurred in our very moral 
incentives due to miracles” that have been produced by “some other obscure 
cause” (Religion, 6:88-89).  His essential point is that if miracles were possible, 
human beings could not be ends in themselves.  Although people might claim to 
believe in the miracles of old, he observes, they are unwilling to accept miracles in 
modern times; this contradiction betrays their true judgment.  
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 Kant’s third and most burdened insight in establishing the limits of 
perceptible experience, i.e., inner and outer nature, is expressed in and through 
his doctrine of “transcendental idealism.”  The central principle in transcendental 
idealism is that objects of possible experience are representations only; they are 
not things in themselves.  To empirical representations Kant gives the name 
“appearances” or “phenomena”; to things in themselves, “noumena.”  In the first 
Critique, the idea of noumena serves, for the most part, as a limiting-idea; the 
thing in itself is conceived negatively, i.e., as “an unknown something” (A 256/B 
312).  It is the ground of objects that appear but it cannot itself appear; the idea of 
it restricts intuitions and categories to the empirical world and blocks their 
application to the transcendental world that necessarily lies beyond nature (A 254-
255/B 310-311).  In the Groundwork and second Critique Kant develops a positive 
account of this unknown something as rational (moral) self-consciousness, which, 
in the second Critique, he explicates in terms of the Christian conception of the 
relationship between freedom and God in the time of “immortality” (or eternal life).  
Kant thus takes the notion of the thing in itself, which for Plato and Aristotle is 
opposed to thought, and he applies it to the human being, who is an end in himself 
and not a means to an end.  Thus, the ideas of both appearance and the thing in 
itself as found in Kant bear no relationship to the notions of appearance and the 
thing in itself as found in Plato and Aristotle.  This, I suspect, is the main reason 
that Kant appropriates these terms; in true biblical spirit he wants to assign to them 
a meaning that is unthinkable from the standpoint of pagan antiquity precisely to 
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show that modern thought is founded on biblical principles, which are not 
teleological.128 
In transcendental idealism, space, time, and the pure concepts are 
synthetic a priori conditions for possible experience: space and time are “forms” of 
our sensibility and the categories are “forms” of our understanding.  There is no 
question that, for Kant, nature is objectively real.  The reason that he maintains 
that space, time, and the pure concepts inhere “in us” and belong to the 
“subjective constitution of our mind” (Critique of Pure Reason, A23/B 37-38, A 
129) is to communicate that objective reality is an idea of the mind.  For the 
concept of nature, and of its reality, is not natural: nature has no concept of itself.  
This means that spatiotemporal reality must be created.  The reason that the 
sciences have acquired knowledge of nature and are on a secure path, Kant 
                                            
128 T.K. Seung argues in his book Kant: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2007) the conventional position that, for Kant, the noumenal is 
transcendent of the mind and cannot be thought.  Seung cannot explain, then, why Kant interlocks 
the idea of the noumena to freedom in his practical philosophy, for “noumena are ensconced 
beyond space and time.  If the noumenal aspect of human beings is unknowable, there is no reason 
to say that it is free” (p. 98).  
     The reason that the thing in itself cannot be known, i.e., as an appearance of nature, is that it is 
not an effect of empirical causes.  That by which I know, the determining self, cannot be known in 
the same manner as that which I know, the determinable object (Critique of Pure Reason, A402).  
Kant’s clearest expositions of the two standpoints from which a human being must be regarded, i.e., 
as an appearance and as a thing in itself, are found in the discussion and resolution of the Third 
Antinomy in the first Critique and in Section 3 of the Groundwork.  In the former, Kant writes that 
“[i]n respect of what happens, one can think of causality in only two ways: either according to 
nature or from freedom.  The first is the connection of a state with a preceding one in the world of 
sense upon which that state follows according to a rule.”  Freedom, however, is “the faculty of 
beginning a state from itself, the causality of which does not in turn stand under another cause 
determining it in time in accordance with the law of nature” (A 532/B 560-A 533/B 561).  Hence, “the 
causality of [the human] being” is grasped “in two aspects”: as determined in the world of sense and 
“as intelligible in its action as a thing in itself” which “is not itself appearance” (A 538/B 566-A 
539/B 567).  In the Groundwork, Kant links the thing in itself with the “pure activity” (or “self-activity”) 
of the “ego” through which “a human being distinguishes himself from all other things, even from 
himself insofar as he is affected by objects” (4:451-452).  For Kant’s articulation of freedom as the 
thing in itself in the Critique of Practical Reason, see 5:6, 5:6 (ft.), 5:42, 5:48, 5:55, 5:94, 5:95, 
5:101, and 5:114.       
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writes, is that its students approach nature not as passive pupils but as 
interrogative judges who demand evidence, evidence that must be secured 
through a rigorous and reliable experimental method, in order to confirm or reject 
their hypotheses.  This approach is born from the realization that  
reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to 
its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its 
judgments … and compel nature to answer its questions, 
rather than letting nature guide its movements by keeping 
reason, as it were, in leading-strings; for otherwise accidental 
observations, made according to no previously designed plan, 
can never connect up into a necessary law … .  [W]hat reason 
would not be able to know of itself and has to learn from 
nature, it has to seek … in accordance with what reason itself 
puts into nature.  This is how natural science was first brought 
to the secure course of a science after groping about for so 
many centuries (Critique of Pure Reason, B xiii-xiv).129 
 
In the section entitled “Transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of 
the understanding,” Kant aims to reconcile the apparent contradiction between two 
ideas: that the pure concepts (1) originate in the mind and (2) are objectively real.  
The basis of his “deduction,” or justification, for holding both positions is 
transcendental idealism, whose ground is this absolutely fundamental principle:  
[t]he I think must be able to accompany all my 
representations; for otherwise something would be 
represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as 
much as to say that the representation would either be 
impossible or at least would be nothing for me.  … Thus all 
manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the I think in 
                                            
129 The Copernican turn serves as an analog for Kant’s critical revolution because it broke from all 
teleologically-oriented notions of what science is, how science ought to proceed, and why science 
is done.  Polka notes in Truth and Interpretation that it is not merely another “cosmic hypothesis.”  
Rather, it is “a revolutionary change” in which the “center of the universe” is no longer judged to be 
that which we see but that by which we interpret: self-consciousness – I think, therefore, I am – as 
the thing (end) in itself (p. 61).  
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the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered 
(Critique of Pure Reason, B 131-132).   
 
That I must be able to think my representations in order for them to be mine; that 
what is not mine is “nothing” for me; that representations are mine because I can 
think them: these ideas indicate that the necessary relationship between thought 
and existence is, as Kant puts it, “the absolutely first and synthetic [a priori] 
principle of our thinking in general” (Critique of Pure Reason, A 117 [ft.]).   
All intuitions are nothing for us and do not in the least concern 
us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness … as a 
necessary condition of the possibility of all representations … .  
All representations have a necessary relation to a possible 
empirical consciousness: for if they did not have this, and if it 
were entirely impossible to become conscious of them, that 
would be as much as to say that they did not exist at all.  All 
empirical consciousness, however, has a necessary relation to 
a transcendental consciousness (preceding all particular 
experience), namely the consciousness of myself, as original 
… .  The synthetic proposition that every different empirical 
consciousness must be combined into a single self-
consciousness is the absolutely first and synthetic principle of 
our thinking in general (Critique of Pure Reason, A 116-A 117 
[ft.]). 
 
 The idea that all my representations must be my representations 
communicates a meaning that is not analytic a priori but synthetic a priori, namely, 
that what nature is, in itself, is an idea of the “transcendental consciousness.”  
Nature is not a mirror in which the mind sees itself as a contradictory appearance 
but an idea of the mind that is conscious of itself as free (“original”).  In complete 
opposition to pagan teleology, in the doctrine of transcendental idealism thought is 
held to be the horizon of existence.  This means that, in order for something to be, 
we must create it.   
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 The main reason that Kant invests so much labor to determine the a priori 
limits of logic and of possible experience is to show that metaphysics cannot move 
a single step forward if it is based on teleological cognition.130  In this light, I shall 
now consider in some detail the metaphysician whose failure, Kant says, most 
impacted him: David Hume.  For although Hume is famous for his attack on 
metaphysics, he represents the tradition of failed metaphysics that Kant addresses 
in his critical philosophy.  The following pages are not a passing digression from 
the aim of this chapter but are of considerable consequence for three main 
reasons.  First, a critique of Hume allows us to distinguish between Kant’s critique 
of metaphysics and the critique that Hume offers, in which logic and sense are 
accorded the status of organons and lead to the very metaphysics that Hume 
purports to undermine.  Second, it allows us to distinguish between two kinds of 
critique: one that proceeds in ignorance and ends in contradiction and one that 
recognizes, but deliberately avoids accounting for, its necessary presuppositions, 
thus leading to contradiction.  Both critiques are fruitless, but for reasons that must 
not be confused with one another.  Third, a critique of Hume allows us to 
comprehend the empiricist tradition as a variant of metaphysics that is rooted in 
formal logic, such as the metaphysics of Leibniz and Berkeley.  It is only at this 
point in our work, having established that ancient Greek and biblical thought have 
                                            
130 In this respect, Kant’s critique of teleologically-oriented metaphysics is consistent with, and, 
indeed, rooted in, the biblical attack on idolatry.  In “Conjectures,” Kant interprets the story of Adam 
and Eve in Genesis as a narrative that tells of the release of the human being from natural captivity 
(i.e., necessary contradiction) into “equality with all rational beings, whatever their rank … because 
he could claim to be an end in himself, to be accepted as such by all others, and not to be used by 
anyone else simply as a means to other ends” (p. 226).  As we have seen, idolatry, as conceived in 
the Bible, emerges when people treat themselves and one another not as ends but as means to 
other ends.   
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utterly disparate conceptions of the human and of existence, that we are able to 
recognize that, how, and why the failure to distinguish between these disparate 
conceptions leads to catastrophic outcomes, e.g., as displayed in the pseudo-
teleological metaphysics of traditional rationalism and empiricism. 
Hume argues in Book 1, Part 1, Section 1 of A Treatise of Human Nature131 
that there are only two possible sources of knowledge: sense-perception (or 
“matters of fact”) and formal logic (or “relations of ideas”).  He divides sense-
perception into “impressions” and “ideas” and maintains that the “difference 
betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike 
upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness.”  
Perceptions that “enter with the most force and violence, we may name 
impressions”; these include “all our sensations, passions and emotions.”  Ideas 
are but “the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning …” (1.1.1, p. 1).  
“[N]othing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions 
and ideas … .  To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to 
perceive” (1.2.4, p. 67).  In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding132 
Hume asserts that “[t]he most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation” 
(Section 2, p. 10) and that the “unbounded liberty” that one might suppose belongs 
to thought  
is really confined within very narrow limits, and … all this 
creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the 
faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or 
                                            
131 Second Edition.  Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
132 Second edition.  Edited by Eric Steinberg.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993. 
 165 
diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and 
experience (Section 2, p. 11, emphasis added).   
 
Thus, Hume argues, if we want to find the origin of an idea “we need but enquire, 
from what impression is that supposed idea derived?” (An Enquiry, p. 13)  Since 
all ideas are reducible to, and deducible from, sense impressions, there is no way 
to determine the source of these impressions, which must remain “unknown” (A 
Treatise, 1.1.2, p. 7).  The second source of knowledge, for Hume, is logic, i.e., 
what is “intuitively or demonstratively certain” and “discoverable by the mere 
operation of thought, without dependence on what is any where existent in the 
universe” (An Enquiry, Section 4, Part 1, p. 15, emphasis added).  Self-evident 
propositions cannot be false because to deny them results in a contradiction.133 
                                            
133 Leibniz develops a more complete account of relations of ideas than does Hume.  In “A 
Specimen of Discoveries about Marvellous Secrets of Nature in General,” he writes that there are 
two first principles of reasoning: the principle of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason.  
The latter, which is ultimately resolved into the former, holds that “every true proposition which is 
not known per se has an a priori proof, or, that a reason can be given for every truth …” (p. 75).  In 
“Primary Truths,” he asserts that “‘[e]ach thing is what it is’, ‘[e]ach thing is like itself, or is equal to 
itself’, ‘[n]othing is greater or less than itself’ – and [other propositions] of this sort … can all be 
included under the one name of ‘identities’.  … All other truths are reduced to [these] primary truths 
by the aid of definitions – i.e. by the analysis of notions; and this constitutes a priori proof, 
independent of experience.  … The predicate or consequent, therefore, is always in the subject or 
antecedent, and this constitutes the nature of truth in general … the nature of truth … is always, 
either expressly or implicitly, identical” (pp. 87-88).  Since the predicate is necessarily contained in 
the subject, nothing in itself changes; what is, is, and cannot be other than what it is.  “The complete 
or perfect notion of an individual substance involves all its predicates – past, present and future.  
For that a future predicate is future is true now, and so is contained in the notion of a thing” (p. 89).  
Or again, “from the notion of any given thing all its future states already follow” (p. 90).  Leibniz has 
no explanation for how he knows, through the principle of contradiction (sufficient reason), that 
apparent contingencies are in themselves a priori identities that cannot be otherwise.  He does not 
indicate a sufficient reason to account for the principle of sufficient reason outside of this very 
principle.  For, as he asserts in “Of Universal Synthesis and Analysis,” the principle of contradiction, 
though the axiomatic basis of all demonstration, is itself indemonstrable (p. 14).  In “An Introduction 
to the Secret Encyclopaedia” and “Necessary and Contingent Truths,” he is explicit in holding that, 
although we are “compelled to trust our senses” (“An Introduction,” p. 8), God perceives the truth in 
“its very notion” (“Necessary and Contingent Truths,” p. 98).  There is no way for Leibniz to account 
for how he can know what God perceives insofar as human beings are dependent upon inquiries 
that proceed “to infinity” (“On Freedom,” p. 109).  (All page references above refer to Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Writings.)  
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 Hume does not account for, or develop a critique of, the position that the 
sole content of the mind is sense-impressions that arise from unknown causes and 
that the principle of contradiction is the sole basis for demonstrating the necessary 
relationship among ideas.  He does not distinguish between spirit and nature but 
between sense and the images of sense, and between these and logic.  Since, as 
Kant shows, left to themselves, logic is empty and the senses are blind (i.e., 
without judgment), Hume is trapped with “knowledge” that, because relative to the 
perceiver, necessarily contradicts both its appearances (to others) and its 
transcendent cause (what it is in itself).  
 Allowing himself to be led by sense and logic, Hume discovers that, 
because the contrary of every matter of fact can never imply a contradiction, “[t]hat 
the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no 
more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise.”  If the idea that the sun will 
not rise tomorrow were “demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and 
could never be distinctly conceived by the mind” (An Enquiry, 4.1, pp. 15-16).  For 
this reason, every “matter of fact and existence” is  
incapable of demonstration.  Whatever is may not be.  No 
negation of a fact can involve a contradiction.  The non-
existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and 
distinct an idea as its existence.  The proposition, which 
affirms it not to be, however false, is no less conceivable and 
intelligible, than that which affirms it to be (An Enquiry, 12.3, p. 
113).    
 
 We see in this passage that, according to Hume, the principle of 
contradiction shows that the facts of real existence do not exist, i.e., that their non-
existence is a clear and distinct idea.  The non-existence of what “is” is just as 
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intelligible as its existence; it is no less intelligible to believe that the sun will not 
rise tomorrow than that it will rise because its non-existence does not imply a 
contradiction!134  The reason that Hume does not distinguish between logical 
possibility and real possibility is that he has not examined their limits through moral 
reason, what Kant calls “absolute” or “practical” possibility.  He tries to hold fast to 
the teleological standpoint in which existence is either relative to us and not in 
itself or in itself and not relative to us.  He does not work through an idea of 
existence that is connected to our thought and that is both relative to us and in 
itself.  He does not ask: how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?   
 Hume proceeds to demonstrate that, on the basis of logic and sense, our 
ideas of a real objective world, a human self, and absolute moral principles cannot 
be supported.  He argues, first, that there is no sense-impression of a necessary 
connection among objects.  The “law of cause and effect” expresses nothing but 
our common expectation that a consequent is sure to succeed an antecedent in 
light of our having witnessed resembling objects under resembling conditions 
conjoined together, time and again, in past experience.  But, he contends, this 
                                            
134 The position taken by Leibniz and Berkeley is indistinguishable in all essential respects from the 
position defended by Hume.  Leibniz argues in “Necessary and Contingent Truths” that “[a]n 
absolutely necessary proposition is one which can be resolved into identical propositions, or, whose 
opposite implies a contradiction.  … That which lacks such necessity I call contingent, but that 
which implies a contradiction, or whose opposite is necessary, is called impossible.  The rest are 
called possible” (pp. 96-97).  That “this stone tends downwards when its support has been removed 
is not a necessary but a contingent proposition [for us]” (p.100).  As with Hume, Leibniz is not able 
to distinguish between what is contingent and exists and what is possible and does not exist.  What 
is, may not be.   
 In Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley argues that “the very notion of what is called 
matter or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it” (Part 1, Section 9, p. 79).  For, if matter 
exists, it is impossible that we should ever come to know what it is independent of the ideas that we 
have of it, in which case the supposition of an external corporeal substance is necessarily 
contradictory.  As with Hume and Leibniz, Berkeley is left with ideas (perceptions) whose ground 
cannot be thought.  
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connection is not known; it is imagined.  For there is no contradiction in supposing 
outcomes that are different from our expectations.  A priori, it is just as likely that a 
stone dropped from a tower will go up rather than down; a ball in motion that hits a 
ball at rest could lead to any logical outcome.  
May not both these balls remain at absolute rest?  May not the 
first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in 
any line or direction?  All these suppositions are consistent 
and conceivable.  Why then should we give the preference to 
one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest?  
All our reasonings a priori will never be able to show us any 
foundation for this preference (An Enquiry, 4.1, pp. 18-19, 
emphasis added).   
 
The reason that we anticipate that the ball at rest will move upon impact is 
“nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct … which carries us along a 
certain train of ideas” in conformity with past observation and experience.  
Reason, then, “is nothing but one of the principles of nature, and derives all its 
force from that origin” (A Treatise, 1.3.16, p. 179, emphasis added).135  
 Hume’s assertion that it is just as conceivable and consistent to maintain 
that a ball at rest will remain at rest when a force is impressed upon it as it is to 
maintain that it will move – that, indeed, the entire body of scientific knowledge 
violates the principle of contradiction and is therefore false! – is especially 
surprising in light of the fact that one of the main inspirations behind Hume’s work 
                                            
135 This position is perfectly consistent with the idealism of Berkeley.  If we have no empirical 
knowledge, then the material world as we think we know it does not exist.  The “objective world” is 
merely imagined.  For Berkeley, it is a contradiction for matter that is perceived to “have any 
existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.”  To be is to be perceived: “esse 
is percipi” (Principles of Human Knowledge, Section 3, p. 78).  It is on this logical basis that 
Berkeley arrives at the utterly contradictory position that the highest being is God, the unmoved 
mover who “actuates the whole [of nature]” and whose “existence … is far more evidently perceived 
than the existence of men,” though God is “unperceivable to men of flesh and blood” (Sections 147 
and 151, pp. 123, 125, emphasis added). 
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is the scientific revolution.  (Hume refers to his own vision as a “science of man.”) 
(A Treatise, p. xvi.)  The fact that, in developing a science of human nature, Hume 
desires to have the success of the great scientists before him, i.e., Copernicus, 
Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Bacon, and others, reveals that, while he appears to 
argue on teleological premises, he does not actually believe the positions that he 
defends. 
 Having denied objective reality in the world, Hume proceeds to argue that 
the self also does not exist.  For there is no impression of the self that corresponds 
with an idea of the self that continues “invariably the same, thro’ the whole course 
of our lives; since [the idea of the] self is supposed to exist after that manner.”  He 
recognizes that the question of what impression gives rise to the idea of the self is 
“impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity.”  Still, he 
insists, “‘tis a question, which must necessarily be answer’d, if we wou’d have the 
idea of self pass for clear and intelligible.  It must be [an] impression, that gives rise 
to every real idea” (A Treatise, 1.4.4, p. 251, emphasis added).  Why is the attempt 
to find an impression of the idea of the self contradictory and absurd if it is based 
on, and follows from, the true premise that all ideas are derived from sense?  Why 
is it necessary to answer a contradictory and absurd question?  In what sense is a 
contradictory and absurd answer to a contradictory and absurd question clear and 
intelligible?  Hume does not ask these questions.  Instead, he chooses to follow the 
principle of contradiction into contradiction.  When he fails to find the impression of 
the self, he concludes that “consequently there is no such idea” (p. 252).  The idea 
of “personal identity” is contrary to experience (p. 251).  
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There is no way for Hume to express the position that he wants to defend.  
His speech betrays him at every step:  
[f]or my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call 
myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or 
other ... I never can … observe any thing but the perception.  
When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound 
sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said 
not to exist (emphasis added). 
 
  To someone who has a different notion of himself, Hume continues,  
I must confess I can reason no longer with him.  All I can allow 
him is, that he may be in the right as well as I … .  He may, 
perhaps, perceive something simple and continu’d, which he 
calls himself; tho’ I am certain there is no such principle in me 
(emphasis added).   
 
Persons “are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which 
succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and 
movement” (p. 252).  Just as a ship is a mass of different parts and appears to 
remain the same when parts in it are removed and other parts are added to it 
during reparation, so, too, Hume asserts, a man (himself included) is but a mass of 
different perceptions and appears to retain a common identity when perceptions 
are added to, or lost from, the mass (A Treatise, p. 257).  There is no identity that 
endures: the idea of a self “is only a fictitious one” (p. 259).136  
 How is one to think about claims whose very possibility presupposes that 
they are not true?  At the Conclusion of Book 1 of A Treatise Hume admits that his 
weather-beaten vessel, upon which he has voyaged into the furthest reaches of 
                                            
136 Berkeley and Leibniz arrive at a conclusion that is both identical with, and the opposite of, the 
conclusion of Hume.  For Berkeley (Principles, section 141, pp. 121-122) and Leibniz 
(“Monadology,” p. 179), the self is in itself simple, immortal, unchanging and indestructible.  Its 
existence is far more certain than objects that are relative to the perceiver.  
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human nature, is full of holes and must be retired from service.  He claims to be in 
the “most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness,” 
and would sooner “resolve to perish on the barren rock, on which I am at present, 
rather than venture myself upon that boundless ocean, which runs out into 
immensity” (1.4.7, pp. 264, 269).  He does not, however, frame his alternative to be 
between truth (which involves giving up his premises) or falsity (continuing to rely 
upon them).  To do so honestly would be to acknowledge, and hold himself 
accountable for the fact, that he has been false to his own thought.  Instead, he 
frames his alternative as one “betwixt a false reason and none at all” and claims 
that “I know not what ought to be done in the present case.”  The “intense view” of 
“manifold contradictions” that he has himself created inspires him not to account for 
them and “to reject all belief and reasoning” such that he “can look upon no opinion 
even as more probable or likely than another” (pp. 268-269).   
Since Hume finds that he is trapped between “a false reason” and “none at 
all,” from which of these standpoints does he recognize his contradictions?  Is it not 
his consciousness of truth that drives him to despair?  After spending time with 
friends, Hume confesses that he finds his speculations “so cold, and strain’d, and 
ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther.”  The 
“commerce and society of men” and “the common affairs of life” makes him “ready 
to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce 
the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy” (A Treatise, pp. 269-
270).  He admits that he tortures himself with “subtilities and sophistries” that leave 
him without any “tolerable prospect of arriving by [their] means at truth and 
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certainty.”  He asks himself: “[u]nder what obligation do I lie of making such an 
abuse of time?  And to what end can it serve either for the service of mankind, or 
for my own private interest?” (p. 270)  
 This is the crux of the matter: Hume recognizes that there are contradictions 
between his speech and his thought.  But he proceeds as though they are 
contradictions between his thought and his existence.  His attempts to reduce his 
thought to his speech are not made in ignorance; for he understands that he 
cannot think his existence in terms of the categories of his speech.  But rather than 
give up on his speech, he pretends to give up on his thought.  He does not 
distinguish between two kinds of contradiction that belong to disparate frames of 
reference: one that is teleological, because it expresses the fatal opposition 
between thought and existence, and one that is created by a bad will, which 
attempts to understand the relationship between thought and existence as a fatal 
opposition.  He is conscious of this distinction when he confesses that he has 
chosen to be ridiculous and to waste so much time, without being of any service to 
himself or others.  But he does not take responsibility for what this realization 
demands of him because he clutches to principles that, he implies, absolve him of 
moral accountability.     
 It is important and instructive to see why it is that Hume, in his final words in 
An Enquiry (p. 173), condemns all abstract metaphysics, i.e., all metaphysics not 
rooted in relations of ideas and matters of fact, to the flames.  He does so because 
such systems are themselves based on formal logic and natural perception and 
that logic and sense, when taken as first principles for existence, are two sides of a 
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counterfeit coin that has no currency in the marketplace of modern life.  He all but 
concedes that his empiricism is fundamentally indistinguishable from the abstract 
metaphysics that he condemns as worthless when he writes that “[a]fter the most 
accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason why I shou’d assent to 
it” (A Treatise, p. 265, emphasis added).  But, again, although he sees, on the 
basis of a moral idea of reason, that he has no reason to accept his reasonings, he 
continues to be false to himself and to others in his subsequent discussion of vice 
and virtue, which, in light of the previous remarks, requires only brief consideration.   
 Hume asks: from what impressions are ideas of good and evil derived?  
Among impressions that attend the consciousness of ideas of good and evil are 
feelings of pleasure, pain, approbation, and aversion.  These cannot originate in 
reason because reason is “nothing but the comparing of ideas, and the discovery 
of their relations” (A Treatise, 3.1.1, p. 466) and it produces no original idea (A 
Treatise, 1.3.14, p. 157).  Its sole function is to discover “truth or falsehood,” which  
consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real 
relations of ideas, or to real existence137 and matter of fact.  
                                            
137 Hume neglects to discuss how it is possible to know what real existence is insofar as our 
impressions are affections of unknown causes.  If real existence is sense-perception, how is it 
different from unreal existence, i.e., perception that has no corresponding material object, as 
Berkeley argues?  Kant demonstrates in his dazzling analysis of the distortions of transcendental 
idealism, i.e., “transcendental realism” and “empirical idealism,” that there is no fundamental 
difference at all between them. 
     For Kant, empirical idealism rests on the doctrine of transcendental realism, in which space and 
time are regarded as existing outside of and apart from the mind.  If space and time are self-
subsistent, the mind can never arrive at sufficient grounds to establish their reality and, therefore, 
the reality of the empirical world.  For we can think a space and a time that is outside of us only 
through representations that are in us.  Thus, as Kant writes in the first Critique, “if one regards 
outer appearances as representations that are effected in us by their objects, as things in 
themselves found outside us, then it is hard to see how their existence could be cognized in any 
way other than by an inference from effect to cause, in which case it must always remain doubtful 
whether the cause is in us or outside us.  … If we let outer objects count as things in themselves, 
then it is absolutely impossible to comprehend how we are to acquire cognition of their reality 
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Whatever … is not susceptible of this agreement or 
disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can 
never be an object of our reason (A Treatise, p. 458).  
 
 Consider murder.  For Hume, the connection between murder and evil is not 
made through either relations of ideas or real existence.  Of the former, Hume 
provides this example: when an oak tree drops its seed and produces a sapling 
that grows large enough to kill the parent tree, the relations of ideas are the same 
as those involved in the case in which a father produces a son who commits 
parricide.  In both cases, the offspring destroys the parent.  The differences 
between a father and a tree, or between a son and a sapling, do not affect the 
relations being considered (A Treatise, 3.1.1, p. 467).  Neither is evil a real 
existence in this matter, for there is no sensible impression of vice in murder: “[t]he 
vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object.”  Vice and virtue 
“may be compar’d to sounds, colors, heat, and cold” (pp. 468-469): they are not in 
the object but (in) the affections of sense.  As it is not contrary to reason to have a 
preference for a particular color or sound over other colors and sounds, so it is “not 
                                                                                                                                     
outside us, since we base this merely on the representation, which is in us.  For one cannot have 
sensation outside oneself, but only in oneself, and the whole of self-consciousness therefore 
provides nothing other than merely our own determinations” (A 372, 378).  Both transcendental 
realism and empirical idealism regard nature as a thing in itself.  In opposing thought and existence, 
there is no way to distinguish between thoughts and things.  Kant calls this error, in which the 
determining self does not self-consciously see itself as fundamentally distinct from objects and so 
as free from the determination by objects, “the subreption of hypostatized consciousness” (A 402).  
He investigates it in the paralogisms of pure reason. 
     In the doctrine of transcendental idealism, space and time are synthetic a priori forms of outer 
and inner sense, respectively; they are empirically real because they are transcendentally ideal.  
Space and time cannot be thought except as existing because they cannot exist except in thought.  
For, again, if they were apart from consciousness, the mind could not have empirical knowledge.  
The basis for establishing both the ideality and reality of space and time is the critique of the 
transcendental subject and empirical object, a critique in which the limits of each are established 
from the standpoint of pure reason (i.e., transcendental philosophy).  It is because Hume never 
establishes this critique that his dogmatic (skeptical) empiricism collapses into skeptical (dogmatic) 
idealism.  
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contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of 
my finger” (A Treatise, 2.3.3, p. 416).  Since, for Hume, reason is formal, he is 
compelled to locate the ends (content) of reason in sense: “[r]eason is, and ought 
only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than 
to serve and obey them” (A Treatise, p. 415).  
 Kant sees that, when Hume argues that ideas of the objective world, the 
unitary self, and moral truth have no corresponding object, he does not err in the 
form of his argument; it is true that knowledge, the idea of self, and morality have 
no corresponding object.  But this is because thought and existence lie “in” the 
transcendental subject whose freedom and dignity are not natural appearances of 
logic and sense but are, rather, the ground for the proof of the objective world and 
of the moral laws to which the self is bound.   
 In the Critique of Practical Reason, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant establishes that 
truth is grounded neither in logic nor in sense perception but in the good will, i.e., in 
practical reason, because human beings are ends in themselves and not means to 
an end.  The explosive thesis with which Section 1 of the Groundwork begins 
orients the entire program of Kant’s practical philosophy: “It is impossible to think of 
anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered 
good without limitation except a good will” (4:393).  Kant defines the good will as 
“the summoning of all means … in our control” (4:394) to treat persons as ends, 
not means.  The good will is good “without limitation,” i.e., “categorically,” 
“intrinsically,” “absolutely,” or “in itself” because the highest power of a human 
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being is expressed through moral choice, i.e., as dignity.  The meaning, purpose, 
goal, end, or good of human life must not be sought – in nature or in a supernatural 
world; it must be willed.  For, because the will alone is free, it is the source of all 
meaning, good, and, indeed, evil.138  Thus, it is impossible even to think of a good 
that is greater than the good will; the good will is “the highest good and the 
condition for every other” good (Groundwork, 4:396).  For it has no end beyond 
itself (4:399, 4:401), no beginning prior to itself, and, without it, “nothing of absolute 
worth would be found anywhere” (4:428).139  
 The necessary connection between (the consciousness of) freedom and 
moral obligation is expressed in Kant’s unequivocal pronouncement on the status 
of persons: “[n]ow I say that the human being and in general every rational being 
exists as an end in [him]self, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will 
                                            
138 Kant opens Part One of Religion with a discussion of “the radical evil in human nature.”  He 
argues, consistent with the Bible, that evil does not arise either from nature or from ignorance, but 
from the will: “for otherwise the use or abuse of the human being’s power of choice with respect to 
the moral law could not be imputed to him, nor could the good or evil in him be called ‘moral’ [or 
‘immoral’] … .  [If] the entire exercise of freedom could be traced back to a determination through 
natural causes – this would contradict freedom” (6:21).  Or again, that the human being is evil 
“cannot mean anything else than that he is conscious of the moral law” (6:32).   
139 In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant writes that either “we represent to ourselves something 
as good when and because we desire (will) it, or … we desire something because we represent it 
to ourselves as good, so that either desire is the determining ground of the concept of the object as 
a good, or the concept of the good is the determining ground of desire (of the will); … in the first 
case … we will something under the idea of the good; in the second, we will something in 
consequence of this idea, which must precede volition as its determining ground”(5:59 [ft.]).  Here, 
Kant follows Spinoza who writes in his Ethics (translated by Samuel Shirley.  Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1992): “we do not endeavor, will, seek after or desire because we judge a 
thing to be good.  On the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we endeavor, will, seek 
after and desire it” (Part 3, Proposition 9, Scholium).   
 The crucial distinction that Kant and Spinoza are making is between a biblical and a 
teleological conception of human life, i.e., between willing the good because the good will is the 
cause of itself and the source of what is good and seeking a good because the will is not good, 
lacks the good, and is moved by the good, as is the case in Plato and Aristotle.  In the first case, 
what is good is good because it is good for human beings who are ends (beginnings) in 
themselves.  In the second case, what is good is good in itself apart from human beings who love it 
because they do not possess it and have no knowledge of what it is.   
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at its discretion; instead he must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or 
also to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end” 
(Groundwork, 4:428).  It is because every person “exists as” an end that she is 
entitled to “be regarded” as an end by others, and vice-versa: our desire to be 
treated with dignity attests to our obligation always to treat others as we wish to be 
treated.  I am an end and am entitled to be respected as such for the same reason 
that all other persons are ends who are entitled to be so respected and whom I 
must never, therefore, use as means: “every other rational being also represents 
his existence [as an end] consequent on just the same rational ground that also 
holds for me” (Groundwork, 4:429, emphasis added).  According to Kant, then, 
human beings have absolute rights, i.e., rights whose priority is not subordinate to 
the fulfillment of imperatives that are empirical or instrumental (i.e., what Kant calls 
“hypothetical” imperatives) and it is precisely these rights that confer upon us an 
absolute obligation to respect them.  This means that I can no more escape moral 
obligation than I can cease to exist as a person, i.e., who has absolute rights.  
That human rights are universal indicates, further, that there is a common bond 
between persons and that the interests of others are at once my own interests; I 
do not have the right to be indifferent to the injustices suffered by others, whose 
existence is bound up with my own.140  The law to defend universal human rights 
                                            
140 Martin Luther King, Jr. was not only a civil rights leader but also one of the great theologians of 
our time.  For he grasped in his thought and existence that individual freedom is dependent on and, 
indeed, constituted by, universal freedom.  He writes in his “Letter from Birmingham City Jail” that 
“[i]njustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.  We are caught in an inescapable network of 
mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.  Whatever affects one directly affects all indirectly” (p. 
290).  Insofar as the Church separates the relationship between human beings and God from the 
relationships among human beings, it cannot but inspire “outright disgust” among those who expect 
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is the heart and soul of biblical teaching and of Kant’s moral philosophy, and the 
failure to comprehend it as the basis of truth is the principal reason that Kant is so 
critical of uncritical metaphysics.  For when the mind conforms to objects, human 
beings objectify themselves and one another.  
 Kant is relentless in insisting that all persons, without exception, have no 
finite equivalent.  He declares that our “inner worth,” or “dignity,” is “that which 
constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself”; it is 
“infinitely above all price with which it cannot be brought into comparison or 
competition at all without, as it were, assaulting its holiness” (Groundwork, 4:435, 
emphasis added).  We are what Kant calls “objective ends” whose “existence … is 
in itself an end, and indeed one such that no other end, to which [we] would serve 
merely as means, can be put in its place” (Groundwork, 4:428).  Once more, the 
right that each person has to be treated as an objective end constitutes his duty to 
treat every other person as an objective end, and this right/duty “is the supreme 
limiting condition of the freedom of action of every human being” (Groundwork, 
4:431).  Freedom is, fundamentally, a moral idea and involves the obligation to 
discipline choice.  I have the power to do evil and am “free” to do so in the limited 
sense that I can choose it and am responsible and accountable for this choice.  In 
a fuller sense, however, I am not free when I do evil, i.e., when I sin, because sin is 
the condition in which I allow myself to be determined through inclinations that do 
                                                                                                                                     
it to live up to its true purpose: to be not just a thermometer (recorder) of the status quo but a 
thermostat (regulator) that helps to defend the rights of everyone (p. 300). (In The Essential 
Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr.) 
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not affirm (my) humanity and dignity; I treat myself and others as having 
hypothetical, and not absolute, value.  Surely it is because we feel guilt when we 
do to others what we do not want done to us that we hide our sins from others.  
The good will gives no reason to feel guilt or shame; it is only when I do evil, i.e., 
when I choose to act with a bad will, that I am in fundamental conflict with myself 
because I act from maxims that I recognize are wrong (Groundwork, 4:437).141    
                                            
141 When discussing self-contradiction, the issue to which Kant returns most often is lying.  As 
James Ellington observes in his translation of the Groundwork, the reason that I think that others 
will believe my lie is that I believe others are truthful.  In order for my lie to work, others must trust 
me; that is what makes it possible for me to take advantage of their confidence in me.  To make 
lying universal would mean that no one would have reason to believe anyone else, which is not a 
condition that I, or anyone else, can ever will (ft. 18, p. 32, in Grounding for the Metaphysics of 
Morals.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1981).  Thus, Kant writes that I can will the 
lie, but never its universality (4:403).   
 I express a contradiction in my own will when I lie because I help to create a world that I do 
not want, i.e., I act in a way that I do not want and could not want others to act.  I do to others what I 
do not want others to do to me and I thus maintain that the principle of my action is both valid (for 
me) and invalid (for others).  I except myself from an unconditional duty on the basis of an empirical 
interest, which I make the standard for my practical interest.  In truth, it is only though the latter that 
empirical interests can be worth anything at all.  Further, I lie to people and not to things because I 
distinguish between them.  This shows that I do not and cannot believe my own lie.  All moral 
transgressions are variants of lying and presuppose that one is aware that one ought not to do what 
one is doing.   
 Lies are willed, not spoken; they express a bad will and not a faltering tongue.  It is, 
therefore, very surprising that in his short paper, “On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy” (in 
The Cambridge Edition: Practical Philosophy), Kant argues that it is always wrong to tell a lie, even 
if one has every reason to believe that it will save a person’s life (e.g., 8:426-8:427).  If a murderer 
asks a person if he knows where his intended victim is hiding, and if this person knows, it is, Kant 
writes, better for him to tell the truth to the murderer than to lie.  For if, in telling a lie, the victim is 
found, the liar could bear some responsibility for the murder to the degree that his lie contributed to 
it.    
 Kant’s analysis of the moral law does not actually support this position.  To live the truth of 
the categorical imperative is not compatible with telling the truth to an evil person if one has reason 
to suspect that he will use this truth to advance his lie.  Further, as Kant himself points out, acting in 
accordance with duty is not necessarily acting from duty.  The former separated from the latter is 
blind obedience to the letter of the law.  It is an a posteriori and not a synthetic a priori judgment.  
The fundamental problem of reason, however, is not how to be a good soldier but how to be a good 
human being.   
 Finally, as Kant has argued, the will must be judged through the principle of its willing and 
not through consequences that fall beyond the limits of will.  Thus, in the event that the murderer 
finds the victim after a person makes every effort to protect him, it is clear that the individual who 
tried to protect the victim in no way deserves blame.   
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 Kant calls the moral law the “categorical imperative.”  An “imperative” is the 
principle for willing this or that action; it is “categorical” when its fulfillment is an end 
in itself.  That the good will is both the highest end of reason and the supreme 
good is consistent with all three formulations of the categorical imperative as 
presented in the Groundwork.  The first formulation is this: “I ought never to act 
except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a 
universal law” (4:402).  In everything, I must think about how what I do affects 
others and consider the consequences if others were to think and behave as I do.  
Under no circumstances do I have the right to make myself an exception to the 
standards to which I hold others.  Rather, I must weigh everything from the infinite 
standpoint of moral reason.  The first formulation of the moral law affirms a radical 
equality among people who nevertheless have no equivalent; there is no rational 
basis for making a fundamental distinction between my own concerns and the 
concerns of others or of assigning precedence of right to either.  The question of 
what I should do is always coupled with the question of how this or that choice will 
affect others. 
 The second formulation of the moral law in the Groundwork is the 
imperative form of the judgment that human beings are ends in themselves: “[s]o 
act that you [treat] humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (4:429).  
Here, Kant defends reason as its own categorical standard: the moral law does not 
come either from nature or from a transcendent sphere but expresses the 
essential character of free self-consciousness.  As we have seen in Deuteronomy 
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30.11-14, the law of God is not “up in heaven” or “beyond the sea” but “in your 
heart.”  Now, it is indeed paradoxical that while the moral law, the Word, is an 
“objective” (a priori) principle that derives from the freedom of the subject, we so 
often fail to grasp that it is the ground of our own being.  One reason for this failure 
is that what is true from a practical standpoint is not understandable from a 
theoretical standpoint, which concerns perceivable objects in natural space and 
time.  That I should treat all persons as ends in themselves is a practical principle 
that I cannot grasp in terms of logic or the categories of possible experience.  I do 
not understand or sense how morality is possible.  From a practical point of view, 
however, I rise above what I can understand and sense and live with faith, treating 
you not as you treat me but as you ought to treat me.  This obligation is not 
conditional upon you treating me in the same way; it is absolute and supports the 
principle that the rational mind must not conform to our natural responses; our 
natural responses must conform to the rational mind.  
 The third formulation of the moral law is closely related to the first and 
second.  Here, Kant explicitly defends the will as its own ground: 
the will is not merely subject to the law but subject to it in such 
a way that it must be viewed as also giving the law to itself and 
just because of this as first subject to the law (of which it can 
regard itself as the author) (Groundwork, 4:431).   
 
We see yet again that Kant blocks all attempts to ground the moral law in an 
extraneous object or being.  The will is its own ground (standard, beginning, and 
end).  In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that nothing more (or less) 
is demanded of the human being than what he himself can do; it is therefore within 
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everyone’s power at all times to fulfill the moral law (5:36-37).  In Religion, he 
argues that what it means to do the will of God, as commanded in the Gospels, is 
to fulfill one’s duties towards oneself and others:  
a morally good life is all that God requires of [people] … 
whenever they fulfill their duties toward human beings 
(themselves and others), by that very fact they also conform to 
God’s commands … and … it is absolutely impossible to serve 
[God] more intimately in some other way … (6:103, emphasis 
added).   
 
Once more:  
[a]part from a good life-conduct, anything which the human 
being supposes that he can do to become well-pleasing to 
God is mere religious delusion and counterfeit service to God 
(Religion, 6:170-171).      
 
 Kant calls his third formulation of the moral law the principle of “autonomy of 
the will.”  However different its emphasis might appear to be when compared to 
the central teachings in the Old and New Testaments, it is perfectly consistent with 
them.  When I read the Old Testament and, in particular, the Five Books, I have 
the impression that the general focus of their teaching is on commanding 
obedience to God: the absolute duty to oneself and the absolute duty to others 
converge in the absolute duty to God.  In the New Testament, I have a different 
impression.  Stories like the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10.30-37) 
merge the absolute duty to oneself and the absolute duty to God in the absolute 
duty to others.  It is striking that, in Kant’s third formulation of the categorical 
imperative, the absolute duty to God and the absolute duty to others converge in 
the absolute duty to oneself.  Admittedly, the above distinctions are forced, but 
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they remind us that one’s duties to oneself, others, and God are inseparable and 
that they are all rooted in the biblical tradition.  
 Kant subsumes all teleological notions of morality under the category of 
heteronomy, which is the futile effort to locate the ground (end) of the will in an 
alien end (ground).  It is the equivalent of idolatry in which the self-determining 
creator whose existence is categorical is understood as hypothetical, i.e., as a 
thing that may not be.  In the Groundwork, Kant argues that the reason that the 
metaphysics of morals has been such a colossal failure is that none of its schools 
has comprehended that human beings are bound to universal laws that they give 
to themselves, and that every individual “is bound only to act in conformity with his 
own will, which, however, … is a will giving universal law” (4:432).  Instead, the 
standard of the will has been viewed in something else.  Kant distinguishes his 
own principle of autonomy from every other failed principle, which he rests not on 
ignorance, but on heteronomy of the will.  Heteronomy is the conflation of biblical 
autonomy with pagan teleology.142 
                                            
142 While Kant has acute insight into biblical teaching, he does not work through the relationship 
between Judaism and Christianity in a manner that is consistent with his recognition in Religion that 
the moral law is the true standard of biblical interpretation (6:110-112 and ft.).  On the contrary, he 
claims in the same work that “the Jewish faith stands in absolutely no essential connection” to 
Christianity because it makes “no claim at all on the moral disposition” of individuals but is, rather, 
“directed simply and solely to external observance” (6:126).  (He does not discuss the Prophets and 
makes no comment on their unflinchingly austere critique of external observance at the expense of 
social obligation.)  Christian thought, he writes, expresses a “total abandonment of the Judaism in 
which it originated, [and,] grounded on an entirely new principle, [it] effected a total revolution in 
doctrines of faith” (6:127).  Kant knows, of course, that Jesus is not a Christian, but a Jew (6:79), 
and that Christianity presupposes the Jewish faith and its sacred texts (e.g., 6:136 ft.); but he does 
not work through the implications of these facts.   
     What does it mean to say that Christianity dispensed with its origins?  How?  Kant observes in 
“Conjectures” that nature is the womb of non-biblical thought and that it is the expulsion from Eden 
that expresses the human being’s “transition from a rude and purely animal existence to a state of 
humanity, from the leading-strings of instinct to the guidance of reason – in a word, from the 
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 If it is the case that the good will alone is good without qualification and the 
condition of all other goods – or else we are stuck in the contradictory metaphysics 
of pre-critical heteronomy – then the parameters for an adequate idea of God 
cannot extend beyond the idea of the good will, which must therefore be respected 
as the supreme and “highest” good (Groundwork, 4:396).  Hence, Kant declares in 
the second Critique that in the idea of God we find “nothing more than what is 
required for the possibility of thinking of [i.e., willing] a moral law” (5:137).  It is to 
make room for this existential idea of God as a postulate of practical reason that 
Kant establishes in the first Critique that it is fruitless to demonstrate the existence 
of God theoretically.  God is not an empirical object or a transcendent notion of 
formal logic.  Kant thus shows that the cosmological and physico-theological 
arguments, which hold that God is a first and final cause of nature, are variants of 
the theses of the first two Antinomies: claims are made about the cosmos for 
which no experience can, in principle, ever offer adequate support.  Further, in 
these arguments, the logical conclusion contradicts the premise on which it rests: 
the premise is that what exists in the world is an effect of prior causes; the 
conclusion is that God must therefore exist, but not as an effect of prior causes.  
Or does God exist transcendent of the world?  If so, how can God be admitted as 
a part (a beginning or end or cause or designer …) of the causal sequence?  This 
transcendent notion of causality is without either objective or practical validity, for it 
                                                                                                                                     
guardianship of nature to the state of freedom” (p. 226).  This Jewish revolution, he writes, has had 
“epoch-making effects in imparting a wholly new direction to thought,” effects that are “more 
important than the whole endless series of subsequent cultural developments” (p. 225, emphasis 
added).  Kant offers no instruction on how to reconcile his crucial insights in “Conjectures” with his 
remarks concerning the Jewish faith in Religion.  
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bears no relationship either to the pure concept of natural causality, in which all 
causes are also effects, or to freedom, which is the cause of itself.  Since 
defenders of these arguments have no empirical support, they must resort to a 
logical analysis of mere concepts, i.e., of “what kinds of properties in general [the 
notion of] an absolutely necessary being would have to have” (Critique of Pure 
Reason, A 606-607/B 634-635).  The cosmological and physico-theological 
arguments for the existence of God thus depend on what Kant calls the 
“ontological” argument.  
 Those who summon the ontological argument to support a theoretical 
proof for the existence of God transition unjustifiably from the logical term “God” to 
its objective existence outside the term and profess to do so in a manner that is a 
priori.  They argue that, since it is a contradiction for a necessary and perfect 
being (God) not to exist in reality – for, in that case, God would not be God – God 
must exist in reality.  Kant replies, however, that existence is “not a real predicate” 
(Critique of Pure Reason, A 598/B 626).  What does this mean?  Seung provides a 
clear explanation in Kant: A Guide for the Perplexed.  There is no difference 
between the content of the term “unicorn” and the content of the term “existent 
unicorn”; to say that the unicorn exists in the term “unicorn” does not affect the 
status of the term “unicorn.”  It does not make the content of the term real in actual 
existence (p. 86).143  Expressed differently, there is no difference between a thing 
and an existent thing in the field of logical possibility.  In the logical form of a 
judgment, “is” is not a predicate that adds real content; it is only what Kant calls a 
                                            
143 I have made slight modifications to the example Seung provides. 
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formal “copula” (Critique of Pure Reason, A 598/B 626).  The problem involved in 
determining real existence is not whether there is an analytic connection between 
the subject and predicate, but whether there is a synthetic connection.  It is true 
that, in an analytic connection, I cannot deny the predicates that belong to the 
subject; but this connection does not mean that the subject exists.  For I can deny 
the subject altogether because it does not exist (Critique of Pure Reason, A 594/B 
692).  In sum, the existence of a thing is not found in the relationship between the 
subject and the predicate, but in the ontological character, status, or condition of 
both subject and predicate.  If I claim that I have a million dollars, a million dollars 
exists as a concept in the claim that I make.  The claim is not true, however, 
unless I have a million dollars in real space and time.  
 Having rejected in the first Critique all theoretical conceptions of God born 
from the dialectical employment of experience and logic, i.e., as organons, Kant 
proceeds in the second Critique to defend the ontological argument for the 
existence of God from a practical standpoint, although he makes no mention that 
(he is aware that) this is what he is doing.  He appears144 to struggle in his moral 
philosophy to present an account of God that is consistent with his account of the 
good will as the supreme and highest good whose essence expresses the 
necessity of moral existence.  On the one hand, he argues that actions which are 
not done from duty are not moral (e.g., Critique of Practical Reason, 5:82).  For 
moral worth consists in acting from duty (Critique of Practical Reason, 5:81) and 
                                            
144 I say “appears” because the unsteadiness in Kant’s presentation could have been a strategic 
decision to make his work more palatable to the Orthodox wing of the Prussian government. 
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this is what makes the moral character incomparably the highest of all goods 
(Groundwork, 4:399) and the very condition for the worthiness of being a free (self-
determining) person (Groundwork, 4:396).  The good will is good in itself only 
through its willing (“volition”) (Groundwork, 4:394), and duty is the indispensable 
condition under which alone something can be an end in itself: “humanity, insofar 
as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity” (Groundwork, 4:435, 
emphasis added).  Thus, the reason that virtue is the supreme good is that it 
expresses the power of self-overcoming through repentance, which demands that 
there is no a priori agreement between will and law (Critique of Practical Reason, 
5:84, 5:110, 5:124, 5:156; Opus Postumum, 22:54).  On the other hand, Kant 
sometimes speaks of God in a manner that could be seen to imply that God 
(holiness) and morality (human virtue) are incompatible or even opposites.  He 
writes that the divine will is in necessary agreement with the law (Groundwork 
4:414, 4:439) and that God, therefore, has no obligation (i.e., moral necessitation), 
no interest in the law, and no respect for the law, because obligation, interest, and 
respect for the law presuppose a will that is not in necessary agreement with the 
law (Groundwork, 4:439; Critique of Practical Reason, 5:76; Opus Postumum, 
22:49).  The divine will is not engaged in a struggle (Critique of Practical Reason 
5:76) and is not subject to any commandment (Critique of Practical Reason, 5:84) 
because, in the idea of God, there is no possibility of moral transgression.  Thus, 
the moral condition of human beings is that of virtue and not holiness (Critique of 
Practical Reason, 5:84), whereas the condition of God is that of holiness and not 
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virtue.  Hence, holiness is unattainable for human beings (Critique of Practical 
Reason, 5:84, 5:123-124). 
 How are we to resolve the conflict between these two presentations?  If the 
will of God necessarily agrees with the moral law and does not involve the 
obligation to fulfill the law, and if willing the moral law because of the categorical 
obligation to do so is the source of all moral worth, how, then, can God be an ideal 
of reason and the supreme and highest good?  How can we even relate to, let 
alone desire, the divine disposition?  Further, if God is not subject to any 
commandment, what does it mean that God’s volition “is of itself necessarily in 
accord with the [moral] law”? (Groundwork, 4:414).  What is the nature of this 
agreement if holiness involves the power to do evil?  If holiness does not involve 
the power to do evil, how is it related to choice and freedom?  Further still, how is 
one to comprehend moral commands as coming from God if God has no interest 
in or respect for them?  What justification does virtuous action have if its end, 
holiness, is unattainable?  How is the ideal of an unattainable holiness different 
from a teleological end?  To resolve these and related issues, it is necessary to 
investigate more deeply the meaning and ontological status of the idea of God.  
Such an effort will lead to a discussion of the postulates of immortality and 
freedom which, together with God, are upheld as “immanent and constitutive” in 
moral practice (Critique of Practical Reason, 5:135). 
 For Kant, the idea of God is synthetic a priori.  It emerges with and through, 
and not antecedent to, the consciousness of the moral law (Religion, 6:5, 6:104).  
Kant begins Religion with this pronouncement:  
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So far as morality is based on the conception of the human 
being as one who is free but who also, just because of that, 
binds himself through his reason to unconditional laws, it is in 
need neither of the idea of another being above him in order 
that he recognize his duty, nor, that he observe it, of an 
incentive other than the law itself.  At least it is the human 
being’s own fault if such a need is found in him (6:3).   
 
Kant writes later in the same work that the “pure faith of reason” is its own proof 
(6:129).  For the idea of freedom involves necessary existence and expresses the 
ontological argument for the existence of God: that than which nothing greater can 
be conceived145 is moral life, i.e., love as the fulfillment of duty.  This message, 
Kant indicates, is precisely the good news of Christianity: 
the Christian principle of morals itself is not theological (and so 
heteronomy); it is instead autonomy of pure practical reason 
by itself, since it does not make cognition of God and his will 
the basis of these laws but … places … the proper incentive to 
observing them not in the results wished for but in the 
representation of duty alone … .  In this way the moral law 
leads … to the recognition of all duties as divine commands, 
not as … contingent ordinances of another’s will – but as 
essential laws of every free will in itself (Critique of Practical 
Reason, 5:129).   
 
In cases where the Bible appears to teach that God ought to be obeyed before 
human beings, as seems to be implied in the “greatest” commandment to love 
God above all others (Matt. 22.37-38), the Bible does not posit a hierarchical 
(idolatrous) relationship between God and human beings.  To love God above all 
                                            
145 I use here St. Anselm’s formulation of God as found in Chapter 2 of the Proslogium (in St. 
Anselm: Basic Writings.  Second Edition.  Translated by S. N. Deane.  La Salle: Open Court 
Publishing Company, 1996).  For St. Anselm, God is that than which nothing greater can be 
conceived, i.e., God is not beyond thought but the “reality” of (the highest object of) thought.  This 
proof is the basis of Descartes’ proofs for the existence of God as presented in Parts 3 and 5 of the 
Meditations on First Philosophy (in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume II.  Translated 
by Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).  There, 
Descartes demonstrates that the existence and perfection of God follow from the cogito: I think, 
therefore I am.    
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others means that in all cases wherein there is a conflict between the moral law 
and subjective maxims, the moral law takes precedence (Religion, 6:153-154 [ft.]).  
It alone must serve as the criterion for distinguishing between authentic and 
spurious commands, whether human or divine.   
In the previous Chapter, I argued that the only possible way that human 
beings can accept the authority of God authoritatively is if they do not subordinate 
their own authority to God.  The acceptance of an authoritative law must itself be 
authoritative if the true authority of the law is to be distinguished from a blind 
authoritarian rule, i.e., idolatry.  It is for this reason that Kant argues in the 
Groundwork that God must be subject to our ideal of moral perfection before God 
can be recognized as God (4:408).  The autonomy of reason, i.e., the idea of 
freedom, must therefore be respected as the sole basis of obligation (Critique of 
Practical Reason, 5:125-126).  The idea of God is valid because it conforms to a 
synthetic a priori moral law of reason and, hence, “the doctrine of virtue stands on 
its own (even without the concept of God)” (Religion, 6:183).  But, Kant shows, it is 
for this reason that the idea of God necessarily exists.   
 Kant rejects the idols of God, idols made not from gold earrings146 but from 
empty concepts, in order to make room for God as the truth of human existence.  
He embraces the ontological argument for the existence of God when 
appropriated by reason in his last but unfinished work, Opus Postumum.  It is best 
to let him speak in his own words: the idea of God “is not a hypothetical thing but 
pure practical reason itself” (22:118, pp. 201-202).  “All expressions of moral-
                                            
146 See Exodus 32.2-4. 
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practical reason are divine” and “only relation (the moral relation) indicates [God]” 
(22:57, 21:26, pp. 215, 230).  God is “in the idea of the relation of man to right and 
duty” but “not as a being outside man” (22:60, p. 217).  He is “not outside man as 
a substance different from man,”  
that is … a being which exists independent of my thought – 
but the idea (one’s own creation …) of a reason which 
constitutes itself into a thought-object, and establishes 
synthetic a priori propositions (21.21 and 21:27, pp. 228 and 
231). 
   
We live, move, and have our being in God.   
It cannot be denied that such a being exists; yet it cannot be 
asserted that it exists outside rationally thinking man.  In him – 
the man who thinks morally according to our own commands 
of duty – we live … move … and have our being (22:55, p. 
214).   
 
Still again:  
[t]here is a God.  There is a being in me, which is different 
from me … itself free (that is, not being dependent upon the 
laws of nature in space and time) it judges me inwardly 
(justifies or condemns); and I, man, am this being myself – it is 
not some substance outside me (21:25, pp. 229-230).   
 
God requires no further proof than moral-practical reason and “already lies, rather, 
in the developed concept of this idea” (21:92, p. 252).  “The mere idea of him is 
likewise proof of his existence” (21:14, p. 221).  
 If, according to Kant, the idea of God has the same ontological standing as 
freedom, which is the case since both God and freedom are bound to one another 
as synthetic a priori postulates of practical reason, then does not God become 
redundant to Kant’s discussion of morality?  Gordon E. Michalson, Jr. explores this 
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question in his provocative study, Kant and the Problem of God.147  He argues that 
“the effect of [Kant’s] position is that language about God gradually becomes 
either redundant or a disguised version of language about ourselves” (p. 2).  The 
attack on the theoretical “proofs” for God’s existence “has the appearance of an 
opening salvo in an atheist manifesto” (p. 28) and the fact that  
divine commands not subsumable under the moral law are 
simply incompatible in principle with human freedom … leaves 
no room for a divine command that derives its obligatory 
status apart from the moral law, or that overrides my own 
exercise of autonomy (p. 73). 
 
Reason, then, assumes the character of divine agency (p. 23).  It is certainly 
possible, Michalson points out, that Kant is “fashioning a new conceptuality for 
divine transcendence” (p. 137) that is immanent in practical reason (pp. 35-36).  In 
this case, “God is real ‘for us’ in the course of a life of moral earnestness rather 
than as the theoretical object of a proof” (p. 44).  Michalson concludes, however, 
that, if religion is not needed for morality, the struggle to incorporate an idea of 
divine transcendence into an idea of autonomy “is finally a losing one”; “the 
intimate link [Kant] forges between moral consciousness and consciousness of 
God … inevitably and completely” results in the subordination of God to moral 
consciousness.  Thus, what Kant himself shows when he invokes the language of 
God is that God is redundant to the discussion, an outcome that is “perhaps the 
ultimate expression of Kant’s own Copernican revolution” (pp. 137-138).  
 Michalson’s work stimulates three important insights that are relevant to the 
present study.  First, there is no question that what Kant shows is that faith in God 
                                            
147 Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999. 
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demands rational atheism, i.e., reason’s critique and abandonment of the 
dialectical pursuit of teleological ideals.  The necessary existence of God requires 
that God is indemonstrable from a theoretical standpoint.  Kant insists in the 
second Critique that every step that he has taken in the practical field is in “precise 
agreement” with “all the moments of the Critique of theoretical reason,” as though 
“each step had been thought out with deliberate foresight merely to provide this 
confirmation [of their agreement]” (5:106).  We are thus assured that, while Kant 
uses theological language, he does not cling to the ideals of theoretical teleology 
that he abandoned in his first Critique.   
 This leads to the second point: Kant relies on biblical usage, I think, for two 
main reasons.  First, it is in the Bible that he finds the roots of his own ideas and, 
indeed, of modernity (e.g., Religion, 6:107).148  Perhaps it is possible for Kant to 
have obviated biblical language; but he cannot dispense with biblical truth, which 
is the focus of his attention.  Second, biblical usage allows him to shine a spotlight 
on its idolatrous conceptualizations.  The creative process of reconfiguring the 
meanings that are conventionally ascribed to the biblical terms that he uses calls 
                                            
148 One of the reasons that Michalson argues that Kant’s idea of God is redundant is that he does 
not work through the meaning and significance of the Bible.  He is perceptive in recognizing that 
Kant’s moral world absorbs Christian doctrine as the “vehicle” of pure moral faith (p. 102); however, 
he holds that to make Christian faith intelligible in modern life may well be to lose what is 
“distinctively Christian” (p. 138).  He does not see clearly that the reason that religion is not needed 
for morality is that morality is religion conceived as the autonomy of reason. 
 It is on the basis of a teleological reading of the Bible that Heinz Cassirer argues in Grace & 
Law: St. Paul, Kant, and the Hebrew Prophets (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
1988) that St. Paul and Kant “propound views concerning morality which are utterly irreconcilable 
with one another.”  There is a “complete contrast” and “radical opposition” between them (p. xvi).  
Cassirer sees that, insofar as one remains within the Kantian orbit, human beings are their own 
autonomous ground and end and that, therefore, all moral content in Kant’s system necessarily falls 
within the province of reason (pp. 80-83).  But he thus falsifies the position of both Kant and the 
Bible in concluding that Kant’s system cannot accommodate what is essential to biblical thought 
(and vice-versa).   
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attention to the inadequacies of these conventional meanings.  It is in the absence 
of adequate ideas of God that inadequate ideas of God proliferate.  
 The third point of interest is that, although virtue stands alone without the 
idea of God, the idea of God is no more dispensable than the idea of freedom.  
God is not subordinate to consciousness, or even to moral consciousness.  It is 
perhaps to help prevent this misinterpretation of his own position that Kant 
elevates God to a necessary idea that is “beyond all measure” (Opus Postumum, 
21:455, p. 6).  For Kant, the human and the divine are comprehensible only 
through each other.  If they are unrelated to each other, they are identical with 
each other and vice versa: their identification leads to their opposition.  In both 
cases, there is no relationship that human beings can have with themselves or 
with others that does not reflect the finitude of nature, leaving us with no higher 
purpose beyond fulfilling our natural inclinations and empirical interests.149  The 
moral law expresses the necessary relationship between thought and existence to 
be infinite.  It locates us in a relationship with ourselves and God such that we are 
bound to ideals which necessarily exceed our grasp although we strive from them 
and within them.    
                                            
149 I suspect that when Kant maintains that God has no interest in the moral law he means that God 
has no theoretical interest in the law, i.e., that the imperative of God’s command is not hypothetical 
but categorical. 
 In the Groundwork Kant distinguishes between practical interests and theoretical interests 
and argues that the specific mark that distinguishes categorical imperatives from hypothetical ones 
is the renunciation of all interests that are grounded in what he calls the kind of “self-love” that can 
never be valid as a universal law (4:431-432).  A practical interest is not based on “mediate,” 
“conditional,” “empirical,” “sensible,” or “sensuous” interests or incentives, all of which are 
hypothetical.  Rather, it is what Kant calls a “pure rational interest” or “that by which reason 
becomes practical.”  It is the interest of the moral will that is the cause of itself.  It is 
indistinguishable from the good will such that “what belongs to mere appearance is … subordinated 
by reason to the constitution of the thing in itself” (4:460-461, incl. ft.). 
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 After Kant discusses the postulate of immortality in the Critique of Practical 
Reason, which I shall take up in a moment, he develops his account of God.  He 
argues that God is the sufficient cause for the highest good that the moral law 
demands, a good that he connects with the Christian idea of the kingdom of God, 
which, Kant grasps, is the kingdom of ends (5:127-128).150  He distinguishes 
between the supreme good and the highest good and claims that whereas virtue is 
the supreme good and is the condition even to be worthy of happiness, it is not 
itself sufficient for the highest good; the latter must involve happiness.  (In 
Religion, Kant maintains that happiness is the natural end of every human being 
[6:46 (ft.)] and that “total renunciation” of the “unavoidable desire” for the sensuous 
element of happiness “cannot be expected” of him [6:134-135].)  There are thus 
two aspects of the highest good of human beings: virtue and happiness.  These 
together fulfill human beings in both their rational and sensible character.  God is 
that power through which the highest good is, and ought to be, realized.  
This account raises a fundamental problem whose solution is not evident.  
To this point I have argued that, for Kant, the highest good is the good will which 
alone has full value in itself, i.e., regardless of whether it furthers happiness.  In 
Kant’s discussion of the postulates of practical reason, however, the good will is 
not necessarily sufficient to achieve the highest good, insofar as happiness and 
moral action are not necessarily connected to one another (Critique of Practical 
Reason, 5:124).  There are moments when happiness is regarded in terms of the 
                                            
150 In the Groundwork, the kingdom of ends is the ideal of perfection (holiness) in which all persons 
respect themselves and others as ends in themselves (4:433-434, 4:438).  In Religion, it is the good 
“common to all,” the “ethical community,” or heaven on earth (6:97, 6:100, 6:101). 
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contentment that comes from the consciousness of being able to make moral 
decisions in the face of contrary inclinations (Critique of Practical Reason, 5:117-
119).  Kant also indicates that happiness depends upon the contentment that 
comes from being moral and, therefore, upon denying happiness as sense-feeling.  
For example, Kant writes that  
an upright man cannot be happy if he is not first conscious of 
his uprightness; for, with such a disposition, the censure that 
his own cast of mind would force him to bring against himself 
in case of a transgression, and his moral self-condemnation 
would deprive him of all enjoyment of the agreeableness that 
his state might otherwise contain … .  If a human being is 
virtuous he will certainly not enjoy life unless he is conscious 
of his uprightness in every action … (Critique of Practical 
Reason, 5:116). 
 
The implied distinction between moral and immoral kinds of happiness is a 
reminder that it is the worthiness to be happy, and not happiness itself, that has 
moral worth.  Yet, to identify happiness and contentment would leave unresolved 
the problem that Kant introduces when he includes natural happiness in the 
highest good: if it is better for human beings to be happy than unhappy in the 
realm of experience, which can hardly be disputed if one assumes that, in both 
cases, human beings are moral, then the highest good would have to involve 
empirical happiness as well as contentment.  Herein lies the problem: on the one 
hand, Kant insists that happiness should not in any manner be a motive or end for 
moral action and that the sole motive and end for moral action is duty, i.e., respect 
for the moral law.  This is what it means for reason to be autonomous.  On the 
other hand, human beings are sensible beings who want to be happy and moral 
action that furthers happiness is a matter of duty (Critique of Practical Reason, 
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5:124-125; Groundwork, 4:399).  In other words, it is Kant’s position that the 
highest good is the goal of the supreme good, but that the supreme good, i.e., the 
good will, alone has intrinsic value.  
Insofar as the happiness that is found in the highest good is a condition that 
exceeds what the collective will of human beings can, in principle, bring about, 
human beings cannot be obligated to bring it about.  Insofar as the collective will of 
human beings can, in principle, create the happiness that is found in the highest 
good, God would have to express the power of the collective will that is sufficient 
to bring about the greatest happiness that moral action will allow.  I should add my 
voice to the cacophony of thinkers who have protested that Kant has not been 
clear in accounting for what exactly is required beyond the fulfillment of one’s 
duties to promote the greatest happiness that moral action will allow.  If the 
happiness of the highest good is not attainable in and through moral action, then it 
cannot be a part of the highest good; if it is attainable in and through moral action, 
then it is subsumed under it and it is not clear how the duty to promote happiness 
is different from the duty to be a moral person.151     
                                            
151 In A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1961) Lewis White Beck articulates clearly the problem with Kant’s presentation.  He sees that 
because, according to Kant, there is nothing that can be conceived to be greater than the good will, 
one cannot be duty-bound to do more than to act from respect for the law.  Thus, promoting a 
happiness that is not within my power to effect cannot be a moral duty.  “Kant simply cannot have it 
both ways.  He cannot say that the highest good is a motive for the pure will, and then say … man 
must have an object which is not exclusively moral (for there is nothing moral in happiness except 
insofar as its condition is worthiness to be happy, and even then the moral value lies in the 
worthiness, not in the enjoyment).  … [T]he highest good … does not exist as a separate command, 
independent of the categorical imperative … .  For suppose I do all in my power – which is all any 
moral decree can demand of me – to promote the highest good, what am I to do?  Simply act out of 
respect for the law … .  I can do absolutely nothing else toward apportioning happiness in 
accordance with desert … .  [That] is not my task; my task is to realize the one condition of the 
summum bonum which is within my power; it is seriously misleading to say that there is a command 
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 Kant is working with two ideas of the “highest” good: (1) the absolutely good 
will and (2) a kingdom of ends in which we find the greatest possible happiness.  
These ideas lead to two parallel ideas of God, conceived as the power that is 
sufficient to create these highest goods.  To comprehend further the relationship 
between these two ideas of God, it is necessary to turn to Kant’s discussion of the 
postulate of immortality.   
 The idea of immortality expresses the tensions inherent in the human 
condition: it is within each and every individual’s power to fulfill the moral law at 
each and every moment of her existence, but it is impossible for her to make a 
choice at one moment that will fulfill her moral obligations in subsequent moments.  
It is not possible, then, for her to arrive at a final and complete end.  To fulfill the 
law, her struggle must be “endless.”   It is for this reason that, although holiness – 
the perfect agreement of the will with the moral law – is attainable by a human 
being at any given moment in time, it is not attainable as a disposition that forever 
satisfies the moral demands of reason.  The positions that God is not separate 
from the good will and that the good will is not identical to God are therefore both 
true, and the reason that they are both true is the idea of freedom.  Freedom 
entails that the highest good is incapable of being met with except in and through 
what Kant calls the “endless progress from lower to higher stages of moral 
                                                                                                                                     
to seek the highest good which is different from the command to fulfill the requirements of duty” (pp. 
244-245).   
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perfection” (Critique of Practical Reason, 5:123).152   Immortality is the time, and 
God is the power, that is sufficient to express holiness of will.     
 The endless progress towards holiness that is demanded by the moral law 
is not measured in chronological time.  The human being will die: the paralogistic 
notion of an everlasting soul as simple and permanent substance is utterly without 
meaning.  As Velkley observes, immortality cannot imply, for Kant, a supernatural 
existence, for the object of pure reason in its practical employment is the 
perfection of earthly and sensible existence (pp. 142, 153).  The endless 
continuance of existence must refer to one’s labor and toil to bring oneself into 
necessary agreement with oneself.  At this point, the question that I raised earlier 
appears to be resolved: when Kant writes that in God we find the necessary 
agreement between will and law, the claim does not imply that God is free from 
duty (obligation, struggle, interest, respect, or morality).  This would be an obvious 
contradiction.  Rather, the “necessary agreement” between will and law in the 
                                            
152 This idea bears a close resemblance to the biblical idea of the connection of death and 
resurrection in eternal life.  While the concept of a miraculous (bodily) resurrection is of no interest 
for Kant, he accepts the idea of resurrection as repentance that leads to what he calls “a kind of 
rebirth” and a “new man” (Religion, 6:47).   
 In his book, Kant as Philosophical Theologian (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988), 
Bernard G. Reardon sees that, for Kant, the end of creation is humankind in its complete moral 
perfection, which Reardon connects with the biblical language of the Son and the Word through 
which all things have been created.  He argues that, for Kant, human beings must raise themselves 
to this moral archetype by the power supplied by the ideal itself, which is found in rational 
consciousness (p. 111).   
 Reardon sees that, on Kant’s view, the idea of redemption (resurrection) is found in the 
course of moral regeneration whose ground is the will; sin is not atoned for through the sufferings of 
Christ as a historical personage or through his literal resurrection.  “The change … from a corrupt to 
a good disposition – ‘the death of the old man’, ‘the crucifying of the flesh’ – is … a sacrifice … 
which the changed man freely accepts – in that he now makes the moral idealism of the Son of God 
his own … .  Physically of course it is the same man who suffers for his guilt, and rightly so, but 
because of his new disposition he is in the sight of his judge another and a different person” (pp. 
115-116).  
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divine disposition refers to the fulfillment of the biblical covenant in the moral life of 
human beings and so the creation of eternal life in the kingdom of ends. 
 That the highest good has two distinct meanings – to repeat, the absolutely 
good will and the kingdom of ends in which we find the greatest possible 
happiness – implies two corresponding ideas of God: (1) the absolutely good will 
of the single individual and (2) the expression of an absolutely good will among all 
persons.  These two ideas of God, in turn, imply two corresponding ideas of 
immortality.  First, immortality is the time that is sufficient for an individual person 
to be in agreement with himself, to live up to himself, or, to borrow a phrase from 
Nietzsche, to become who he is.153  It is time as unfinished, as yet to be fulfilled, 
as infinite, as the eternally returning obligation to love, once more, innumerable 
times more, yet always originally, freely.  Second, immortality is the time that is 
sufficient for the universal expression of love.  Here, the peaceable kingdom – in 
which the lions and lambs of inner nature lie together and reason rules over the 
beasts, birds, fishes, and creeping inclinations – is not the moral disposition of this 
or that individual but the condition of actual human relationships throughout the 
social and political world.  The greatest possible happiness that this ideal heavenly 
world – in which injustice for one is injustice for all – will allow cannot be anything 
                                            
153 Aphorism #270 of The Gay Science reads: “What does your conscience say?  ‘You shall 
become the person you are.’”  Here, Nietzsche distinguishes his own position from the ancient 
Greeks, for whom being does not involve becoming and becoming does not involve being.  The 
moral imperative of human beings is to will their being, i.e., to live as ends and not means.  He says 
as much in The Antichrist, “[t]he problem I … pose is not what shall succeed mankind in the 
sequence of living beings (man is an end), but what type of man … shall be willed, for being higher 
in value, worthier of life” (Section 3).  He then proceeds to attack what he calls “Christianity,” which, 
he notes, is not the teaching of Christ, but is the history of its “misunderstanding,” i.e., the Antichrist 
(see, for example, Sections 35-37).       
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other than the happiness that results when every person in God’s kingdom 
promotes her own happiness and the happiness of others within the limits of 
reason alone.  It is the happiness that emerges when human beings treat 
themselves and one another with kindness, compassion, respect, and dignity.  Any 
other notion of the greatest possible happiness in the highest good is not 
consistent with the first principles of Kant’s moral philosophy.   
 Thus it is that, when Kant maintains that human existence must be endless 
in order to attain the highest good, he testifies to the nature of the difficulty of 
willing that than which something greater cannot be conceived, the idea of which 
straddles the invisible border between necessity and impossibility: how to be holy, 
as God is holy; how to be perfect, as God is perfect; how to live in such a way that, 
in everything that you do, big or small, with others or in secret, you treat others as 
you want to be treated, as ends and never as means.  Kant’s revolutionary insight 
is that the awareness of this task originates in biblical self-consciousness, whose 
core ideas – God (the highest good), love (the good will), creation (freedom), 
eternity (immortality), and the kingdom of God (the kingdom of ends) – he sees, 
express the necessary relationship between thought and existence to be 
transcendentally ideal, i.e., determined always anew through the “I think” as the 
cause of itself.  The fundamental problem of the critical project – How are synthetic 
a priori judgments possible?  How must I synthesize my thought and my existence 
in a manner that fulfills the categorical imperative of my own reason? – is 
incomprehensible, an unknown X, through logic and perception.  That is why it 
never appears, in any formulation, at any time, in any pagan text.  Its solution is 
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found only through the existential trial of human beings before the divine court of 
practical reason. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 The general thesis that I have defended in this dissertation is that the 
necessary relationship between thought and existence in the modern world is 
anchored in the first principle of biblical thought, i.e., human beings are ends in 
themselves.  I have argued that the consciousness of this first principle is not 
present in ancient Greek thought.  In fact, ancient non-biblical thought in general is 
teleological: human beings are not regarded as ends in themselves.  On the one 
hand, in ancient teleology thought and existence are opposed to each other.  
Thought does not exist and existence cannot be thought.  For the unchanging, 
immortal, self-sufficient end in itself necessarily contradicts the changing 
perceptions that are relative to the observer.  On the other hand, however, the end 
in itself is the essence, soul, or definition of appearance and constitutes what 
thought is in itself.  The ontological condition of human beings as depicted in pagan 
teleology is, therefore, contradictory.  The limit of human wisdom is the 
consciousness that no human being can know anything at all.  Thus, teleological 
systems are sealed from the inside (and, as well, from the outside).  The opposition 
between the changing perceptions of mortals and their unchanging immortal end, 
i.e., between what thought and its objects appear to be and what they actually are, 
is, in itself, immortal and unchanging.  Human beings are, therefore, fatally 
dependent on reproducing contradictions in their efforts to escape from ignorance, 
i.e., they seek the end because they cannot know what it is.  
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 I have argued that the ontological structure of thought and existence in the 
Old and New Testaments is completely different from the ontological structure of 
thought and existence in ancient teleology.  For, in the Bible, human beings see 
themselves seeing themselves from the standpoint of the holiness and infinite 
perfection of God: they comprehend themselves to be ends in themselves and not 
appearances within the unending metamorphoses of finite nature.  I have shown 
through consideration of core ideas of the Bible that the standard of truth and 
interpretation and of (a truthful interpretation of) thought and existence in biblical 
metaphysics is moral reason, i.e., the idea of freedom as necessary existence, and 
not formal (Aristotelian) logic or natural perception.  To fulfill one’s moral 
obligations to oneself and others is to fulfill one’s moral obligations to God, whose 
highest commandment is love, i.e., the good will.  The human being does not seek 
an end in ignorance of what it is but must will the end that he comprehends to be 
the good in itself and, therefore, do his part to create the kingdom of ends, which is 
the highest fulfillment of both God and humankind.  We learn from the fact that the 
biblical authors bind their core ideas to moral obligation and dissociate them from 
the teleology of neighboring populations that the mythical narratives which they 
self-consciously appropriate within a rational/moral matrix have no point of contact 
at all with pagan ideas and ideals.  For, whereas pagan teleology begins and ends 
in necessary contradiction, biblical thought begins and ends with necessary truth.  
 Once I showed that ideas central to biblical thought are not teleological, I 
was then able to establish that Kant stands within the biblical tradition.  Kant 
demonstrates that the success of the theoretical sciences is possible only on the 
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basis of “Christian” morality, the pure religion of reason whose essence, he sees, is 
the consciousness of the moral law to treat all persons as ends in themselves and 
not as, or on the basis of, appearances of nature.  It is this consciousness that 
underlies the scientific comprehension that nature is not free, that we must attain 
knowledge of it, and that we must use this knowledge for moral ends.  Kant shows 
that when reason transgresses its moral limits, together with the limits of logic and 
sense, it precipitates itself into contradictions.  He establishes the a priori limits of 
logic, possible experience (sense perception, nature), and moral reason to provide 
the criteria for detecting, diagnosing, and resolving the contradictions that emerge 
when we breach these limits and view the contradictions between our speech and 
our thought as reflecting an impassable contradiction between our thought and our 
existence.  This failure to distinguish between two completely incommensurable 
kinds of self-contradiction is common not merely in the tradition of metaphysics as 
a discipline of academic philosophy but also in our everyday lives.  
 To defend the above general thesis, I began by first establishing that ancient 
teleology cannot overcome the necessary contradiction of its beginning.  In 
Chapter 2, “Ancient Greek Metaphysics: the End in Itself in Plato and Aristotle,” I 
explored the fundamental structure of thought and existence as presented by Plato 
and Aristotle, the two most systematic, comprehensive, and influential expositors of 
ancient Greek metaphysics, and showed that, while they observe that both they 
and their opponents perpetually fall into contradiction, they are not able to resolve 
the contradictions that they observe.  The reason for this is that both philosophers 
think within an ontological framework in which all things divide into dependent 
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contradictories.  For Plato and Aristotle, opposites appear to come from opposites 
in the world that is relative to the observer; in reality, however, opposites cannot 
admit of opposites.  The unchanging essence of appearances cannot appear 
(appearances cannot express their essence) or else the essence of appearances 
would be an appearance and appearances would be without an essence and could 
not exist. 
 The ontological opposition between thought and existence that we find in 
Plato and Aristotle necessitates that consciousness is dependent on formal logic, 
which is not concerned with appearances, to account for appearances that are the 
sole objects of thought.  Hence, Aristotle points out, the law of contradiction 
(together with the laws of identity and the excluded middle) is the basis of all 
demonstration: what is cannot not be what it is (A=A); it cannot express 
contradictory predicates (A cannot be not-A); and it must be one of two 
contradictories (either A or not-A) because contradictories admit of no 
intermediate.  It is on the basis of these principles that human beings seek the 
reason for their seeking in ignorance of what this reason is, a seeking that confirms 
the opposition between, and identity of, thought and existence.  Thus, thought 
relies on logic because it violates it, i.e., it lives in the excluded middle: its essence 
is to be (in itself) and not to be (as an appearance).  Because each side is known 
through the other that cannot be known through it, there are no means available for 
the mind to escape from contradiction.  Teleological logic, logic that is employed 
not as a canon but as an organon, is intrinsically contradictory.  For the mind that 
views itself as dependent on what it cannot know detects contradictions only from 
 207 
the standpoint that led to them, with the result that the consciousness of 
contradiction is itself a contradictory appearance.   
 Plato demonstrates in the dialogues of Socrates that the apex of human 
wisdom is the “knowledge” of being completely ignorant.  Socrates understands 
himself to be the wisest of men because he “knows” that he knows nothing.  He 
teaches that he teaches nothing and he learns that he learns nothing.  His 
dialogues are not dialogues in the modern sense of the word; there is no moral 
relationship, and thus no violation of any moral relationship, between interlocutors.  
Rather, adversaries battle one another in the agon of rhetoric, where sense and 
logic are used as instruments of war and where, therefore, opposite conclusions 
come from opposite conclusions without end.  Socrates does not know what he 
seeks; what, then, does he seek?  What does it mean to seek an end that violates 
the law of contradiction on the basis of appearances, which also violate the law of 
contradiction, and to do so on the basis of the law of contradiction, which is 
inviolable?  Whether one argues through appearances (imagination, opinion, or 
thought) to account for the end (which cannot be imag[in]ed, opined, or thought) or 
through logical analysis of the end to account for appearances, the standpoint from 
which one argues inexorably contradicts that for which one wants to account.  The 
defeated party in the contest is the individual who asserts that he has knowledge.  
Because the object of desire cannot be possessed (for what is possessed cannot 
be desired), human beings are dependent on being contradicted in their desire to 
escape from contradiction.  
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 Aristotle recognizes that there are fundamental contradictions in Plato’s 
metaphysics.  However, like Plato, he does not know the end of these 
contradictions.  For they are deduced from the immortal, necessary, ontological 
given of natural teleology.  It is the nature of a man, Aristotle maintains, to desire, 
to aim at, knowledge, so that he can reach the actual end of the world of 
potentiality, becoming, non-being … .  The first and final cause of every action, 
choice, inquiry, and movement is the divine end in itself – the complete and self-
sufficient subject and object of thought that moves without being moved.  “Ends” 
that are a part of the process of becoming can be a subject of choice and 
deliberation, but the final end of deliberation cannot itself be a subject of choice or 
deliberation.  For deliberation is reasoning with a view to the end and choice is for 
the sake of the end, an end that, because it is in itself, is the proper object of wish.  
Since the reason for the things that are done consists in that for the sake of which 
they are done, the end is sought, i.e., it produces motion, because human beings 
love (lack) it.  Love of the end consists in the opposition between the seeker and 
his end.  It is this opposition that drives and sustains the unending contradictory 
search for knowledge.  
 The notion of aiming at an end in itself that we cannot attain is alien for us in 
the modern world, i.e., from the standpoint of freedom.  For an object that we 
cannot think cannot be an object for us at all.  According to Plato and Aristotle, 
however, human beings must lack the reason for their action if they are not to be 
aimless.  If a man does not love the end, if he does not seek knowledge, we are 
told that his life is purposeless and in vain.  Since he cannot attain knowledge 
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through the appearances of thought, the starting-point and compass of 
demonstration is the principle of contradiction, a principle that one must 
acknowledge is indemonstrable if one is to avoid calling for an infinite regress of 
explanations.  Since the ground of explanation can have no explanation, or else it 
would not be possible to explain anything, all convictions can be overthrown.  Once 
more we see that, in order to avoid contradiction, it is necessary to end in 
contradiction, i.e., to lead to conclusions that are consistent with the ontological 
contradiction within which one begins but which cannot be thought precisely 
because it is what thought is in itself.  Thus, it is impossible to escape from 
necessary contradiction, and the reason for this is that no one can know what this 
reason is.  Human reason is indistinguishable from the employment of the law of 
contradiction to demonstrate that, because appearance and existence are 
irreconcilable opposites, the appearances of thought have no valid currency.   
 Having shown that the structure of teleological thought and existence as 
developed in the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle is an ontological contradiction, 
I argued in Chapter 3, “Why Biblical Metaphysics is Not Teleological: an 
Examination of Core Biblical Ideas,” that it is in biblical thought that we find the 
basis of modern existence: the consciousness that human beings are, and must be 
respected as, ends in themselves.  What it means to love God with all your heart, 
mind, and soul is to love your neighbor (the stranger) as yourself and so to treat 
everyone, friend or enemy, as you would want her to treat you, i.e., as an end and 
not as a means.  This is what we learn in the Books of the Prophets (Isaiah, 
Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Amos, Hosea, and others): knowledge and worship of God are 
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expressed through moral practice, i.e., helping the poor, the needy, the oppressed, 
the weak, the disadvantaged, and the marginalized.  It is on the basis of the 
necessary connection between love of God and love of neighbor that is explicated 
in Law and the Prophets that Jesus and Paul interpret the fundamental teaching of 
the scriptures as the golden rule.  The Word of God is not up in heaven or beyond 
the sea, but written on the human heart: it is what Kant calls a synthetic a priori 
moral law of rational (free) consciousness.  
 Since the Bible upholds the golden rule as the highest standard of truth, 
interpretation, thought, and existence, it follows that the Bible is to be read from 
this principle.  This involves extracting from the text the insight that it contains – no 
more and no less – and meeting the text halfway in order to allow it the opportunity 
to justify the faith that we have put into it, a hermeneutical approach that involves 
charity but also the resolve to reprove the text where necessary so that we will not 
share in its guilt (perversions, injustice, idolatry).  To interpret the Bible from itself 
alone, i.e., as a "thing in itself” and not merely as an appearance, is to see that, 
although the biblical narratives might at first glance appear similar to pagan myths 
and may, indeed, have in part been stolen from there (quite consistent with the 
eighth commandment), the constellation of values that surrounds and envelops the 
biblical narratives simply does not exist in pagan thought.  Doubtless it is because 
the biblical authors do not defend their teaching on the basis of pagan notions of 
nature, human being, and the divine but, in fact, condemn these notions, that they 
do not cite any sources that are authoritative in the Near Eastern and Greco-
Roman traditions in order to give authority to their own position.  The Bible refers 
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only to itself because it has to; it has no other source upon which to call to explain 
and defend its teaching. 
 The status to which the golden rule (or the principle of love) is raised in the 
Old and New Testaments demonstrates that the biblical people are self-conscious 
of the fundamental differences between good and evil.  It also demonstrates self-
consciousness of the fundamental differences between spirit and nature and of the 
connection between one’s power to choose and one’s moral obligation to be 
accountable for one’s choices.  The ideas of sin and repentance presuppose this 
special kind of self-consciousness; there is no sin or repentance where evil reflects 
ignorance of the good and where good and evil are appearances that are identical 
with, and opposed to, each other.  Whereas in Greek teleology everyone can 
contradict everyone, no one can escape contradiction, and violence is an essential 
feature of life (in both word and deed), in biblical consciousness evil is chosen with 
full knowledge of the good in itself and is always at one and the same time injustice 
to God, to others, and to oneself.  Sin points to the infinite gap that divides us from 
ourselves such that we are both lesser and greater than ourselves, too small and 
too large to contain ourselves.  (This infinite gap is what Kant calls “immortality.”)  It 
is precisely the sinner, i.e., every free person, who is called upon to become 
perfect through repentance, i.e., through authentic moral transformation.  Such 
transformation is morally necessary because every person is wholly accountable 
for her choices.  The children’s teeth are not set on edge because the father has 
eaten sour grapes (Ez. 18.1-3). 
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 I next considered the biblical idea of creation and examined what it means 
for the two biblical creation narratives with which Genesis opens to contradict one 
another explicitly at a literal level.  I argued that the contradictions guide us to 
approach the creation stories with a winnowing fork so that we can gather the 
wheat in the granary and burn the chaff in unquenchable fire.  When we do this, we 
are able to see that the reason that human beings are exalted as the image and 
likeness of God is that they comprehend their freedom as the cause of itself: the 
stars, planets, animals, birds, fish, vegetation, and things in nature in general are 
not gods, omens from the gods, or things in themselves.  Human beings are 
condemned to the blessing and “curse” of freedom until death.  It is we who are 
responsible for creating the world through the manner in which we think our 
existence and exist in our thought.  I defended the position that the creation 
account of the Gospel of John is consistent with this interpretation.  For we learn 
there that the light that overcame – that understood and illuminated – the darkness 
of pagan teleology is the Word (of) God: love, the covenant, the categorical 
imperative to treat oneself and others as ends and not means.  The creation 
narratives end with human beings barred forever from the dark and formless void 
of immortal contradiction because they know good and evil.  
 The God of the Bible expresses the developing comprehension among the 
biblical people of the truth that is involved in the consciousness that human beings 
are free.  The parameters for an adequate comprehension of God in biblical 
thought can be expressed in three related observations: (1) the ideas that human 
beings have of God tell us about how they view themselves.  The development of 
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these ideas of God expresses the development of the mind(s) in which these ideas 
are thought.  The fact that the biblical people conceive of God as a holy and perfect 
creator whose highest commandment is love shows that they are aware that 
holiness, perfection, and creation inhere in love.  Further, that human beings 
maintain that the commandment comes from God indicates that they are aware 
that to love one another is morally necessary.  (2) God is not a part of nature, the 
sum of nature, or opposed to nature.  These three notions of God are dominant in 
pagan myth but are comprehended from the biblical standpoint to be idols.  God’s 
presence is only in the embodied existence, the spirit and flesh, of human beings 
who are conscious of the moral law.  To become like God is to become more fully 
human (rational, faithful, and moral).  (3) Since the highest commandment of God 
is the golden rule, the God of the Bible is no less obligated to human beings than 
human beings are obligated to God, which demands that the relationship between 
human beings and God, like the relationship among human beings, is not, and 
must not be viewed as, hierarchical, i.e., as a relationship between means and 
ends.  The fact that the biblical people think of themselves as dependent on a God 
who is bound to love them as He wishes to be loved by them demonstrates that 
they are free from bondage to teleological notions of God.  Hence, while the 
worship of God expresses a critique of pagan teleology, it does so mainly through 
its critique of idolatry, which is comprehended from within the covenant with God 
(and human beings) to be the abrogation of the covenant with God (and human 
beings).  Strictly speaking, then, in light of the aforementioned observations, the 
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teleological notion of the divine falls outside the compass of biblical cognition (and 
vice-versa).  
 From the biblical standpoint, there is no higher end than eternal life in the 
kingdom of ends (heaven, the kingdom of God) that we must will into existence.  
Isaiah describes this world through the unnatural metaphor of natural enemies, i.e., 
predators and prey, living together in peace in a common space and time.  This 
metaphor, in which the first is the last and the last is the first, is inconceivable in 
pagan thought because it utterly contradicts the appearances of nature.  In the 
kingdom of ends I do not determine my relationship to others on the basis of 
appearances (lineage, status, wealth, private interest …); rather, I perceive myself 
in others and others in myself and others perceive themselves in me and me in 
themselves such that all people treat themselves and one another as ends and not 
as means, ends who belong to a common human family.  The universal fulfillment 
of the moral law translates into a compassionate and humane world that includes 
everyone and excludes no one because the rights that belong to one person are 
respected as belonging to all persons.  To describe the quality of this life as 
“eternal” signifies that it is not predicated on the time of the common order of 
nature regarded as a thing in itself but on the transcendentally ideal time that is 
appropriated by reason and rendered meaningful through continual moral effort (or 
good will).  Eternity is a special kind of existence in chronological time, an 
existence that is neither finitely complete (at its finite end) nor finitely incomplete 
(lacking its finite end) – nor both together, as is the case in pagan teleology.  
Rather, it is the fullness (fulfillment) of time that is realized through its creation by 
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human beings in their infinite transition from lesser to greater degrees of their 
moral perfection.  Eternal life is life conceived as repentance. 
 As the ideal of eternal life does not refer to a supernatural existence but is, 
rather, a call for a deeper immersion in human existence, I have argued that the 
biblical miracle narratives, of which the resurrection from the dead is the most 
burdened, do not imply an impossible natural occurrence.  (Kant shows that a 
single supernatural occurrence would render modern thought and existence 
impossible.)  Rather, they depict the power of faith in God, i.e., the power of love 
for, and belief in, oneself and others.  In Exodus the account of the miracles that 
Moses performs in front of the Pharaoh is preceded and succeeded by the 
teaching that the God of the Israelites is not at all like the pagan gods and that the 
Israelites are not like the Egyptians.  In this way, we are warned against 
interpreting the miracles of God as pagan magic because they are performed 
precisely to show that the Israelites are free from bondage in Egypt. 
The critique of (super)natural miracles through miracle narratives in the Old 
Testament carries over into the New Testament.  Jesus teaches that it is the devil 
and idolaters who seek proof of God in what is impossible rather than in what is 
necessary, i.e., love, the love that Paul teaches is the sole source of all miracles.  
Further, it is instructive that the miracles in the Gospels are almost always healing 
narratives: they do not make people blind, deaf, mute, paralyzed, and sick; they 
cure.  They do not kill, but resurrect.  It is because miracles rest on the power of 
love that Jesus is unable to do miracles where there is unbelief and that he 
teaches that any faithful person will do even greater things than he has done. 
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 In 1 Corinthians 15 Paul grounds the value of faith on the resurrection from 
the dead, a resurrection that he links to the resurrection of Christ, creation, the 
“second” (expelled) Adam, eternal life, and the kingdom of God.  In light of the fact 
that Paul regards love to be “greater” than faith only two chapters earlier, and that, 
in Romans, which is believed to be his last epistle (and so indicative of his most 
developed position), he defends love as sufficient for the fulfillment of the Law, it 
follows that the value of faith depends on the resurrection only if the idea of the 
resurrection expresses love.  The resurrected Christ is the Word, the call to repent, 
that cannot die; thus, Paul binds the resurrected Christ not to the first Adam but to 
the second Adam who, knowing good and evil, comprehends that he dies.  Paul 
writes that the resurrection is the change from the natural, perishable, living, 
earthly, mortal body – all of which describe living in the likeness of the “first” Adam 
of pagan Mesopotamia – to the spiritual, imperishable, life-giving, heavenly body 
that is “clothed” with the “immortality” of the second (expelled, fallen) Adam.  When 
Paul connects the resurrection through Christ as the second Adam to eternal life in 
the kingdom of God where death has been swallowed up victoriously, we see that 
life in Christ is described as the condition in which there is no death and that the 
condition in which there is no death is described as the condition in which God is 
all in all.  If life in Christ is expressed in the fall of Adam, then the condition in which 
there is no death cannot refer to the pagan notion of immortality.  Death must be a 
metaphor for the condition of the mind that does not live in Christ, i.e., that is 
hostile to God’s law.  Paul uses death in precisely this sense, most evidently in 
Romans, in a manner that is entirely consistent with key passages in the Old and 
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New Testaments.  Since the resurrection is a time in which there is no death and 
not a time in which there is no sin – the time in which there is no sin would be the 
time of the first Adam in Eden and not the time of the second Adam – eternal life in 
Christ, i.e., immortality, must express the ceaseless struggle on the part of the 
human being to overcome death as unrepented sin.  Once more, we see that 
eternal life in Christ is repentance: the commitment to truth as expressed in moral 
life.  The claim that faith is futile unless there is resurrection from the dead is, 
therefore, consistent with the teaching that faith without love is worth nothing at all. 
 Once I established that the consciousness that human beings are ends in 
themselves envelops the core ideas in the Bible and that these ideas are, 
therefore, inconceivable from the standpoint of ancient teleology, I was then able to 
show in Chapter 4, “Kant’s Critical Revolution: Human Beings are Ends in 
Themselves,” that Kant demonstrates in his critical philosophy that modern thought 
and existence are based on the first principles of the Bible and not on the first 
principles of ancient teleology.  Kant shows that the fundamental reason that 
uncritical (dogmatic) metaphysics has become contradictory is that its diverse 
traditions have been rooted, almost without exception, in the false assumption that 
analytic a priori logic and synthetic a posteriori experience are organons for 
reason.  No school has on these bases been able to establish a position that 
cannot be contradicted on the same grounds on which it is defended because the 
compass of thought is here completely unreliable.  Metaphysics cannot arrive at 
necessary existence unless it proceeds from necessary existence, i.e., the 
categorical imperative. 
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 Kant hints in the Preface of the second edition of the first Critique that his 
ultimate purpose in his critical project involves establishing the inseparable 
connection between modern reason and the Christian religion.  What he means 
when he writes that he must “deny” knowledge – of God, freedom, and immortality 
– in order to make room for “faith” is that it is necessary to show that God, freedom, 
and immortality cannot be known in terms of the categories through which nature 
must be conceptualized in order to demonstrate their necessary existence and 
necessary relationship in moral practice.  In the second Critique and the 
Groundwork, Kant focuses on demonstrating that reason itself cannot be known as 
an object of possible experience.  Experience has no categorical imperative.  It is 
in order to demonstrate that all attempts of reason to think on teleological grounds, 
i.e., outside of “Christian” faith as pure rational religion, are necessarily fruitless 
that Kant sets out to establish the a priori limits of logic, possible experience, and 
reason.  
 Kant demonstrates that Aristotelian logic, the analytic a priori, is finite.  It is a 
closed and complete system of the formal operations of thought.  It is able to 
demonstrate merely formal necessity; it cannot demonstrate existence.  Thus, its 
success depends on the fact that it has no content and can produce no insight.  
When one employs logic as an organon, one cannot judge the content of one’s 
judgments; one can only judge whether these judgments are consistent with prior 
hypothetical premises.  Whether these premises are true or false is not deducible 
through logic.  Thus, because logical possibility admits of contrary hypothetical 
premises, the conclusions at which one arrives will contradict all conclusions that 
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follow from contrary premises.  Deductive logic cannot resolve these 
contradictions.  From the standpoint of reason, if logic is not to annihilate itself, its 
nature must be clarified and its boundaries must be respected.    
 From the critical perspective, experience, unlike logic, involves existence but 
cannot reveal that what appears must be as it appears and not otherwise.  Kant 
shows that, while all our knowledge begins with experience, the concept of 
experience is not itself a product of experience and the concept of an empirical 
object is not itself an empirical object.  All objects of nature are created in and 
through their conceptualization.  It is because appearances are not things in 
themselves that things in themselves cannot be known as the objects of nature are 
known: the mind by which I know, the self-determining subject, cannot be known in 
the same fashion as that which I know, the determined object.  This critical-biblical 
insight, that human beings are not like other creatures in nature (i.e., means) but 
are the image of God, is the foundation of the theoretical sciences.  If we followed 
nature’s footsteps, we could never have knowledge.  It would not be possible to 
demonstrate causal necessity because the mind would be dependent upon nature, 
and there is nothing in nature that can produce the pure concept of necessity.  
 The fact that, on the one hand, logic demonstrates necessity but not 
existence and, on the other, experience involves existence but cannot establish 
necessity, does not show that logic and experience together are sufficient to 
demonstrate necessary existence, as we have seen Hume discover in his uncritical 
metaphysical critique of uncritical metaphysics.  It is because Hume maintains that 
logic and experience are the sole sources of knowledge that he professes to deny 
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necessary existence altogether, a conclusion that is not consistent with the 
necessary presuppositions of his own critique.  Kant demonstrates that reason can 
have meaningful conceptions of logic and experience only insofar as it 
comprehends that they are not their own sufficient grounds.  Otherwise, it 
hypostatizes consciousness and falls into transcendental illusion.  The negative, or 
problematizing, account of the grounds of logic and experience is the doctrine of 
transcendental idealism, which holds that objects of nature are appearances, i.e., 
our representations, and not things in themselves: things in themselves can never 
appear and what appearances are, in themselves, can never be known.  It is in 
practical philosophy that we learn that the thing in itself is unknowable (as an 
appearance) not because it is transcendent of the mind, as is the case for Plato 
and Aristotle, but because it is the self-conscious mind.  Thus, while the 
problematic relationship between things in themselves and appearances might 
seem at an immediate level to be teleological, in truth this problematic relationship 
constitutes an essential part of the demonstration that teleological metaphysics is 
fruitless.  When Kant uses Platonic language to divide appearances from things in 
themselves, he adopts the strategy of the biblical thinkers who appropriate 
teleological language in order to express ideas that are inconceivable in pagan 
teleology.  This allows us to see that the fount of the critical revolution is not 
teleological but biblical, which is what Kant himself argues. 
 Kant refers to the story of the expulsion in Genesis as the story of human 
freedom, the story that tells of the release of human beings from captivity to nature 
into the rational consciousness that all persons, regardless of their rank, have the 
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right to be respected as ends in themselves.  He sees that this insight set human 
beings on an entirely different course than hitherto and that nothing in history has 
been greater than this revolution of which, he grasps, transcendental idealism is a 
necessary consequence.  Space, time, and the categories of possible experience 
are not apart from us but inhere “in” us.  The reason is not that our experiences, or 
nature itself, is not objectively real; it is that nature is not its own ground but 
determined through the meaning and significance that we ascribe to it.  For me to 
be able to represent an experience as my own, i.e., to be able to think all my 
representations as mine, means that, because these representations belong to me, 
I must create them in choosing the manner in which I incorporate them into my 
existence.  This, again, is the fundamental point: the mind does not conform to 
objects; objects conform to the mind.  In space, the universe envelops me; in 
thought, I envelop it.154 
 The apparent dichotomy between the idea that all things are determined 
according to the principle of cause and effect and the idea that freedom is the 
cause both of itself and of all things is not a contradiction.  On the contrary, it is 
because appearances are not things in themselves that the free mind can 
conceptualize nature through synthetic a priori categories that no experience can 
justify.  The reason that Kant claims that we can have insight only into what we 
produce by our own design is that we cannot have knowledge of an objective world 
that we are not responsible for creating; such a world is “nothing.”  We know that 
appearances have objective validity because nature is not the cause of itself.  Put 
                                            
154 I take this formulation from thought #66 in Pascal’s Pensées (in Selections). 
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another way, it is because objects in nature may not be that the principle of 
causality is synthetic a priori.  In contrast with the dogmatic (skeptical) metaphysics 
of transcendental realism and empirical idealism, which cannot account either for 
freedom or for nature because, from their common standpoint, the thing in itself 
cannot be thought, transcendental idealism and empirical realism show that the 
limit of thought and existence is the necessary relationship between freedom and 
nature.  Transcendental idealism is, therefore, the absolute antithesis of ancient 
teleology and reveals all metaphysics in the likeness of ancient teleology to be the 
heteronomy of reason, i.e., the idolatrous reduction of ends to means (or elevation 
of means to ends). 
 The positive account of transcendental idealism is, to repeat, fulfilled only in 
practical philosophy, where it is explicated through the metaphysics of morals 
whose foundation is the categorical imperative.  The reason that I have no right to 
treat you (or myself) as a means is that we are free.  I must not will anything from 
any principle that I do not want to be universal.  If I treat you as an object, I do so in 
self-contradiction because I cannot even conceive of the world I pretend to will, i.e., 
in which everyone has the right to infringe upon my rights.  This self-contradiction 
expresses a bad will and not a will that is anchored in contradiction.  (We must 
never forget that it is only from the standpoint of freedom that these two kinds of 
contradiction are distinguishable from, and can be confused with, one another.)     
 It must not be supposed that, because articles of faith have meaning only 
within the province of reason, reason can dispense with faith.  Kant demonstrates 
the opposite: the categorical imperative, which is both biblical and rational, cannot 
 223 
exist outside of the necessary relationship between freedom and God, whose 
perfect agreement presupposes immortality.  From the critical standpoint, God and 
immortality have the same ontological status as freedom and are, therefore, no 
less necessary than freedom for thinking the moral law.  God is not a cosmological 
or teleological cause but the sufficient cause of the highest good that inheres in 
moral practice, i.e., the good will than which nothing greater can be conceived.  For 
Kant, no one can outdo a moral human being.  On the one hand, since the will is its 
own cause, there is nothing outside of one’s choice to do evil that can prevent one 
from being moral.  On the other hand, what it means to be truly moral is to be 
engaged in lifelong repentance; therefore, it is impossible for a moral person to 
acquit herself, permanently or absolutely, from the trial of being human.  Thus, 
while reason is inseparable from God, God is nevertheless an unattainable ideal of 
reason, and this is the case because human beings can never be equal to 
themselves in the likeness of finite objects.  The infinite distance between human 
beings and God is identical to the infinite distance between human beings and the 
fulfillment of the moral law.  It is the space of relationship – between human beings 
and themselves, between human beings and one another, and between human 
beings and God – that Kant calls “immortality.”  Immortality is the time that is 
necessary to fulfill the moral law and that prevents the reduction of both human 
beings and God to natural appearances.  It signifies that, because reason is the 
thing in itself, rational beings must strive for the good in itself from the position of 
being it.  
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 In demonstrating through the critique of pure reason that human beings are, 
in the beginning, ends in themselves, Kant shows that metaphysics is meaningful 
only when bound to the ethics of existence whose revelation is biblical metaphysics 
interpreted from itself alone.  Perhaps it is because the idea of freedom cannot be 
thought except as existing that its nature and origins have not been viewed as a 
problem in traditional metaphysics but have been mistaken for matters of fact.  In 
so doing, reason has confused things in themselves with appearances and has 
plunged itself into contradictions that it is not in a position either to ignore or to 
overcome insofar as it remains under the spell of its delusion.  I have undertaken in 
this dissertation to confront a teleological world that we cannot comprehend 
through its first principles except as incomprehensible in order to show that the 
ontological presuppositions and limits of thought and existence in modern life are 
moral, not teleological, and have their origin in biblical, not pagan, thought.  For 
when we grasp that the necessary relationship between thought and existence in 
the modern world is biblical and is incomprehensible from the viewpoint of pagan 
teleology, then we shall be in a stronger position to comprehend, to resolve, and so 
to avoid the inevitable contradictions that arise when we confound sense 
perception with experience, logic with reason, and means with ends.  The insight 
that reason is moral practice means that the origin of self-contradiction – the 
condition in which reason is in conflict with itself – is the conflation of Greek and 
biblical values.  While it is true, then, that what we learn from Greek texts when we 
read them from themselves alone is that we can learn nothing from them, it is hard 
to conceive of an insight that is more important.  For the inconceivability of the 
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ontological contradiction of pagan teleology is what defines the absolute limit of 
conceivability to be necessary existence, whose fulfillment, unknowable through 
logic and sense, is the end in itself.  
 226 
Bibliography 
 
 
Adar, Zvi.  Humanistic Values in the Bible.  Translated by Victor Tcherikover.  New 
 York: Jewish Reconstructionist Press, 1967.  Print. 
 
Aeschylus.  Oresteia.  Translated by Christopher Collard.  New York: Oxford 
 University Press, 2008.  Print. 
 
Amore, Roy C. and Ching, Julia.  “The Buddhist Tradition.”  In A Concise 
 Introduction to World Religions.  Edited by Willard G. Oxtoby and Alan F. 
 Segal.  Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007.  376-479.  Print.   
 
Anderson, Bernhard W.  “Covenant.”  In The Oxford Companion to the Bible.  
 Edited by Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan.  New York: Oxford 
 University Press, 1993.  138-139.  Print. 
 
Anselm of Canterbury.  “Anselm’s Apologetic.  In Reply to Gaunilon’s Answer in 
 Behalf of the Fool.”  In St. Anselm: Basic Writings.  Second Edition.  
 Translated by S. N. Deane.  La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 
 1996.  311-328.  Print.      
 
Anselm of Canterbury.  Monologium.  In St. Anselm: Basic Writings.  Second 
 Edition.  Translated by S. N. Deane.  La Salle: Open Court Publishing
 Company, 1996.  81-190.  Print. 
 
Anselm of Canterbury.  Proslogium.  In St. Anselm: Basic Writings.  Second 
 Edition.  Translated by S. N. Deane.  La Salle: Open Court Publishing 
 Company, 1996.  47-80.  Print.  
 
Aquinas, St. Thomas. The  Summa Theologica.  In Introduction to St. Thomas 
 Aquinas: The Summa Theologica, The Summa Contra Gentiles.  Edited by 
 Anton C. Pegis.  New York: Random House Inc., 1948.  Print.    
 
Aristotle.  Metaphysics.  Translated by W. D. Ross.  In The Complete Works of  
 Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation: Volume Two.  Edited by Jonathan 
 Barnes.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.  1552-1728.  Print. 
 
Aristotle.  Nicomachean Ethics.  Translated by W. D. Ross.  Revised by J. O. 
 Urmson.  In The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
 Translation: Volume Two.  Translated and edited by Jonathan Barnes. 
 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.  1729-1867.  Print. 
 
 227 
Aristotle.  On the Soul.  Translated by J. A. Smith.  In The Complete Works of 
 Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Volume One.  Edited by Jonathan 
 Barnes.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.  641-692.  Print. 
 
Aristotle.  Rhetoric.  Translated by W. Rhys Roberts.  In The Complete Works of  
 Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Volume Two.  Edited by Jonathan 
 Barnes.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.  2152-2269.  Print. 
 
Auerbach, Erich.  “Odysseus’ Scar.”  In Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in 
 Western Literature.  Translated by Willard R. Trask.  Princeton: Princeton 
 University Press, 1971.  3-23.  Print. 
 
Augustine of Hippo.  Confessions.  Translated by R. S. Pine-Coffin.  New York: 
 Penguin Putnam Inc., 1961.  Print.   
 
Barnes, Jonathan.  “Aristotle.”  In Founders of Thought.  Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 1991.  85-189.  Print. 
 
Beardslee, William A.  “Logos.”  In The Oxford Companion to the Bible.  Edited by 
 Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan.  New York: Oxford University 
 Press, 1993.  463-464.  Print. 
 
Beck, Lewis White.  A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. 
 Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1961.  Print. 
 
Benner, Jeff A.  “Hebrew Nouns.”  Ancient Hebrew Research Center.  Web.  27 
 December, 2013.  < http://www.ancient-hebrew.org/26_nouns.html>  
 
Berger, Peter.  Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective.  New York: 
 Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1963.  Print.   
 
Berkeley, George.  A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.  In 
 George Berkeley: Philosophical Works.  London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 
 1992.  63-127.  Print. 
 
Bible.  New International Version.  Grand Rapids: The Zondervan Corporation, 
 1984.  Print. 
 
Bible. The New Oxford Annotated Bible: Third Edition: New Revised Standard 
 Version with the Apocrypha.  Edited by Michael D. Coogan.  Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2001.  Print.   
 
Bible. The New Oxford Annotated Bible: Fourth Edition: New Revised Standard 
 Version with the Apocrypha.  Edited by Michael D. Coogan.  Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2010.  Print.    
 228 
Bloom, Harold.  The Book of J.  Translated by David Rosenberg.  New York: 
 Random House, Inc., 1990.  Print. 
 
Buber, Martin.  I and Thou.  Translated by Walter Kaufmann.  New York: Charles 
 Scribner’s Sons, 1970.  Print. 
   
Cahill, Thomas.  The Gifts of The Jews: How a Tribe of Desert Nomads Changed 
 the Way Everyone Thinks and Feels.  New York: Random House, Inc., 
 1999.  Print. 
 
Cassirer, Heinz.  Grace & Law: St. Paul, Kant, and the Hebrew Prophets.   Grand 
 Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1988.  Print. 
 
Code of Hammurabi.  Translated by L. W. King.  “Ancient History Sourcebook: 
 Code of Hammurabi, c. 1780 BCE.”  Internet History Sourcebooks Project.  
 Edited by Paul Halsall.  Fordham University.  Web.  25 December, 2013.  
 <http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/ancient/hamcode.asp>  
Cohen, David.  Law, Violence and Community in Classical Athens.  Cambridge:  
 Cambridge University Press, 1995.  Print. 
 
Cullmann, Oscar.  “Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead?  The 
 Witness of the New Testament.”  London: The Epworth Press, 1958.  Print. 
 
Dalley, Stephanie (editor).  Atrahasis.  In Myths from Mesopotamia.  Translated by 
 Stephanie Dalley.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.  9-38.  Print. 
 
Dalley, Stephanie (editor).  The Epic of Creation.  In Myths from Mesopotamia.  
 Translated by Stephanie Dalley.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.  
 233-277.  Print. 
 
Dalley, Stephanie (editor).  The Epic of Gilgamesh.  In Myths from Mesopotamia.  
 Translated by Stephanie Dalley.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.  
 50-135.  Print. 
 
Danes, Lee.  “Between Genealogy and Virgin Birth.”  In Derrida’s Bible (Reading a 
 Page of Scripture with a Little Help from Derrida).  Edited by Yvonne 
 Sherwood.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2004.  23-36.  Print. 
 
Descartes, René.  Discourse on the Method for Conducting One’s Reason Well 
 and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences.  Third Edition.  Translated by Donald 
 A. Cress.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998.  Print.   
 
Descartes, René.  Meditations on First Philosophy.  In The Philosophical Writings 
 of Descartes: Volume II.  Translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, 
 229 
 and Dugald Murdoch.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.  3-62.  
 Print. 
 
Dickinson, G. Lowes.  The Greek View of Life.  Ann Arbor: The University of 
 Michigan Press, 1958.  Print. 
 
Epicurus.  Epicurus: The Extant Remains.  Translated by Cyril Bailey.  Oxford: 
 Clarendon Press, 1926.  Print. 
 
Euripides.  The Bacchae.  Translated by William Arrowsmith.  In The Complete 
 Greek Tragedies: Euripides V.  Edited by David Grene and Richmond 
 Lattimore.  London: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1968.  154-222.  
 Print. 
 
Euripides.  Hippolytus.  Translated by David Grene.  In Greek Tragedies: Volume 
 1.  Second edition.  Edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore. 
 London: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1991.  236-295.  Print. 
 
Euripides.  Iphigenia in Aulis.  Translated by Charles R. Walker.  In The Complete 
 Greek Tragedies: Euripides IV.  Edited by David Grene and Richmond 
 Lattimore.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1958.  216-
 300.  Print. 
 
Euripides.  The Medea.  Translated by Rex Warner.  In The Complete Greek 
 Tragedies: Euripides I.  Edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore.  
 Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955.  58-108.  Print. 
 
Fisher, Mary Pat and Bailey, Lee W (editors).  “Buddhism.”  In An Anthology of 
 Living  Religions.  Second edition.  Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2008.  
 113-141.  Print. 
 
Fisher, Mary Pat and Bailey, Lee W (editors).  “Confucianism.”  In An Anthology of 
 Living Religions.  Second edition.  Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2008.  
 142-164.  Print. 
 
Fisher, Mary Pat and Bailey, Lee W (editors).  “Daoism.”  In An Anthology of 
 Living  Religions.  Second edition.  Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2008.  
 165-185.  Print. 
 
Fisher, Mary Pat and Bailey, Lee W (editors).  “Hinduism.”  In An Anthology of 
 Living  Religions.  Second edition.  Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2008.  
 62-93.  Print. 
 
 230 
Fredriksen, Paula.  “Repentance.”  In The Oxford Companion to the Bible.  Edited 
 by Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan.  New York: Oxford University 
 Press, 1993.  646-647.  Print. 
 
Fromm, Erich.  You Shall Be as Gods: A Radical Interpretation of the Old
 Testament and its Tradition.  New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1976.  
 Print. 
 
Gaunilon of Marmoutier.  “In Behalf of the Fool.  An Answer to the Argument of  
 Anselm in The Proslogium.”  In St. Anselm: Basic Writings.  Second Edition.  
 Translated by S. N. Deane.  La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 
 1996.  303-311.  Print.      
 
Hare, R. M.  “Plato.”  In Founders of Thought.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
 1991.  Print.   
 
Hauer, Christian E. and Young, William A.  An Introduction to the Bible: A Journey 
 into Three Worlds.  Seventh Edition.  Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 
 2008.  Print. 
 
Hegel, G. W. F.  The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of 
 Philosophical Sciences.  Translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and 
 H. S. Harris.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1991.  Print. 
 
Hegel, G. W. F. Philosophy of Mind: Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of 
 Philosophical Sciences.  Translated by William Wallace.  Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 1971.  Print. 
 
Heraclitus.  Fragments: A Text and Translation with a Commentary by T. M.  
 Robinson.  Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.  Print. 
 
Hesiod.  Theogony.  Translated by Stanley Lombardo.  In Works & Days, 
 Theogony.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993.  61-103.  
 Print. 
 
Hesiod.  Works & Days.  Translated by Stanley Lombardo.  In Works & Days,  
 Theogony.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993.  23-60.  
 Print. 
 
Homer.  The Iliad.  Translated by Richmond Lattimore.  Chicago: The University of 
 Chicago Press, 1961.  Print. 
 
Homer.  The Odyssey.  Translated by Robert Fitzgerald.  New York: Farrar, Straus 
 and Giroux, 1998.  Print. 
 
 231 
Hume, David.  An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.  Second edition.  
 Edited by Eric Steinberg.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993.  
 Print. 
 
Hume, David.  A Treatise of Human Nature.  Second edition.  Edited by L. A. 
 Selby- Bigge.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.  Print. 
 
James, William.  “The Will to Believe.”  The Gutenberg Project.  Web.  27 
 December, 2013.   
 <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/26659/26659-h/26659-h.htm> 
 
Kafka, Franz.  The Trial.  Translated by Willa and Edwin Muir.  Revised by E. M. 
 Butler.  New York: Schocken Books Inc., 1984.  Print. 
 
Kant, Immanuel.  “Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History.”  In Cambridge 
 Texts in the History of Political Thought: Kant: Political Writings.  Second 
 edition.  Translated  by H. B. Nisbet.  Edited by H. S. Reiss.  Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2010.  221-234.  Print. 
 
Kant, Immanuel.  The Critique of Practical Reason.  In The Cambridge Edition of 
 the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy.  Translated and  edited 
 by Mary J. Gregor.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  133-271.  
 Print. 
 
Kant, Immanuel.  Critique of Pure Reason.  In The Cambridge Edition of the Works 
 of Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason.  Translated and  edited by Paul 
 Guyer and Alan W. Wood.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
 Print. 
 
Kant, Immanuel.  Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals.  Translated by James 
 W. Ellington.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1981.  
 Print.     
 
Kant, Immanuel.  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.  In The Cambridge 
 Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy.  Translated 
 and edited by Mary J. Gregor.  New York: Cambridge University Press,  
 2009.  133-271.  Print. 
 
Kant, Immanuel.  Opus Postumum.  Translated by Eckart Förster and Michael 
 Rosen.  Edited by Eckart Förster.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1998.  Print. 
 
Kant, Immanuel.  Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.  In Cambridge 
 Texts in the History of Philosophy: Religion within the  Boundaries of Mere 
 232 
 Reason And Other Writings.  Edited by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni.  
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.  Print. 
 
Kierkegaard, Søren.  Fear and Trembling.  In Fear and Trembling / Repetition.  
 Translated and edited by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong.  
 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.  1-123.  Print.   
 
Kierkegaard, Søren.  Philosophical Fragments.  In Philosophical Fragments / 
 Johannes Climacus.  Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong.  
 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.  1-159.  Print. 
 
King, Jr., Martin Luther.  Selection from Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery 
 Circle.  In “An Experiment in Love.”  In A Testament of Hope: The 
 Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King Jr.  Edited by James 
 Melvin Washington.  New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991.  16-20. 
 Print.   
 
Kitto, H.D.F.  The Greeks.  Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1986.  Print. 
 
Kulak, Avron Paul.  “Origin and Critique: Reading Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of 
 Morals.”  Toronto: York University Dissertation, 1997.  Print.   
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “Discourse on Metaphysics (selections).”  In Gottfried 
 Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Writings.  Translated by Mary Morris and G. 
 H. R. Parkinson.  Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  London: J. M. Dent & Sons 
 Ltd., 1990.  18-47.  Print. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “An Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia.”  In 
 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Writings.  Translated by Mary 
 Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson.  Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  London: J. 
 M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1990.  5-9.  Print. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “Metaphysical Consequences of the Principle of 
 Reason.”  In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Writings.  Translated 
 by Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson.  Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  
 London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1990.  172-178.  Print. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “Monadology.”  In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: 
 Philosophical Writings.  Translated by Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson.  
 Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1990.  179-
 194.  Print. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “The Nature of Truth.”  In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: 
 Philosophical Writings.  Translated by Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson.  
 233 
 Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1990.  93-
 95.  Print. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “Necessary and Contingent Truths.”  In Gottfried 
 Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Writings.  Translated by Mary Morris and  
  G. H. R. Parkinson.  Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  London: J. M. Dent & 
 Sons Ltd., 1990.  96-105.  Print. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “New Essays on the Human Understanding.”  In 
 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Writings.  Translated by Mary 
 Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson.  Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  London: J. 
 M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1990.  148-171.  Print. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “Of an Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking.”  In 
 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Writings.  Translated by Mary 
 Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson.  Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  London: J. 
 M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1990.  1-4.  Print. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “Of Universal Synthesis and Analysis; or, of the Art of 
 Discovery and of Judgement.”  In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical 
 Writings.  Translated by Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson.  Edited by G. 
 H. R. Parkinson.  London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1990.  10-17.  Print 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “On Freedom.”  In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: 
 Philosophical Writings.  Translated by Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson.  
 Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1990.  106-
 111.  Print. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “On the Ultimate Origination of Things.”  In Gottfried 
 Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Writings.  Translated by Mary Morris and  
 G. H. R. Parkinson.  Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  London: J. M. Dent & 
 Sons Ltd., 1990.  136-144.  Print. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “Primary Truths.”  In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: 
 Philosophical Writings.  Translated by Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson.  
 Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1990.  87- 
 92.  Print. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “A Résumé of Metaphysics.”  In Gottfried Wilhelm 
 Leibniz: Philosophical Writings.  Translated by Mary Morris and G. H. R. 
 Parkinson.  Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson.  London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 
 1990.  145-147.  Print. 
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.  “A Specimen of Discoveries About Marvellous  Secrets 
 of Nature in General.”  In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Writings. 
 234 
 Translated by Mary  Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson.  Edited by G. H. R.
 Parkinson.  London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1990.  75-86.  Print. 
 
Livy.  “Rome Under the Kings.”  In The Early History of Rome: Books I-V of The 
 History of Rome from Its Foundations.  Translated by Aubrey De Sélincourt.  
 New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 2002.  29-105.  Print.   
 
Lucretius.  The Nature of Things.  Translated by Frank O. Copely.  New York: W. 
 W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1977.  Print.   
 
Mahaffy, John Pentland.  What Have the Greeks Done for Modern Civilization? 
 New York: G. P. Putnam, 1909.  Print. 
 
Michalson, Jr., Gordon E.  Kant and the Problem of God.  Oxford: Blackwell 
 Publishers Ltd., 1999.  Print. 
 
Mitchell, Lynette G. and Rhodes, P. J.  “Friends and Enemies in Athenian Politics.”  
 Greece & Rome.  Vol. 43, No. 1, April 1996: 11-30.  JStor.  Web.  10 
 January, 2014. 
 
Montaigne.  “Of Repentance.”  In Selections from the Essays: Montaigne. 
 Translated and edited by Donald M. Frame.  Arlington Heights: Harlan 
 Davidson, Inc., 1973.  75-91.  Print. 
 
Myers, Jim.  “Rediscovering the meanings of the teachings of the historical Jesus.”  
 Biblical Heritage Center.  Web.  27 December, 2013.   
 <http://biblicalheritage.org/DTB/0210_DTB_TESHUVAH.pdf> 
 
Narayanan, Vasudha.  “The Hindu Tradition.”  In A Concise Introduction to World 
 Religions.  Edited by Willard G. Oxtoby and Alan F. Segal.  Toronto: Oxford 
 University Press, 2007.  259-321.  Print. 
 
Navia, Luis E.  Socrates: A Life Examined.  Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2007. 
 Print. 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich.  The Gay Science.  Translated by Walter Kaufmann.  New 
 York: Random House, Inc., 1974.  Print. 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich.  Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  Translated by Walter Kaufmann.   
 In The Portable Nietzsche.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.  
 103-439.  Print. 
 
Ovid.  Metamorphoses.  Translated by Rolfe Humphries.  Bloomington: Indiana 
 University Press, 1983.  Print. 
 
 235 
Parmenides of Elea.  Fragments: A Text and Translation.  Translated by David  
 Gallop.  Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.  Print. 
 
Pascal, Blaise. The Thoughts (selections).  Translated by Arthur H. Beattie.  
 Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1965.  Print. 
 
Plato.  Apology.  Translated by G.M.A. Grube.  In Plato: Complete Works.  Edited 
 by John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997.  17-
 36.  Print. 
 
Plato.  Crito.  Translated by G. M. A. Grube.  In Plato: Complete Works.  Edited by 
 John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997.  37-48.  
 Print. 
 
Plato.  Euthyphro.  Translated by G. M. A. Grube.  In Plato: Complete Works. 
 Edited by John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
 1997.  1-16.  Print. 
 
Plato.  Meno.  Translated by G. M. A. Grube.  In Plato: Complete Works.  Edited by 
 John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997.  870-
 897.  Print. 
 
Plato.  Parmenides.  Translated by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan.  In Plato: 
 Complete Works.  Edited by John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis: Hackett 
 Publishing Company, 1997.  359-397.  Print. 
 
Plato.  Phaedo.  Translated by G. M. A. Grube.  In Plato: Complete Works.  Edited 
 by John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997.  49-
 100.  Print. 
 
Plato.  Republic.  Translated by G. M. A. Grube.  Revised by C.D.C. Reeve.  In 
 Plato: Complete Works.  Edited by John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis: Hackett 
 Publishing Company, 1997.  971-1223.  Print. 
 
Plato.  Symposium.  Translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff.  In 
 Plato: Complete Works.  Edited by John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis: Hackett 
 Publishing Company, 1997.  457-505.  Print. 
 
Plato.  Theaetetus.  Translated by M. J. Levett.  Revised by Myles F. Burnyeat.  In 
 Plato: Complete Works.  Edited by John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis: Hackett 
 Publishing Company, 1997.  157-234.  Print. 
 
Polka, Brayton.  The Dialectic of Biblical Critique: Interpretation and Existence.  
 New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986.  Print. 
 
 236 
Polka, Brayton.  Truth and Interpretation: An Essay in Thinking.  New York: St.  
 Martin’s Press, 1990.  Print. 
 
Powell, Barry B.  “Chapter 1: The Nature of Myth.”  In Classical Myth.  Second 
 edition.  Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1995.  1-18.  Print. 
 
Reardon, Bernard G.  Kant as Philosophical Theologian.  London: The Macmillan 
 Press Ltd., 1988.  Print.  
 
Reynolds, John Mark.  When Athens Met Jerusalem: An Introduction to Classical 
 and Christian Thought.  Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009.  Print. 
 
Richmond, W. Kenneth.  Socrates and the Western World: An Essay in the  
 Philosophy of Education.  London: Alvin Redman, 1954.  Print. 
 
Rig Vedas.  Holy Books.  Web.  27 January, 2013. 
 <http://www.holybooks.com/wp-content/uploads/RigVeda.pdf> 
 
Robinson, John A. T.  Honest to God.  London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963.  Print. 
 
Russell, Bertrand.  A History of Western Philosophy.  New York: Stratford Press, 
 Inc., 1960.  Print. 
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul.  Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on 
 Ontology.  Translated by Hazel E. Barnes.  New York: Washington Square 
 Press, 1992.  Print. 
 
Seddon, Frank.  “Kant on Faith.”  The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies.  Vol. 7, No. 1., 
 Fall of 2005: 189-202.  JStor.  Web.  15 January, 2014. 
 
Segal, Alan F.  “The Jewish Tradition.”  In A Concise Introduction to World 
 Religions.  Edited by Willard G. Oxtoby and Alan F. Segal.  Toronto: Oxford 
 University Press, 2007.  61-127.  Print. 
 
Seneca.  Thyestes.  In Four Tragedies and Octavia.  Translated by E. F. Waitling.  
 New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 1966.  Print. 
 
Seung, T. K.  Kant: A Guide for the Perplexed.  London: Continuum International 
 Publishing Group, 2007.  Print. 
 
Sophocles.  Antigone.  Translated by David Grene.  In Greek Tragedies: Volume 1.  
 Second edition.  Edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore.  London: 
 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1991.  180-232.  Print. 
 
 237 
Sophocles.  Oedipus at Colonus.  Translated by Peter Meineck and Paul 
 Woodruff.  In Sophocles: Theban Plays.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
 Company, Inc., 2003.  126-207.  Print. 
 
Sophocles.  Oedipus the King.  Translated by David Grene.  In Greek Tragedies:  
 Volume 1.  Second edition.  Edited by David Grene and Richmond 
 Lattimore.  London: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., 1991.  110-
 176.  Print. 
 
Spinoza, Baruch.  Ethics.  Translated by Samuel Shirley.  Indianapolis: Hackett 
 Publishing Company, 1992.  Print. 
 
Spinoza, Baruch.  Theological-Political Treatise.  Translated by Samuel Shirley.  
 Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998.  Print. 
 
Thornton, Bruce S.  Greek Ways: How the Greeks Created Western Civilization.   
 San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000.  Print. 
 
Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War.  Translated by Rex Warner. 
 London: Penguin Books, 1972.  Print. 
 
Velkley, Richard.  Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of  
 Kant’s Critical Philosophy.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989.  
 Print. 
 
Vernant, Jean-Pierre.  “Introduction.”  In The Greeks.  Translated by Charles 
 Lambert and Teresa Lavender Fagan.  Edited by Jean-Pierre Vernant.  
 Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.  Print. 
 
Virgil.  The Aeneid.  Translated by Robert Fitzgerald.  New York: Random House, 
 Inc., 1990.  Print. 
 
Wilson, Donna F.  Ransom, Revenge, and Heroic Identity in the Iliad.  Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2002.  Print.  
 
Zeno of Elea.  A Text, with Translation and Notes.  Translated by H. D. P. Lee.  
 Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1967.  Print.  
 
